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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents a significant step forward in automatic and semi-
automatic reasoning for reachability properties of rewriting logic specifica-
tions, a major research goal in the current state of the art. In particular, this
work develops deductive techniques for reasoning symbolically about speci-
fications with initial model semantics, including: (i) new constructor-based
notions for reachability analysis, (ii) a proof system for the task of proving
safety properties, and (iii) a novel method for symbolic reachability analysis
of rewrite theories with constrained built-ins. These three new techniques
are not just theoretical developments: each of them has been implemented
in freely available tools for the automated reasoning presented in this the-
sis and are validated through case studies. These case studies include: (i)
a reliable communication protocol, (ii) a secure-by-design browser system,
and (iii) a NASA language for robotic machines. One main characteristic of
the methods developed in this dissertation is that they are suitable for wide
classes of rewrite theories and are highly generic, so that they can be used
over many different instance languages and application domains.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Although this work expands many different areas, all of it relates to verifying
the model theoretic satisfaction relation
TR |= ϕ,
where TR is a transition system of some sort and ϕ is a reachability property.
The transition system can describe the behavior of a communication proto-
col, the interactive session of a user with a web browser, or the simulation of
a robotic machine. Then, the reachability property may refer to the fact that
the communication protocol achieves reliable communication across a lossy
channel and never deadlocks, or that the security policy in the web browser
(protecting the user from malicious attacks) cannot be compromised even
under the presence of such an attack, or that the robotic machine does not
‘freeze’ during a mission due to an unforeseen change of temperature in the
environment. Actually, some of these scenarios are part of the case studies
contained in this dissertation. But before entering into particular examples,
let us look at TR and ϕ from a formal and general perspective.
Computer systems have become more powerful, and many different appli-
cations and services have grown to depend on them. This includes essential
safety-critical systems such as communication networks and cyber-physical
systems. In the end, these systems depend on the correct operation of com-
puter hardware and the software controlling it. However, the software has
become extraordinarily complex in order to deal with the diverse require-
ments of these different applications. Handling this development complexity
while ensuring that the system satisfies all of its property requirements has
become one of the greatest challenges in software development.
Fundamental to any system development and validation is a clear and
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precise semantics that can be given to the meaning of both programs and
properties. One prominent logical and semantic framework to doing this
is rewriting logic [70], where a specification R has both a deduction-based
operational semantics and an initial model semantics TR. In this approach,
programs are specified axiomatically by means of rewrite rules l → r, and
a state of a program is represented by a term t. Programs are executed by
replacing instances of l appearing in t with the corresponding instance r, for
each rule l → r, meaning that t transitions to another state. Operational
properties ϕ of a program R can then be expressed through modal logics
such as various temporal logics, or in standard mathematical logic such as
first-order logic.
A major research goal in the current state of the art and advanced in this
thesis is to develop deductive techniques for reasoning symbolically about
specifications with initial model semantics:
Deductive and symbolic verification methods for rewrite theo-
ries, including narrowing-based methods, their combination with
SMT solving, deductive temporal verification, and inductive proof
methods ... New proof techniques, new algorithms, and new tool
implementations are needed to make all this happen. The great
advantage of developing them for suitable classes of rewrite the-
ories is that they will be highly generic, so that they can be
amortized over many different instance languages and applica-
tion domains.
Jose´ Meseguer
On some future research directions
20 Years of Rewriting Logic [72].
Another important motivation for the deductive approach is that algo-
rithmic methods such as model checking, although very-widely used, are
not sufficient for all verification purposes. This is clear from the fact that
satisfaction of properties is in general undecidable, from the infinite-state
nature of many systems and, even when a system is finite-state for each
initial state, from the fact that in general there may be an infinite number
of initial states.
However, as the applications of rewriting logic have grown, it has been
quite useful to add advanced features to the specification language such as
reasoning modulo fundamental structural properties such as associativity
and commutativity. Of course, these extra features can allow complex sys-
tems to be specified in a significantly simpler and more elegant way, but
they poses a major challenge for reasoning about specifications. Both auto-
mated reasoning techniques and tools have to be built, or be extended, to
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handle these more expressive features. A major point of this dissertation is
to answer this challenge.
In particular, this work presents a significant step forward in automatic
and semi-automatic reasoning for reachability properties of rewriting logic
specifications as follows:
1. New constructor-based notions for reachability analysis are developed
in Chapter 3.
2. A relatively complete proof system for the task of proving safety prop-
erties of rewrite theories is presented in Chapter 4.
3. A novel method for symbolic reachability analysis of rewrite theories
with constrained built-ins is introduced in Chapter 7.
These three new techniques are not just theoretical developments: each
of them has been implemented in freely available tools for the automated
reasoning presented in this thesis and are validated through case studies.
Specifically, this thesis presents the following case studies:
1. A reliable communication protocol in Chapter 5.
2. A secure-by-design browser system in Chapter 6.
3. A NASA language for robotic machines in Chapter 9.
Diagram 1.1 depicts the different topics in this dissertation and their log-
ical connections. The diagram breaks the topics covered into theoretical
results, tools, and case studies. The diagram also suggests a reading order
and a conceptual division among the three main techniques for deductive
and symbolic reasoning about reachability properties developed in this dis-
sertation:
1. Constructor-based reachability analysis and deadlock freedom.
2. A deductive approach for proving safety properties.
3. Symbolic reachability analysis for theories with constrained built-ins.
1.1 Summary of Chapters and Contributions
This dissertation contributes to several ongoing research efforts within the
areas of formal methods, algebraic specifications, deductive analysis, theo-
rem proving, and symbolic reachability analysis.
3
Theoretical results
Constructor-based
reachability analysis and
deadlock freedom
Reachability analysis for
rewrite theories with
constrained built-ins
Inference system for
proving safety properties
Tools
New decision procedures
in Maude's SCC
Maude's
Invariant Analyzer Tool
(InvA)
The Alternating Bit
Protocol (ABP)
Symbolic rewriting logic
semantics of PLEXIL
Illinois Browser
Operatin System (IBOS)
Case studies
Figure 1.1: Relationship between contributions.
Chapter 3. A new notion of constructor for rewrite theories that general-
izes the usual notion of constructor for equational specifications in the
algebraic method. This notion turns out to be intimately related with
the notion of deadlock freedom of a transition state system. It also
makes possible constructor-based inductive techniques for reachability
analysis. Decision procedures in the form of Propositional Tree Au-
tomata are exhibited for checking deadlock freedom and other notions,
all implemented as extension of the Maude Sufficient Completeness
Checker. The method of constructor-based inductive proof of reach-
ability properties is summarized and illustrated with examples. This
chapter is based on joint work with J. Meseguer [87, 86].
Chapter 4. A methodology and a proof system for proving safety proper-
ties of rewrite theories. The inference system is specialized to ground
stability and ground invariance, and has rules for the application of
strengthening techniques. The inference system has been implemented
in the Maude Invariant Analyzer Tool (InvA), which offers great degree
of automation for discharging proof obligations. This chapter is based
on joint work with J. Meseguer [89, 88].
Chapter 5. The Alternating Bit Protocol (ABP), a well-established bench-
mark in the area of mechanical reasoning for concurrent systems, is
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mechanically proved correct with help of the methods of Chapter 4
and the InvA implementation. This chapter is based on joint work
with J. Meseguer
Chapter 6. The Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS), a state-of-the-
art browsing system designed with the idea of security in mind, is
analyzed for safety properties with help of the InvA tool. It is proved
automatically that the web browser satisfies some security invariants
of interest by discharging thousands of proof obligations. The case
study served also as a stress test for InvA, given the large size of this
specification. Some areas that have room for improvement in the InvA
are identified and left for future work. This chapter is based on joint
work with J. Meseguer.
Chapter 7. A sound and complete approach for analyzing rewrite theories
with constrained built-in terms is presented. The main feature of this
symbolic method is that, with the help of SMT solving techniques, it
can be based on matching instead than on unification. This approach
is specially suitable for symbolically analyzing reachability properties
of rewrite theories modulo decision procedures such as those supported
by SMT solving. This chapter is based on joint work with C. Mun˜oz.
Chapter 8. A rewriting logic semantics of NASA’s Plan Execution Inter-
change Language (PLEXIL), a benchmark for the official interpreter
of the language. PLEXIL was designed by NASA to meet the require-
ments of flexible, efficient, and reliable plan execution in space mission
operations. This chapter is based on joint work with H. Cadavid, G.
Dowek, C. Mun˜oz, and R. Siminiceanu [31, 91, 84, 90].
Chapter 9. An implementation of the symbolic techniques introduced in
Chapter 7 for the symbolic analysis of PLEXIL plans, thus comple-
menting the more limited kinds of reachability and model checking
analysis possible using the semantics for ground plans in Chapter 8.
The non-determinism for the PLEXIL language is modeled by sym-
bolic variables that are left unspecified or are partially specified with
Boolean constraints. This chapter is based on joint work with C.
Mun˜oz.
Chapter 10. Concluding remarks and opened research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
This thesis uses standard notation and terminology about terms, term alge-
bras, and order-sorted equational theories as employed, for example, by [5]
and [46].
2.1 Order-Sorted Equational and Rewrite Theories
An order-sorted signature Σ is a tuple Σ = (S,≤, F ) with a finite poset of
sorts (S,≤) and set of function symbols F . The binary relation ≡≤ denotes
the equivalence relation generated by ≤ on S and its point-wise extension
to strings in S∗. The function symbols in F can be subsort-overloaded and
satisfy the condition that, for (w, s), (w′, s′) ∈ S∗ × S, if f ∈ Fw,s ∩ Fw′,s′ ,
then w ≡≤ w′ implies s ≡≤ s′. A top sort in Σ is a sort s ∈ S such that
if s′ ∈ S and s ≡≤ s′, then s′ ≤ s. For any sort s ∈ S, the expression
[s] denotes the connected component of s, that is, [s] = [s]≡≤ , called the
kind of the connected component. A signature Σ can be kind-completed by
adding to it: (i) a new top sort [s] above all sorts s ∈ S, and (ii) a new
subsort-overloaded f : [s1] · · · [sn] −→ [s] for each f : s1 · · · sn −→ s in Σ.
The collection of variables X is an S-indexed family X = {Xs}s∈S of
disjoint variable sets with each Xs countably infinite. The set of terms of
sort s is denoted TΣ(X)s and the set of ground terms of sort s is denoted
TΣ,s. The expressions TΣ(X) and TΣ denote the corresponding order-sorted
Σ-term algebras. It is assumed that all order-sorted signatures are preregu-
lar [46], i.e., each Σ-term has a least sort ls(t) ∈ S such that t ∈ TΣ(X)ls(t).
A term is called linear if no variable occurs in it twice. The set of variables
of a term t is written vars(t) and is extended to sets of terms in the natural
way.
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A position in a term is denoted by strings of natural numbers, indicating
the sequences of branches from the root to each subterm. The expression
pos(t) denotes the collection of positions of t ∈ TΣ(X). Given a position
pi ∈ pos(t), the expressions tpi and pi(t) denote, respectively, the subterm
of t occurring at position pi, and the topmost operator in tpi. For , the
empty position, t denotes the whole term t. Given a set C of function
symbols, posC(t) denotes the set of positions of the subterms of t whose root
symbol is in C, that is, posC(t) = {pi ∈ pos(t) |pi(t) ∈ C}. By definition,
posΣ(t) = posF (t), for all t ∈ TΣ(X).
A substitution is an S-indexed mapping θ : X −→ TΣ(X) that maps
variables of sort s to terms of sort s and is different from the identity for
a finite subset of X. The identity substitution is denoted by id and the
expression θ|Y denotes the restriction of a substitution θ to a set of variables
Y ⊆ X. The expression ran(θ) denotes the set of variables introduced by
θ. Substitutions extend homomorphically to terms in the natural way. A
substitution θ is called ground if and only if ran(θ) = ∅. The application
of a substitution θ to a term t is denoted by tθ and the composition of
two substitutions θ1 and θ2 is denoted by θ1θ2. A context C is a λ-term
of the form C = λx1, . . . , xn.c with c ∈ TΣ(X) and {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ vars(c).
A context C can be viewed as a n-ary function C(t1, . . . , tn) = cθ, where
θ(xi) = ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and θ(x) = id(x) otherwise. Given a sort s ∈ S, a
context C = λx1, . . . , xn.c is called an s-context if and only if {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆
Xs for s ∈ S.
2.1.1 Equational Theories and Initial Algebras
A Σ-equation is an unoriented pair t = u with t ∈ TΣ(X)st , u ∈ TΣ(X)su ,
and st ≡≤ su. A conditional Σ-equation is a triple t = u if γ, with t = u a Σ-
equation and γ a finite conjunction of Σ-equations; it is called unconditional
if γ is the empty conjunction. An equational theory is a tuple (Σ, E), with Σ
an order-sorted signature and E a finite collection of (possibly conditional)
Σ-equations. Throughout this thesis, it is assumed that TΣ,s 6= ∅ for each
s ∈ S, because this affords a simpler deduction system. An equational
theory E = (Σ, E) induces the congruence relation =E on TΣ(X) defined for
t, u ∈ TΣ(X) by t =E u if and only if E ` t = u by the deduction rules
for order-sorted equational logic in [71], if and only if, [71] t = u is valid
in all models of E . The E-subsumption ordering E is the binary relation
on TΣ(X) defined for any t, u ∈ TΣ(X) by t E u if and only if there is a
substitution θ : X −→ TΣ(X) such that t =E uθ. A set of equations E is
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called collapse-free for a sort s ∈ S if and only if for any x ∈ Xs E does not
contain any equations of the form either t = x if γ or x = t if γ.
The expressions TE(X) and TE (or similarly TΣ/E(X) and TΣ/E) denote
the quotient algebras induced by =E on the term algebras TΣ(X) and TΣ,
respectively. The algebra TΣ/E is called the initial algebra of (Σ, E). A
theory inclusion (Σ, E) ⊆ (Σ′, E′), with Σ ⊆ Σ′ and E ⊆ E′, is called
protecting if the unique Σ-homomorphism TΣ/E −→ TΣ′/E′ |Σ to the Σ-reduct
of the initial algebra TΣ′/E′ is a Σ-isomorphism, written TΣ/E ' TΣ′/E′ |Σ.
A set of equations E is called regular if and only if vars(t) = vars(u) for
any equation t = u if γ ∈ E. For t, u ∈ TΣ(X), the expression GUE(t = u)
denotes the set of ground E-unifiers of t = u, i.e., GUE(t = u) = {σ : X −→
TΣ | tσ =E uσ}.
2.1.2 Rewrite Theories and Initial Reachability Models
A Σ-sequent is an oriented pair t→ u with t ∈ TΣ(X)st , u ∈ TΣ(X)su , and
st ≡≤ su. A conditional Σ-rule is a triple t→ u if γ, with t→ u Σ-sequent
satisfying vars(u) ⊆ vars(t) and γ a finite conjunction of Σ-equations; it is
called unconditional if γ is the empty conjunction. A rewrite theory is a
tuple R = (Σ, E,R) with equational theory ER = (Σ, E) and a finite set
of Σ-rules R. A topmost rewrite theory is a rewrite theory R = (Σ, E,R),
such that each rule t → u if γ ∈ R is such that l, r ∈ TΣ(X)s for some
top sort s = [s] in Σ, l /∈ X, and no operator in Σ has s as argument sort.
A rewrite theory R = (Σ, E,R) induces the rewrite relation →R on TΣ(X)
defined for t, u ∈ TΣ(X) by t→R u if and only if a one-step rewrite proof of
R ` t → u can be obtained by the deduction rules for order-sorted rewrite
theories in [18], if and only if, [18] t → u is valid in all models of R. For
t, u ∈ TΣ(X), R ` t = u if and only if ER ` t = u.
The expression TR = (TΣ/E ,→∗R) denotes the initial reachability model
of R = (Σ, E,R) [18], with →∗R expressing the reflexive-transitive closure
of →R. A Σ-sequent t → u is an inductive consequence of R, written
R  t → u, if and only if R ` tσ → uσ for each ground substitution
σ : X −→ TΣ if and only if TR |= t→ u.
2.2 Admissible Modules in Maude
The Maude tool [23] is a high-performance implementation of rewriting logic.
It supports order-sorted equational specification in functional modules, cor-
8
responding to equational theories E , and order-sorted rewrite specification
in system modules, corresponding to full rewrite theories R. In functional
modules other functional modules can be included, sorts and subsorts can
be declared, and operator symbols can be defined, possibly with equational
attributes (called axioms). Sorts, subsorts, and conditional equations define
the computations that are possible. In system modules other functional and
system modules can be included, and the rewrite rules define the system
transitions that are possible.
2.2.1 Admissible Functional Modules
Reasonable executability requirements are needed to make a module admis-
sible (see [23], Sections 4.6 and 6.3). It is assumed that the set of Σ-equations
of an equational theory E can be decomposed into a disjoint union E∪B, with
B a collection of structural axioms (such as associativity, and/or commuta-
tivity, and/or identity) for which there exists a matching algorithm modulo
B producing a finite number of B-matching solutions, or failing otherwise.
It is also assumed that the equations E can be oriented into a set (of pos-
sibly conditional) sort-decreasing, operationally terminating, and confluent
conditional rewrite rules
−→
E modulo B. The set
−→
E is sort decreasing modulo
B if and only if for each t→ u if γ ∈ −→E and substitution θ, ls(tθ) ≥ ls(uθ)
if (Σ, B,
−→
E ) ` γθ. The set −→E is operationally terminating modulo B if and
only if there is no infinite well-formed proof tree in (Σ, B,
−→
E ) [32]. The set−→
E is confluent modulo B if and only if for all t, t1, t2 ∈ TΣ(X), if t→∗E/B t1
and t →∗E/B t2, then there exists u ∈ TΣ(X) such that t1 →∗E/B u and
t2 →∗E/B u. The term t ↓E/B∈ TΣ(X) denotes the E-canonical form of t
modulo B (or E/B-canonical form) so that t →∗E/B t ↓E/B and t ↓E/B is
→E/B-irreducible, i.e., it cannot be further reduced by →E/B. Under the
above assumptions t ↓E/B is unique up to B-equality. Then, Maude can ex-
ecute an admissible functional module by equational simplification modulo
the axioms, where the equations in E are used as rules from left to right
and Maude’s built-in matching for the axioms B leads for each term t to
its canonical form with a least sort. In particular, this yields an operational
semantics defined by the algebra of canonical forms CanΣ/E∪B, which un-
der the above admissibility assumptions, is isomorphic to the initial algebra
TΣ/E∪B. Equational simplification modulo axioms is executed by the reduce
command in Maude.
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2.2.2 Admissible System Modules
In order to be admissible, a system module corresponding to a rewrite theory
R = (Σ, E∪B,R) has to, in addition to its equational component being ad-
missible, satisfy the coherence requirement [34]. Coherence precisely means
that Maude can execute an admissible system module by adopting the strat-
egy of first simplifying a term t to its E/B-canonical form and then applying
a rule with R modulo B to achieve the effect of rewriting with R modulo
E ∪B. This is exactly the mathematical semantics of R. In particular, this
yields an operational semantics defined by the canonical reachability model
CanR isomorphic, under the above admissibility requirements, to the ini-
tial reachability model TR. Rewrites in a system module are performed
in Maude by the rewrite command. There is also a breadth-first search
command, and a built-in linear temporal logic (LTL) model checker to verify
safety and liveness properties.
2.3 Order-Sorted Equality Enrichments Modulo Axioms
The use of equality enrichments is pervasive throughout this thesis. This
section summarizes the main properties of equality enrichments; see [49, 48]
for more details about their properties and their effective implementation
for a wide class of order-sorted equational theories with free constructors
modulo axioms. Given an order-sorted signature Σ = (S,≤, F ) and an
order-sorted equational theory E = (Σ, E) with initial algebra TE , an equality
enrichment [73] of E is an equational theory E∼ that extends E by defining a
Boolean-valued equality function symbol ‘∼’ that coincides with ‘=’ in TE .
Definition 1. An equational theory E∼ = (Σ∼, E∼) is called an equality
enrichment of E = (Σ, E), with Σ∼ = (S∼,≤∼, F∼) and Σ = (S,≤, F ), if
and only if
• E∼ is a protecting extension of E;
• the poset of sorts of Σ∼ extends (S,≤) by adding a new sort Bool that
belongs to a new connected component, with constants > and ⊥ such
that TE∼,Bool = {[>], [⊥]}, with > 6=E∼ ⊥; and
• for each connected component in (S,≤) there is a top sort k ∈ S∼ and
a binary commutative operator ∼ : k k −→ Bool in Σ∼, such that
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the following equivalences hold for any ground terms t, u ∈ TΣ,k:
E ` t = u ⇐⇒ E∼ ` (t ∼ u) = >, (2.1)
E 6` t = u ⇐⇒ E∼ ` (t ∼ u) = ⊥. (2.2)
An equality enrichment E∼ of E is called Boolean if and only if it
contains all the function symbols and equations making the elements
of TE∼,Bool a two-element Boolean algebra.
The equality predicate ‘∼’ in E∼ is sound for inferring equalities and
inequalities in the initial algebra TE , even for terms with variables. The
precise meaning of this claim is given by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Equality Enrichment Properties). Let E∼ = (Σ∼, E∼) be
an equality enrichment of E = (Σ, E). If t, u ∈ TΣ(X), then the following
equivalences hold:
TE |= (∀X) t = u ⇐⇒ TE∼ |= (∀X) (t ∼ u) = >, (2.3)
TE |= (∃X) ¬(t = u) ⇐⇒ TE∼ |= (∃X) (t ∼ u) = ⊥, (2.4)
TE |= (∀X) ¬(t = u) ⇐⇒ TE∼ |= (∀X) (t ∼ u) = ⊥. (2.5)
By using an equality enrichment E∼ of E , the problem of reasoning in
TE about a universally quantified inequality ¬(t = u) (abbreviated t 6= u)
can be reduced to reasoning in TE∼ about the universally quantified equality
(t ∼ u) = ⊥. A considerably more general reduction, not just for inequalities
but for arbitrary quantifier-free first-order formulae, can be obtained with
Boolean equality enrichments.
Corollary 1. Let E∼ = (Σ∼, E∼) be a Boolean equality enrichment of E =
(Σ, E). Let ϕ = ϕ(t1 = u1, . . . , tn = un) be a quantifier-free Boolean formula
whose atoms are the Σ-equations ti = ui with variables in X, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and with Boolean connectives in {¬,∨,∧}. Then, the following equivalence
holds:
TE |= (∀X)ϕ ⇐⇒ TE∼ |= (∀X) ϕ̂(t1 ∼ u1, . . . , tn ∼ un) = >,
(2.6)
where ϕ̂(t1 ∼ u1, . . . , tn ∼ un) is the Σ∼-term of sort Bool obtained from ϕ
by replacing each occurrence of the logical connectives ¬, ∨, and ∧ by, re-
spectively, the function symbols ¬ , unionsq , and u in EBool , and each occurrence
of an atom ti = ui by the Bool term ti ∼ ui, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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In this thesis the Boolean theory EBool specified in [23, Subsection 9.1]
is used. The theory EBool has free constructors modulo BBool , it is sort-
decreasing, confluent, and operationally terminating modulo associativity-
commutativity axioms, and hence provides a Boolean decision procedure.
It has signature of free constructors ΩBool = {>,⊥}, set of defined symbols
ΣBool \ ΩBool = { ¬ , u , unionsq ,  , ⊃ }, and satisfies TEBool |= > 6= ⊥. The
choice of EBool is somewhat arbitrary: any equational theory implementing
an equational Boolean decision procedure should suffice for the purpose here
(for instance, see [85] for other equational Boolean decision procedures).
2.4 The Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS)
The Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS) [101] is a modern, security-
conscious web browser designed at the University of Illinois which could
be integrated into a secure operating system. The basic idea is to move
from the monolithic approach and modularize the different processes of the
browser. There is only one truly trusted process, the kernel. All other
process such as web page instances, network processes, storage, etc., are not
trusted. Security of all uncompromised components is desired, even when
there are some compromised components in the mix. For that reason, all
communication must go through the kernel, which will allow or disallow it
based on its specific policies. See Chapter 6 for more details.
2.5 NASA’s PLEXIL Language
The Plan Execution Interchange Language (PLEXIL) [39] is a language de-
veloped by NASA for representing plans for automation and a technology for
executing these plans on real or simulated systems. PLEXIL was designed
to meet the requirements of flexible, efficient and reliable plan execution
in space mission operations. It is compact, semantically clear, and deter-
ministic given the same sequence of events from the external world. At
the same time, the language is quite expressive and can represent branches,
loops, time- and event- driven activities, concurrent activities, sequences,
and temporal constraints. The core syntax of the language is simple and
uniform, making plan interpretation simple and efficient, while enabling the
application of validation and testing techniques. See chapters 8 and 9 for
more details.
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2.6 The CETA Library
CETA [52] is a library for reasoning about Boolean combinations of equa-
tional tree languages. It supports emptiness testing of tree languages defin-
able by a Boolean combination of regular tree automata over an equational
theory containing operators that are associative and/or commutative and
maybe have identity symbols. CETA is based on propositional tree automata
(PTA) [52] and offers algorithms and data structures for representing tree
automata, combining tree automata using Boolean operations, and testing
emptiness. The decision procedures for checking deadlock freedom of rewrite
theories in this thesis are based on PTA and have been implemented using
the CETA library. See Chapter 3 for more details.
2.7 The Maude ITP
The Maude ITP [24, 52] is an experimental interactive tool for proving
properties of the initial algebra TE of an order-sorted equational theory E
written in Maude. The ITP has been written entirely in Maude and it is in
fact an executable specification in Membership Equational Logic (MEL) [71],
an equational super-logic of order-sorted equational logic, of the formal in-
ference system that it implements. It supports different induction principles
for terms including structural and coverset induction. Some equational in-
ductive obligations in this thesis have been proved using the ITP tool. See
Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 for more details.
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CHAPTER 3
CONSTRUCTORS AND DEADLOCK FREEDOM
This chapter is concerned with the sufficient completeness and deadlock
freedom of rewrite theories, with automatic proof methods for checking these
properties, and with the closely related topic of constructor-based symbolic
reachability analysis.
Sufficient completeness has been thoroughly studied for equational speci-
fications, where function symbols are classified into constructors and defined
symbols. But what should sufficient completeness mean for a rewrite theory
R = (Σ, E,R) with equations E and non-equational rules R describing con-
current transitions in a system? Since a rewrite theory comprises deduction
with both equations E and rules R, this chapter argues that there are two
different notions of constructors for R and therefore two different notions
of sufficient completeness with quite different meanings:
• Equational constructors, or E-constructors, are specified by a subsig-
nature Ω ⊆ Σ, and then E-sufficient completeness is the usual require-
ment that for each sort s and each ground term t ∈ TΣ of that sort
there is a ground term u ∈ TΩ of sort s such that (Σ, E) ` t = u.
• Rewrite constructors, or R-constructors, are specified by a subsigna-
ture Υ ⊆ Σ, and then R-sufficient completeness is the different re-
quirement that for each sort s and each ground term t ∈ TΣ of that
sort there is a ground term v ∈ TΥ of sort s such that R ` t→ v.
Intuitively, E-sufficient completeness has the traditional meaning in which
function symbols in Σ \Ω are fully defined by means of the equations E, so
that any ground term can be proved equal by E to one where only operators
in Ω are used. But how should R-sufficient completeness be intuitively
understood?
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First of all, because of rewriting logic’s equality rule (see [18]), whenever
there is a proof of (Σ, E) ` t = u there is also a (zero-step) proof of R `
t → u. That is, since the states of R are E-equivalence classes of terms
[t]E , there is already a representative term u ∈ [t]E with u ∈ TΩ, so that
E-constructors are trivially R-constructors. Therefore, for R-constructors
to have any teeth, a more restrictive subsignature Υ ⊆ Ω is needed, so that
each ground Σ-term of a given sort reaches nontrivially a ground Υ-term of
the same sort. R-sufficient completeness then provides an algebraic notion
of deadlock freedom, that is, of proper termination. A concurrent system
design often has an intended set P of goal states that any computation
should ultimately reach. A system is then called deadlock-free outside P if
and only if all terminal system states belong to P . Therefore, R-sufficient
completeness implies that R is deadlock free outside TΥ.
It is well-known that E-constructors are essential for inductive equational
reasoning, i.e., reasoning about the theorems satisfied by the initial algebra
TΣ/E . This chapter argues that R-constructors (and also E-constructors)
play a similarly crucial role in reasoning about inductive reachability proper-
ties of the initial model TR of the rewrite theory R, which intuitively models
the states and concurrent computations of the system defined by R.
This chapter also investigates automatic sufficient completeness proof meth-
ods based on equational tree automata under appropriate left-linearity as-
sumptions, and it reports on their implementation in an extension of Maude’s
Sufficient Completeness Checker (SCC) [52]. The need for equational tree
automata, as opposed to just standard tree automata, comes from the fact
that the equations E in many rewrite theories R = (Σ, E,R) naturally de-
compose as a union E = E0 ∪ B, where B is a set of structural axioms
such as associativity, and/or commutativity, and/or identity for some op-
erators in Σ, and the equations E0 are (ground) sort-decreasing, confluent,
and operationally terminating modulo B.
One last contribution of this chapter is to generalize the notions of con-
structors, sufficient completeness, deadlock freedom, the equational tree au-
tomata methods of checking sufficient completeness and deadlock freedom,
and the role of R constructors (and E-constructors) in reasoning about
inductive reachability and joinability properties to the case of generalized
rewrite theories of the form R = (Σ, E,R, ν) (see [18]). The additional com-
ponent ν maps each operator f or n arguments to a subset ν(f) ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
of its frozen argument positions, so that rewriting with R under such posi-
tions is forbidden. Note that a standard rewrite theory R = (Σ, E,R) can
now be seen as the special case R = (Σ, E,R,⊥), where ⊥(f) = ∅ for each
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function symbol f . Such a frozenness map ν is very natural in various appli-
cations; therefore a more general theoretical treatment in this form is given.
This generalization achieves, for the sufficient completeness of rules R with
frozenness constraints ν, proof methods (and tool support in the extended
version of the Maude SCC presented here), which are similar to those devel-
oped in [52, 54] at the equational level for algebraic specifications where the
equations E are applied with a context-sensitive rewriting strategy map.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gathers preliminaries on
the more general case of generalized rewrite theories assumed in this sec-
tion. Section 3.2 gives the main definitions and theorems about sufficient
completeness and deadlock freedom. A class of generalized rewrite theo-
ries with simpler rewrite relation, and thus rendering the problem of finding
decision procedures for the properties of interest accessible in practice, are
characterized in Section 3.3. Section A.1 covers the tree automata founda-
tions of the automated checking of these properties for such theories in the
left-linear case and the extension of the Maude SCC tool supporting such
checking. Section 3.5 discusses the crucial relationship of constructors for
generalized rewrite theories to inductive reasoning for both ground reacha-
bility and ground joinability; the use of some of these inductive reachability
methods is illustrated with an example in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 discuses
related and future work. The proofs omitted in this chapter can be found
in Appendix A, including the mechanical proofs for the admissibility of the
Maude examples and ITP proof scripts for proving some inductive facts
about them.
3.1 Generalized Rewrite Theories
The development in this chapter assumes an order-sorted signature Σ =
(S,≤, F ), the existence of a subset K ⊆ S of sorts, one per connected
component of (S,≤), and that each operator f : s1 · · · sn −→ s is also
declared at the level of its top sorts f : k1 · · · kn −→ k. The expression FK
denotes the set of overloaded function symbols at the level of top sorts. A Σ-
mapping χ is a K∗×K-indexed family of function symbols assigning to each
f : k1 · · · kn −→ k ∈ FK a finite set χ(f) ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. The complement χ
of a Σ-mapping χ is the K∗×K-indexed family of function symbols defined
for each f : k1 · · · kn −→ k ∈ FK by χ(f) = {1, . . . , n}\χ(f). The empty Σ-
mapping ⊥ is defined by ⊥(f) = ∅, for any f ∈ FK , and the full Σ-mapping
> is defined by > = ⊥.
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An (unconditional) generalized rewrite theory is a tupleR = (Σ, E, µ,R, ν)
such that (Σ, E,R) is an order-sorted rewrite theory, with unconditional
equations E, unconditional rewrite rules R of the form l → r where l, r ∈
TΣ(X)k for some k ∈ K, µ is a Σ-mapping defining for each f ∈ FK the
positions µ(f) under which it is allowed to perform equational deduction
with the equations E, and ν is a Σ-mapping defining for each f ∈ FK the
positions ν(f) under which it is forbidden to perform rewriting deduction
with the rules R. The Σ-mappings µ and ν are called, respectively, the
evaluation strategy and the frozenness map of R. Given a term t ∈ TΣ(X),
the subterm tpi at position pi is called frozen if and only if there are two
positions pi1, pi2 and a natural number n such that pi = pi1.n.pi2 and n ∈
ν(pi1(t)). The expression posν(t) denotes the set of frozen positions of term
t under the frozenness map ν. The occurrence of tpi is called unfrozen if and
only if it is not frozen.
Similar to ordinary rewrite theories, reasonable executability requirements
are needed to make a generalized rewrite theory admissible (see Section 2.2.1).
It is assumed that the set of Σ-equations of a generalized rewrite theory can
be decomposed into a disjoint union E∪B, with B a collection of structural
axioms (such as associativity, and/or commutativity, and/or identity) for
which there exists a matching algorithm modulo B producing a finite num-
ber of B-matching solutions, or failing otherwise. It is also assumed that
the equations E can be oriented into a set of rewrite rules
−→
E inducing a
rewrite relation →E/B that conforms to the evaluation strategy µ and that
is ground sort-decreasing, operationally terminating, and confluent modulo
B. The set of rewrite rules R is assumed to induce a rewrite relation →R/B
that conforms to the frozenness map ν and is coherent with respect to→E/B.
Table 3.1 introduces an inference system, borrowed from [32], that defines
the operational semantics of the rewrite relations →E/B and →R/B induced
by a generalized rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪B,µ,R, ν).
3.2 Sufficient Completeness and Deadlock Freedom
This section proposes two different notions of constructors and sufficient
completeness for a subclass of order-sorted generalized rewrite theories, and
further relates these notions to deadlock freedom. In order to focus on the
relationship between rewrite constructors and the notion of deadlock free-
dom, this section considers order-sorted generalized rewrite theories with
full strategy map. This assumption helps, mainly, in avoiding involved defi-
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(R-Ref)
t→∗E/B u
t→∗R/B u
(R-Trans)
t→1R/B t′ t′ →∗R/B u
t→∗R/B u
(R-Cong)
ti →1R/B ui
f(t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tn)→1R/B f(t1, . . . , ui, . . . , tn)
where i /∈ ν(f)
(R-Subs)
t→∗E/B t′ rθ →∗E/B u
t→1R/B u
if t′ =B lθ
where l→ r ∈ R
(E-Ref)
.
t→∗E/B u
if t =A u
(E-Trans)
t→1E/B t′ t′ →∗E/B u
t→∗E/B u
(E-Cong)
ti →1E/B ui
f(t1, . . . , ui, . . . , tn)→1E/B f(t1, . . . , ui, . . . , tn)
where i ∈ µ(f)
(E-Subs)
.
t→1E/B rθ
if t =B lθ
where l = r ∈ E
Table 3.1: Operational semantics for a generalized rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪B,µ,R, ν).
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nitions that in the end do not contribute considerably to the understanding
of the main idea. On the other hand, Section 3.3 discusses the case in which
the theories can have richer equational strategy information.
This section assumes a generalized rewrite theory R = (Σ, E,>, R, ν), or
simply (Σ, E,R, ν), with order-sorted signature Σ = (S,≤, F ). The expres-
sion ER abbreviates the equational theory (Σ, E).
Definition 2 introduces the basic notion of constructor signature pair.
Definition 2. A constructor signature pair for R is a pair (Υ,Ω) of order-
sorted sub-signatures Υ = (S,≤, FΥ) ⊆ Ω = (S,≤, FΩ) ⊆ Σ.
• The S-sorted set TΩ = {TΩ,s}s∈S ⊆ TΣ is called the set of E-constructor
terms.
• The S-sorted set C ΥR = {C ΥR,s}s∈S ⊆ TΩ is called the set of R-con-
structor terms and is defined for any s ∈ S by:
t ∈ C ΥR,s ⇐⇒ t ∈ TΩ,s ∧ posν(t) ⊆ posΥ(t). (3.1)
The intuition behind E-constructor terms is the traditional one, in that
any ground Σ-term should be provably equal to a term in TΩ. This is precisely
the notion of constructor subsignature already mentioned in Section 2.3. The
intuition about R-constructor terms is that any Σ-term should be rewritable
after a finite number of steps to a term in C ΥR . Of course, these are claims
about R that need to be verified. In particular note that if ν = ⊥, then
C ΥR = TΥ, that is, the R-constructor terms coincide with the Υ-terms. The
somewhat subtle point is that, because of frozen positions in some of the
operators in Ω, frozen subterms may not be rewritable at all with R, and
therefore they may still be Ω-terms and not Υ-terms.
The notion of sufficient completeness for R relative to a constructor sig-
nature pair (Υ,Ω) is the expected one, i.e., Ω are the constructors for the
equations and Υ the constructor for the rules.
Definition 3 (Sufficient Completeness). If (Υ,Ω) is a constructor signature
pair, then R is called:
• E-sufficiently complete relative to Ω if and only if
(∀s ∈ S)(∀t∈TΣ,s)(∃u∈ TΩ,s) ER ` t = u. (3.2)
• R-sufficiently complete relative to Υ if and only if
(∀s ∈ S)(∀t∈TΣ,s)(∃v∈ C ΥR,s) R ` t→ v. (3.3)
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• Sufficiently complete relative to (Υ,Ω) if and only if statements 3.2
and 3.3 hold.
The constructors Ω are called E-constructors and the constructors Υ are
called R-constructors.
Definition 3 makes explicit use of sort information by requiring the wit-
nesses u and v to have sort less or equal than the sort s of t. This sort
requirement can be crucial, for example, when inducting on a variable xs
of sort s. Also note that Definition 3 does not yet make any use of the
admissibility assumptions about R. Under such assumptions, the notion of
sufficient completeness for R = (Σ, E ∪ B,R, ν) can be further sharpened
by relating it to two fundamental sets, namely, the set of terms CanΣ,E/B of
the canonical term algebra CanΣ,E/B for (Σ, E ∪B) and the set NormR/B
of R-normal forms of TR.
Definition 4. Assume R = (Σ, E ∪ B,R, ν) is admissible. The S-sorted
family of sets NormR/A ⊆ CanΣ,E/A, called the family of R-terminal states
of CanR is defined for each s ∈ S by:
[t]B ∈ NormR/B,s ⇐⇒ [t]B ∈ CanΣ,E/B,s ∧ (∀u ∈ TΣ)R 6` t→1 u.
(3.4)
Moreover, R is called:
• Ground weakly-normalizing (modulo B) if and only if
(∀t ∈ TΣ)(∃[v]B ∈ NormR/B) R ` t→ v. (3.5)
• Ground sort-decreasing (modulo B) if and only if
(∀s ∈ S)(∀t ∈ TΣ,s)(∀u ∈ TΣ)R ` t→ u =⇒ u ∈ TΣ,s (3.6)
Note that the assumption ofR being admissible ensures that the canonical
algebra CanΣ,E/B exists and it is well-defined. Also note that notions of
ground weak-normalization and sort-decreasingness for R do not necessarily
imply the ground weak-operational termination or sort-decreasingness of the
orientable equations E modulo the axioms B.
Theorem 1 gives a sufficient condition for checking sufficient completeness
of R relative to a constructor signature pair under the above-mentioned
operational assumptions.
Theorem 1. Let (Υ,Ω) be a constructor signature pair for R. If:
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• R = (Σ, E ∪B,R, ν) is admissible,
• CanΣ,E/B ⊆ TΩ,B, and
• R is ground weakly-normalizing and sort-decreasing,
• NormR/B ⊆ C ΥR/B,
then R is sufficiently complete relative to (Υ,Ω).
Proof. Let s ∈ S and t ∈ TΣ,s. Let u = t ↓E/B and note that u is well-defined
because ER is admissible by the first assumption. Then [u]B ∈ CanΣ,E/B,
t =E/B u, and (by ground sort-decreasingness of ER) u has sort s. From
the second assumption it follows that u witnesses Statement 3.2, and thus
R is E-sufficiently complete relative to Ω. On the other hand, R being
ground weakly-normalizing and sort-decreasing (third assumption), implies
the existence of [v]B ∈ NormR/B, s such that R ` t → v. Then, by the
fourth assumption there is v′ ∈ C ΥR,s satisfying [v]B = [v′]B and such that
R ` t → v′, that is, v′ is a witness for Statement 3.3. This implies R-
sufficient completeness relative to Υ. Therefore, R is sufficiently complete
relative to (Υ,Ω).
Definition 5. If (Υ,Ω) is a constructor signature pair for R = (Σ, E ∪
B,R, ν), then R is called canonically sufficiently complete relative to (Υ,Ω)
if and only if it satisfies the premises in Theorem 1. Furthermore,
• Ω is called a signature of E-free constructors modulo B if and only if
CanΩ,E/B = TΩ/B. (3.7)
• Υ is called a signature of R-terminal constructors if and only
NormR/B = C ΥR/B. (3.8)
Condition 3.8 exactly means that R is deadlock free outside C ΥR/B. There-
fore, if R is canonically sufficiently complete relative to (Υ,Ω), then it is
deadlock free outside C ΥR/B. The S-sorted sets TΩ/B and C
Υ
R/B provide re-
spective envelopes containing the key sets CanΣ,E/B (the set of states of
CanR) and NormR/B (the set of terminal states of CanR). Furthermore,
if Ω is a signature of E-free constructors modulo B, and Υ is a signature of
R-terminal constructors, these envelopes are tight, in the sense that TΩ/B
and TΥ/B exactly characterize CanΣ,E/B and NormR/B, respectively. Fig-
ure 3.1 depicts the containment relationships between these S-sorted sets of
terms.
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TΣ/B
Figure 3.1: Containment relationships between some sets of terms related to general-
ized rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪ B,R, ν) with constructor signature pair (Υ,Ω) that is
canonically sufficiently complete.
3.3 Checking Canonical Sufficient Completeness
For purposes of checking sufficient completeness of a generalized rewrite the-
ory R = (Σ, E ∪B,R, ν), it is helpful to find simple conditions under which
the rewrite relations →E/B and →R/B can be jointly captured by a single
rewrite relation. This is not entirely straightforward, because evaluation
strategies apply to E but not necessarily to R and frozenness requirements
apply to R but not necessarily to E. The goal in this section is to prove that
for the purpose of checking the canonical sufficient completeness of R, it is
correct to reason about the rewrite relation →E∪R/B, which is simpler than
→R/B for this purpose. This section assumes an admissible order-sorted
rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪B,R, ν) with signature Σ = (S,≤, F ).
The key insight is that the complement µ of the evaluation strategy µ
can sometimes be seen as a frozenness map without altering the overall
reachability properties of the original generalized rewrite theory R. As ex-
plained in [54], under appropriate admissibility conditions, the notion of
canonical term algebra CanΣ,E/B can be relativized to a map µ specifying
E-reducible positions, yielding an algebra CanµΣ,E/B. The way to combine
→E/B and →R/B into a single rewrite relation →E∪R/B without changing
the mathematical semantics of the given theory R is then, in essence: (i) to
require that µ = ν, so that →E/B and →R/B obey the same frozenness con-
straints, and (ii) to further require that the canonical term algebra remains
unchanged. This is captured by the notion of simple generalized rewrite
theories, a subclass of generalized rewrite theories for which is sound and
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complete, relative to reachability analysis, to ignore the semantic distinction
between equations and rules at the operational level, even in the presence
of strategy and frozenness information for both equations and rules.
Definition 6 (Simple Generalized Rewrite Theory). The generalized rewrite
theory R is called simple if and only CanΣ,E/B ' CanµΣ,E/B, where µ = ν.
Example 1 illustrates the notion of simple generalized rewrite theories in
Definition 6.
Example 1. Consider the specification BAG-CHOICE+CARD, representing a
generalized rewrite theory
(ΣBCC, EBCC ∪BBCC, µBCC, RBCC, νBCC)
in the language of Maude, that models bags (or multisets) of natural numbers
in Peano notation:
mod BAG-CHOICE+CARD is
sorts Nat .
op 0 : -> Nat [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
op s_ : Nat -> Nat [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
sorts NeBag Bag .
subsort Nat < NeBag < Bag .
op mt : -> Bag [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
op __ : Bag Bag -> Bag [assoc comm id: mt ctor] .
op |_| : Bag -> Nat [strat(0) frozen(1)] .
eq [card0] :
| mt |
= 0 .
eq [card1] :
| N:Nat B:Bag |
= s | B:Bag | .
rl [choice] :
N:Nat NeB:NeBag
=> N:Nat .
endm
The equational constructor ctor and rewrite constructor metadata "rctor"
declarations define the constructor signature pair for BAG-CHOICE+CARD.
Equations [card0] and [card1] fully define the cardinality of any bag of
natural numbers. Rule [choice] non-deterministically chooses an element
of a non-empty bag of natural numbers. In Maude, an evaluation strategy
µ for the equations is declared with the attribute keyword strat, which al-
ways begins with a 0 and is followed by the numbers i1, . . . , im such that
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µ(f) = {i1, . . . , im}. Instead, a frozenness mapping ν for the rewrite rules
is declared with the attribute keyword frozen (see [23] for details). In par-
ticular, for this specification, the evaluation strategy µBCC and the frozenness
map νBCC satisfy:
µBCC(| |) = ⊥ = νBCC(| |)
µBCC(f) = ⊥ = νBCC(f), for any f ∈ {0, s,mt, }.
The frozenness map νBCC prevents the rewrite rule [choice] from per-
forming any rewrites below any occurrence of the cardinality function sym-
bol | | in any ΣBCC-term, which is necessary to avoid the cardinality of a
bag itself to be rewritten to a smaller cardinality. Observe that µBCC = νBCC.
Furthermore, whether CanΣBCC,EBCC/BBCC and Can
µBCC
ΣBCC,EBCC/BBCC coincide is a
decidable property [54] that can be automatically checked by Maude’s SCC
tool for this specification. Moreover, the admissibility of this specification can
also be checked automatically. See Appendix A for the mechanical proofs. In
this case, BAG-CHOICE+CARD is indeed a simple generalized rewrite theory.
As an important remark, observe that any generalized rewrite theory
(Σ, E ∪ B,µ,R, ν) is inherently a simple generalized rewrite theory when
ν and µ are ignored.
Definition 7. For any generalized rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪ B,R, ν),
define RE = (Σ, B,−→E , ν) and RE∪R = (Σ, B,−→E ∪R, ν).
Although RE and RE∪R ignore at the operational level the semantic dis-
tinction between the equations E and the rules R of R, these two simple
generalized rewrite theories are sound and complete relative to reachability
analysis with respect to R, even in the presence of strategy and frozenness
information for the equations E and the rules R, respectively (see Defi-
nition 6). The key observations are that under some conditions: (i) the
sets CanΣ,E/B and NormRE/B coincide, and (ii) the sets NormRE∪R/B and
NormR/B also coincide, even though RE∪R has a simpler rewrite relation
than R. These claims are verified in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. If R is an admissible simple generalized rewrite theory, then
the following equalities hold:
1. NormRE/B = CanΣ,E/B.
2. NormRE∪R/B = NormR/B.
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Proof. For (1) observe that since R is admissible and it is a simple gener-
alized rewrite theory, it follows that NormRE/B = Can
ν
Σ,E/B = CanΣ,E/B.
For (2) first note that NormRE∪R/B ⊆ NormRE/B because
−→
E ⊆ −→E ∪R and
then, from (1), NormRE∪R/B ⊆ CanΣ,E/B. Let s ∈ S and t ∈ TΣ,s, and
observe:
[t]B ∈ NormRE∪R/B,s
⇐⇒ { by definition of NormRE∪R/B,s }
[t]B ∈ CanΣ,E/B,s ∧ (∀u ∈ TΣ)RE∪R 6` t→1 u
⇐⇒ { by ground coherence of R w.r.t. E modulo B }
[t]B ∈ CanΣ,E/B,s ∧ (∀u ∈ TΣ)R 6` t→1 u
⇐⇒ { by definition of NormR/B,s }
[t]B ∈ NormR/B,s.
3.4 Decision Procedures with Propositional Tree
Automata
Given a constructor signature pair (Υ,Ω) for an simple generalized rewrite
theory R = (Σ, E∪B,R, ν), this section presents sufficient conditions under
which the problems of deciding whether: (i) R is canonically sufficiently
complete relative to (Υ,Ω), (ii) Ω is a signature of E-free constructors mod-
ulo B, and (iii) Υ is signature of R-terminal constructors, can all be reduced
to emptiness checks of languages recognized by propositional tree automata.
The treatment here generalizes that of [54, 52], where such automata were
used to check E-sufficient completeness of order-sorted (equational) specifi-
cations.
Tree automata techniques have been used to check the sufficient com-
pleteness of equational specifications, e.g., [27, 54, 52]. Propositional Tree
Automata [55] (PTA) extend traditional equational tree automata by allow-
ing inputs to range over a many-kinded signature instead of over an unsorted
signature, recognition is done modulo axioms, and an input term is accepted
if its set of reachable states satisfies a given proposition.
Definition 8. A propositional tree automaton (PTA) is a tuple B of the
form (K,F,Q,Γ, B,∆) where
• (K,F ) is a many-kinded signature, i.e., a set K of kinds and a K∗×K-
indexed set F of function symbols,
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• Q = {Qk}k∈K is a K-indexed set of pairwise disjoint sets of states
such that Qk ∩ F,k′ = ∅ for each k, k′ ∈ K,
• Γ = {γk}k∈K is a K-indexed set of Boolean propositions where the
atoms in each γk are the states in Qk,
• B is a set of unconditional (K,F )-equational axioms, and
• ∆ is a set of transition rules of the form f(p1, . . . , pn)→ q, or p→ q,
for some k ∈ K, p, q ∈ Qk, f ∈ Fk1...kn,k, and each pi ∈ Qki.
A PTA B can be regarded as a rewrite theory RB, so that L(B), the
language accepted by B, can be defined in terms of reachability in RB.
Definition 9. Let B = (K,F,Q,Γ, B,∆) be a PTA and let Σ = (K,∅, F ∪
Q), where each q ∈ Qk is viewed as a constant of kind k ∈ K. Then,
RB = (Σ, B,∆) is the associated rewrite theory of B and the move relation
→B is the binary relation defined for t, u ∈ TΣ by:
t→B u ⇐⇒ t→1RB u.
For each k ∈ K, let reachB,k : TΣ −→ P(Qk) be the map defined by:
t 7→ {q ∈ Qk | t→∗B q}.
Then, L(B) = {L(B)k}k∈K , where
L(B)k = {t ∈ TΣ,k | reachB,k(t) |= γk},
and |= denotes the satisfaction relation of propositional logic.
When the emptiness problem for PTA is decidable, other typical decision
problems, such as inclusion, universality and intersection-emptiness are all
decidable due to the Boolean closure properties of PTAs. As shown in [55],
when B is any combination of associativity, commutativity and identity
axioms, but excluding the case in which there is an associative but not
commutative symbol in B, the emptiness problem for PTA is decidable. In
the special case in which there are associative but not commutative symbols
in B, machine learning techniques can be applied to create a semi-decision
procedure which can always show non-emptiness, and can show emptiness
under certain regularity conditions [55].
Definition 10. A simple generalized rewrite theory R = (Σ, B,R, ν) is
PTA-checkable if and only if
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• R is ground weakly-normalizing and ground sort-decreasing,
• Sk ∩ F,k = ∅ for each k ∈ K,
• the axioms B are any combination of associativity, commutativity and
identity axioms, except for the cases in which a symbol is associative
but not commutative, and
• every rule in R is of the form f(t1, . . . , tn) → t, with f(t1, . . . , tn)
linear.
3.4.1 Checking Sufficient Completeness
An executable simple generalized rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪B,R, ν), with
signature Σ = (S,≤, F ), is not canonically sufficiently complete relative to
the constructor signature pair (Υ,Ω) if and only if there is a sort s ∈ S and
a term t ∈ TΣ,s such that either
(i) [t]B ∈ NormRE/B,s ∩
(
TΣ/B,s \ TΩ/B,s
)
or
(ii) [t]B ∈ NormRE∪R/B,s ∩
(
TΣ/B,s \ C ΥR/B,s
)
.
Under PTA-checkability, canonical sufficient completeness can be reduced to
an emptiness problem of PTAs by constructing two automata that accept
precisely those terms t ∈ TΣ,s such that [t]B satisfies (i) or (ii).
Theorem 3. Let R = (Σ, E ∪ B,R, ν) be an admissible, ground weakly-
normalizing, and ground sort-decreasing simple generalized rewrite theory,
and let (Υ,Ω) be a constructor signature pair for R. If RE and RE∪R are
PTA-checkable, then there are PTAs BE and BE∪R such that R is canoni-
cally sufficiently complete relative to (Ω,Υ) if and only if L(BE)∪L(BE∪R) =
∅.
Proof. See Section A.1 in Appendix A.
3.4.2 Checking E-free and R-terminal Constructors
If a simple generalized rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪ B,R, ν), with signature
Σ = (S,≤, F ), is canonically sufficiently complete relative to (Υ,Ω), then:
(i) Ω is an E-free constructor signature if and only if
(∀s ∈ S) TΩ/B,s \NormRE/B,s = ∅.
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(ii) Υ is an R-terminal constructor signature if and only if
(∀s ∈ S) C ΥR/B,s \NormR/B,s = ∅.
Theorem 4. Let R = (Σ, E∪B,R, ν) be a simple generalized rewrite theory
that canonically sufficiently complete relative to the constructor signature
pair (Ω,Υ). If RE and RE∪R are PTA-checkable, then there are PTAs FE
and DE∪R such that Ω is a signature of E-free constructors modulo B if and
only if L(FE) = ∅, and Υ is signature of R-deadlock constructors if and
only if L(DE∪R) = ∅.
Proof. See Section A.1 in Appendix A.
3.4.3 The Extended Maude Sufficient Completeness Checker
The Maude Sufficient Completeness Checker [54] (SCC) has been extended
to construct the automata defined in the proofs of Theorem 3 and The-
orem 4, so that sufficient completeness checks, and also checks for E-free
constructors and R-terminal constructors, can be automatically handled for
such generalized rewrite theories.
Given an admissible simple generalized rewrite theoryR = (Σ, E∪B,R, ν)
annotated with constructor signature pair (Υ,Ω) in the syntax of Maude and
satisfying the conditions in Theorem 3, the SCC’s command scc-df builds
the automata BE and BE∪R and checks for their emptiness. For the example
in Section 3.3, it works as expected:
Maude> (scc-df BAG-CHOICE+CARD .)
Checking sufficient completeness and deadlock freeness of BAG-CHOICE+CARD...
Success: The equational subtheory of BAG-CHOICE+CARD is sufficiently complete
under the assumption that it is ground weakly-normalizing, ground confluent,
and ground sort-decreasing.
Success: The rewrite theory BAG-CHOICE+CARD is deadlock-free outside rctor-terms
under the assumption that it is ground weakly-normalizing, ground sort-decreasing,
and ground coherent.
For R and (Υ,Ω) as above, and under the assumption of R being canon-
ically sufficiently complete relative to (Υ,Ω), the Sufficient Completeness
Checker commands free-terminal builds the automata FE and GE∪R and
checks for their emptiness.
Maude> (free-terminal BAG-CHOICE+CARD .)
Checking freeness of constructors of BAG-CHOICE+CARD...
Success: The equational subtheory of BAG-CHOICE+CARD has equational free
constructors under the assumption that it is sufficiently complete, ground
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weakly-normalizing, ground confluent, and ground sort-decreasing.
Success: BAG-CHOICE+CARD has terminal constructors under the assumption that it
is deadlock-free outside rctor-terms, ground weakly-normalizing, ground
sort-decreasing, and ground coherent.
As an additional example, consider the one-sorted simple generalized
rewrite theory NAT-LIST adapted from [45]:
mod NAT-LIST is
sort List .
ops 0 nil err : -> List [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
ops nats zeros : -> List [ctor] .
op s : List -> List [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
ops incr adx head tail : List -> List [ctor] .
op cons : List List -> List [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
vars X L : List .
rl incr(nil) => nil .
rl incr(cons(X,L)) => cons(s(X),incr(L)) .
rl adx(nil) => nil .
rl adx(cons(X,L)) => incr(cons(X,adx(L))) .
rl nats => adx(zeros) .
rl zeros => cons(0,zeros) .
rl zeros => cons(0,nil) .
rl head(cons(X,L)) => X .
rl tail(cons(X,L)) => L .
rl adx(0) => err .
rl adx(s(X)) => err .
rl incr(0) => err .
rl incr(s(X)) => err .
rl tail(nil) => nil .
rl tail(0) => err .
rl tail(s(X)) => err .
rl head(nil) => nil .
rl head(0) => err .
rl head(s(X)) => err .
endm
Running the scc-df command on NAT-LIST yields and error:
Maude> (scc-df NAT-LIST .)
Checking sufficient completeness and deadlock freeness of NAT-LIST...
Success: The equational subtheory of NAT-LIST is sufficiently complete under
the assumption that it is ground weakly-normalizing, ground confluent,
and ground sort-decreasing.
Failure: The term adx(err) is a terminal term outside rctor-terms of sort List.
It turns out that the rewrite system given in [45] was missing rewrite
rules for defining adx, incr, tail, and head when the argument was the
error list err. By adding the rewrite rules “adx(err) => err”, “incr(err)
=> err”, “tail(err) => err”, and “head(err) => err” to complete the
above Maude specification to one called NAT-LIST-COMPLETE, the sufficient
completeness check succeeds.
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Maude> (scc-df NAT-LIST-COMPLETE .)
Checking sufficient completeness and deadlock freeness of NAT-LIST-COMPLETE...
Success: The equational subtheory of NAT-LIST-COMPLETE is sufficiently complete
under the assumption that it is ground weakly-normalizing, ground confluent,
and ground sort-decreasing.
Success: The rewrite theory NAT-LIST-COMPLETE is deadlock-free outside rctor-terms
under the assumption that it is ground weakly-normalizing, ground sort-decreasing,
and ground coherent.
3.5 Constructor-Based Reachability Analysis
This section discusses the role that R-constructors and E-constructors can
play in inductive proofs of ground reachability and ground joinability prop-
erties for a rewrite theory R. The discussion here does not cover in detail
either the theoretical foundations for the soundness of the inductive argu-
ments given in the examples, or the alternative proof techniques that could
be used for proving ground reachability and ground joinability properties.
The aim here is more modest, namely, to characterize when it is sound to
use constructors in such inductive reachability proofs. A simple example in
Section 3.6 illustrates the key role constructors can play in such proofs.
3.5.1 Ground Reachability
Ground reachability is an inductive property of rewrite theories. In partic-
ular, it is important for establishing reachability properties of concurrent
systems specified by generalized rewrite theories, for instance, when algo-
rithmic model checking techniques are limited. This section clarifies the role
of constructors in ground reachability proofs.
Definition 11. Let R be a simple generalized rewrite theory with signature
Σ = (S,≤, F ) and let t, u ∈ TΣ(X)s, for some s ∈ S. The term u is ground
R-reachable from t, written R  t→ u, if and only if
(∀σ : X −→ TΣ) R ` tσ → uσ. (3.9)
In general, reasoning in R about an inductive property ϕ requires a de-
duction relation `ind with inductive inference support (and more powerful
than `) such that if R `ind ϕ then R  ϕ. Note that there is no hope for
the converse in general to hold because of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
The relationship between these relations is made explicit by the following
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chain of (meta) implications:
R ` ϕ =⇒ R `ind ϕ =⇒ R  ϕ ⇐⇒ TR |= ϕ.
The notion of R = (Σ, E,R, ν) being sufficiently complete relative to a
constructor signature pair (Υ,Ω) is important for inductive reasoning at
both equational and rewrite levels because different explicit or implicit in-
ductive proof methods (including structural induction) become much more
effective when the inductions can be restricted to constructor terms.
Inductive reasoning about rewrite sequents for a rewrite theory R is some-
what subtle, particularly in the presence of frozenness information. The
first subtle point is that, because of frozen variables occurring in some of
the terms in the goal, it is wrong to assume that it is enough to “instanti-
ate” the induction variables with R-constructor terms. The problem is that
frozen subterms may be Ω-terms and not R-constructor terms, and so they
may not be rewritable at all with R into R-constructor terms. The solu-
tion is then to consider the possibility of frozen subterms being Ω-terms.
For ground reachability the reasoning is even subtler, because even if frozen
variables are handled as just explained, there is the hidden risk of the target
term in the reachability goal becoming a “moving” target. The problem
here is that rewrite sequents are not symmetric and the proofs obtained by
induction over R-constructor terms in general cannot be “lifted” to proofs
for Ω-terms. A solution for this problem is to require that the E-equivalence
class of the target term in the reachability goal be invariant under the sub-
stitutions used in the proof, by imposing a simple condition on the variables
occurring in the target term. As a direct consequence of these observations,
for a constructor-based structural induction proof of ground reachability to
be sound, it is mandatory to consider all E-constructor terms of the given
sort s not only when inducting on a frozen variable xs, but also when this
variable (even if not frozen) occurs in the target term of the reachability
goal.
Theorem 5. Let R be a simple generalized rewrite theory with signature
Σ = (S,≤, F ) and frozenness map ν, let t, u ∈ TΣ(X)s for some s ∈ S, and
let θ : X −→ TΣ. If R is sufficiently complete relative to the constructor
signature pair (Υ,Ω), then there exists η : X −→ TΩ such that:
1. η(x) ∈ C ΥR for x ∈ ν(t) \ vars(u), and ER ` θ(x) = η(x) for x ∈
vars(u),
2. R ` tθ → tη.
31
Furthermore, R  t→ u if and only if R ` tη → uη for each η as above.
Proof. (Existence of η) Let θ : X −→ TΣ be as given. Since R is sufficiently
complete relative to (Υ,Ω), there are β : X −→ TΩ s.t. ER ` θ(xsi) = β(xsi),
and ρ : X −→ C ΥR s.t. R ` β(xsi) → ρ(xsi), for each xsi ∈ X. Take
η : X −→ TΩ to be the map x 7→ ρ(x) if x ∈ ν(t) \ vars(u), and x 7→ β(x)
otherwise. Observe that η fulfills (1) and (2). ( =⇒ ) Let η : X −→ TΩ
satisfy (1) and (2). Observe that C ΥR ⊆ TΩ ⊆ TΣ, and hence R ` tη → uη
follows from the assumption. (⇐=) Let θ : X −→ TΣ. There exists η :
X −→ TΩ satisfying conditions (1) and (2), and such that R ` tη → uη
from the assumption. Then, R ` tθ → uη follows from the transitivity of
rewrite sequents. Observe that η is such that ER ` uη = uθ, and then
R ` tθ → uθ. Therefore R  t→ u, as desired.
3.5.2 Ground Joinability
The notion of ground joinability is of great importance in the field of term
rewriting and also in theorem proving, see, e.g., [83, 6, 60, 69, 9, 2, 15]. In
particular, it is a key technique for proving ground confluence. This section
explains how R-constructors can be used to prove ground joinability and
illustrate the ideas by means of a simple example. A detailed discussion of
alternative proof techniques for ground reachability is outside the scope of
this paper: the focus here is in clarifying the role that R-constructors can
play in such proofs.
Definition 12. Let R be a simple generalized rewrite theory, with signature
Σ = (S,≤, F ), and let t, u ∈ TΣ(X)s, for some s ∈ S. The terms t and u
are called ground R-joinable, written R  t ↓ u, if and only if
(∀σ : X −→ TΣ) R ` tσ ↓ uσ. (3.10)
The notion of R = (Σ, E,R, ν) being sufficiently complete relative to
a constructor signature pair (Υ,Ω) is also important for ground joinability.
For inductive reasoning about ground joinability the only subtle point is that
of frozen variables occurring in some of the terms in the goal: it is wrong
to assume that it is enough to “instantiate” the induction variables with R-
constructor terms. As explained for ground reachability, the problem is that
frozen subterms may be Ω-terms and not R-constructor terms, and so they
may not be rewritable at all with R into R-constructor terms. As shown by
Theorem 6, it is sufficient to consider the possibility of frozen subterms being
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Ω-terms for inductive proofs to be sound. That is, for a constructor-based
structural induction proof of ground joinability to be sound, it is sufficient
to consider all equational constructor terms of sort s when inducting on a
frozen variable xs.
Theorem 6. Let R be a simple generalized rewrite theory, with signature
Σ = (S,≤, F ) and frozenness map ν, and let t, u ∈ TΣ(X)s, for some s ∈ S.
If R is sufficiently complete relative to the constructor signature pair (Υ,Ω),
then R  t ↓ u if and only if R ` tη ↓ uη for each η : X −→ TΩ such that if
η(x) ∈ C ΥR then x ∈ ν(t, u), for all x ∈ X.
Proof. ( =⇒ ) Let η be such that if η(x) ∈ C ΥR then x ∈ ν(t, u) for each
x ∈ X. Observe that C ΥR ⊆ TΩ ⊆ TΣ, and hence R ` tη → uη follows from
the assumption. (⇐=) Let θ : X −→ TΣ. Since R is sufficiently complete
relative to (Υ,Ω), there are β : X −→ TΩ s.t. ER ` θ(xsi) = β(xsi), and
ρ : X −→ C ΥR s.t. R ` β(xsi)→ ρ(xsi), for each xsi ∈ X. Take η : X −→ TΩ
to be the map x 7→ ρ(x) if x ∈ ν(t, u) and x 7→ β(x) otherwise. Observe
that R ` tθ → tη and R ` uθ → uη, and η is defined so that R ` tη ↓ uη
follows from the assumptions. Therefore R  t ↓ u, as desired.
3.6 Formal Properties of CHANNEL
This section shows the use of the constructor-based inductive techniques
introduced in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 for proving reachability properties
of rewrite theories based on constructors, with an example of a concurrent
system communicating through a channel. This example also illustrates how
the PTA-based decision procedures defined in Section A.1 can automatically
aid, not only in proving the sufficient completeness and deadlock freedom of
the specification, but also in obtaining proofs of other inductive reachability
properties. Some mechanical proofs are shown in the development of the
section; the remaining ones can be found in Appendix A.
Consider the specification CHANNEL representing a generalized rewrite the-
ory
(ΣCHANNEL, ECHANNEL ∪BCHANNEL, RCHANNEL)
in the language of Maude. It models a system comprising a sender of a list
of numbers, a receiver of such a list, and a communication channel through
which numbers are sent to the receiver, and acknowledgments are sent back
to the sender.
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mod CHANNEL is
sorts Nat List NilList EmptyChannel Channel Terminal State .
subsorts NilList < List .
subsorts Nat EmptyChannel < Channel .
subsorts Terminal < State .
op 0 : -> Nat [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
op s_ : Nat -> Nat [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
op nil : -> NilList [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
op _;_ : Nat List -> List [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
op _@_ : List List -> List .
op mt : -> EmptyChannel [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
op ack : -> Channel [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
op <_:_:_> : List Channel List -> State [ctor] .
op <_:_:_> : NilList EmptyChannel List
-> Terminal [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
vars M N : Nat . vars L L’ : List .
eq [ap01] : nil @ L = L .
eq [ap02] : (N ; L) @ L’ = N ; (L @ L’) .
rl [send] : < N ; L : mt : L’ > => < L : N : L’ > .
rl [recv] : < L : N : L’ > => < L : ack : L’ @ (N ; nil) > .
rl [ack] : < L : ack : L’ > => < L : mt : L’ > .
endm
States of this systems are (ground) terms of sort State, that is, ground
terms of the form
< l : c : l’ >
where l is the list of numbers still to be sent by the sender, c is the current
contents of the channel, and l’ is the list of numbers already received by the
receiver. The contents c can be either a natural number built up with 0 and
the successor operator s, or the empty contents mt, or an acknowledgment
ack. Lists of natural numbers are defined with the function symbols nil,
; , and @ , with ; a list “cons” operator and @ a list append operator.
The equations ECHANNEL are labeled [ap0] and [ap1]. They define the ap-
pend function in the usual way. The rules RCHANNEL specifying the system’s
transitions are labeled [send], [recv], and [ack]. Rule [send] puts the
leftmost number of the sender’s list in the channel if the channel is empty,
rule [recv] appends the number in the channel to the receiver’s list and
sends back an ack, and rule [ack] consumes the ack message and clears the
channel so that a new number can be sent.
Sort Terminal is the subsort of State determined by those states in which
there are not numbers waiting to be sent through the channel and the chan-
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nel is empty. The intention, of course, is to characterize the terminal or
final states of the system, for which no more transitions are possible. First
note that the only symbol not having the ctor declaration is the list append
operator @ . Therefore, ECHANNEL-sufficient completeness is the claim that
@ is fully defined by the equations [ap0] and [ap1]. Analogously, the only
symbol having the ctor declaration and not having the metadata "rctor"
declaration is
op <_:_:_> : NilList EmptyChannel List
-> Terminal [ctor metadata "rctor"] .
Since only terms of sort State can be rewritten by the rules RCHANNEL, this
means that every state is expected to be rewritable with RCHANNEL to one of
the form < nil : mt : l >.
Two key properties of CHANNEL are of particular interest:
1. In-order reception: every (ground) terminal state reachable from an
initial state of the form < l : mt : nil > preserves the order of
messages, i.e., for L and L’ variables of sort List:
CHANNEL < L : mt : nil >→< nil : mt : L’ > =⇒ L = L’.
2. Proper termination: the protocol always terminates in a state of sort
Terminal.
Observe that, if CHANNEL is strongly-normalizing and the constructor sub-
signature ΥCHANNEL is a signature of terminal constructors, then (1) and (2)
together ensure that the protocol always terminates with successful in-order
communication. Note also that (1) cannot be checked by standard model-
checking algorithms because the number of ground instances of L is count-
ably infinite.
CHANNEL is executable (see Appendix A) and is sufficiently complete rel-
ative to its constructor signature pair, as shown below:
Maude> (scc-df CHANNEL .)
Checking sufficient completeness and deadlock freeness of CHANNEL...
Success: The equational subtheory of CHANNEL is sufficiently complete
under the assumption that it is ground weakly-normalizing, ground confluent,
and ground sort-decreasing.
Success: The rewrite theory CHANNEL is deadlock-free outside rctor-terms under
the assumption that it is ground weakly-normalizing, ground sort-decreasing,
and ground coherent.
This particularly implies that the reachability condition in (1) is satisfiable
and hence the property is not trivially true. Two complementary proofs are
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required for establishing (1), namely, a proof of the existence of a reachable
terminal state preserving the order of messages for each initial state, and
a proof of the uniqueness of such a terminal state. Property (2) follows
directly from the strong-normalization of CHANNELE (see Appendix A), plus
the fact that ΥCHANNEL is a signature of terminal constructors as just shown.
The existence claim is a logical consequence of the following inductive
claim, for L and L’ variables of sort List:
CHANNEL `ind < L : mt : L’ >→< nil : mt : L′@ L > .
Using the sufficient completeness of CHANNEL relative to its constructor
signature pair (ΥCHANNEL,ΩCHANNEL), the steps of the constructor-based induc-
tive proof are a base case in which the property is proved for l = nil, and
an inductive case in which the property is proved for l = n ; l with the
hypothesis that there is a proof for n and l, where n is a fresh constant of
sort Nat and l is a fresh constant of sort List.
The soundness of the proof follows from the soundness of structural induc-
tion and from Theorem 5, where C⊥CHANNEL,List = TΥCHANNEL,List. As a remark
observe that the choice of induction variable for this proof does not increase
its complexity, because ΥCHANNEL,List = ΩCHANNEL,List.
• Base case. Let l = nil:
< nil : mt : L’ >
= { L’ @ nil = L’ is an inductive consequence of ECHANNEL }
< nil : mt : L’ @ nil >
• Inductive case. Assume the property holds for l = l, where l is a
“fresh” constant of sort List. Let l = n ; l, with n a fresh constant
of sort Nat:
< (n ; l) : mt : L’ >
→1 { by [send] }
< l : n : L’ >
→1 { by [recv] }
< l : ack : L’ @ (n ; nil) >
→1 { by [ack] }
< l : mt : L’ @ (n ; nil) >
→ { by induction hypothesis }
< nil : mt : (L’ @ (n ; nil)) @ l >
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= { by associativity of @ is an inductive consequence of ECHANNEL }
< nil : mt : L’ @ ((n ; nil) @ l) >
= { by [ap01] }
< nil : mt : L’ @ (n ; (nil @ l)) >
= { by [ap02] }
< nil : mt : L’ @ (n ; l) >
The inductive claims about ECHANNEL can be discharged automatically with
the current version of Maude’s Inductive Theorem Prover [52] by constructor-
based equational induction over ECHANNEL-constructors (see Appendix A).
The uniqueness proof uses a ground joinability argument about CHANNEL.
As shown in Figure 3.2 for any simple generalized rewrite theory R that is
admissible, if the rewrite rules R ∪ −→E are ground sort-decreasing, ground
confluent, and ground weakly-normalizing modulo B, then the ground con-
fluence of R is a logical consequence of the ground confluence of RE∪R. The
key observation is that for rewrite proofs R ` t → u and R ` t → v, there
are analogous rewrite proofs RE∪R ` t→ u ↓E/B and RE∪R ` t→ v ↓E/B.
Since RE∪R is ground confluent, the (ground) RE∪R-joinability witness for
u ↓E/B and v ↓E/B is also a witness for the R-joinability of u and v: mem-
bership to E∪B-equivalence classes is invariant under sequent inference with
the oriented equations in RE . In this way R inherits the ground confluence
from RE∪R. Note that in Figure 3.2 there is no need to mention RE because
RE∪R subsumes deduction with RE . Its mention is made explicit for better
understanding of the proof. Also, note that RE is trivially ground sort-
decreasing, ground confluent, and ground operationally terminating modulo
B because of the assumptions on R.
CHANNEL is ground sort-decreasingness, ground confluence, and ground
operationally terminating as automatically shown in Appendix A. This then
entails the desired uniqueness proof of a reachable deadlock state preserving
the order of messages for each initial state, and hence, property (1) holds.
Property (2) follows directly from the strong-normalization of the rewrite
theory CHANNELECHANNEL∪RCHANNEL .
Therefore, as desired, the CHANNEL protocol always terminates in a state
of sort Terminal with successful in-order communication.
3.7 Related Work and Concluding Remarks
Sufficient completeness was first defined in Guttag’s thesis [50]; this prop-
erty is in general undecidable, even for unconditional equational specifica-
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Figure 3.2: If R = (Σ, E ∪B,R, ν) is an admissible simple generalized rewrite theory and
such that RE∪R is (ground) sort-decreasing, (ground) confluent and (ground) weakly-
normalizing, then the (ground) confluence of RE∪R implies the (ground) confluence of R.
In this figure, e.g., t
R→ u is a short hand for R ` t→ u.
tions [50, 51]. Sufficient completeness of equational specifications has been
widely studied, see, e.g., [56, 78, 25, 59, 14, 16, 15, 64], but some of the pro-
posed approaches are restricted to simple expressive formalisms, such as un-
sorted specifications or specifications without structural axioms, or assume
strong properties such as termination and confluence. For a good review of
the literature up to the 1980s and for important decidability/undecidability
results see [62, 61]. A closely connected concept is ground reducibility, see,
e.g., [83, 62, 26, 63, 28]. Tree automata methods have been used since the
late 1980s for both sufficient completeness and ground reducibility, see, e.g.,
[26, 28, 54, 16], and Chapter 4 of [27] and references there. In the context of
order-sorted and membership equational logic specifications, sufficient com-
pleteness has been studied in, e.g., [17, 53, 15], and for order-sorted specifi-
cations modulo axioms, including the context-sensitive case, in [54, 52].
The work presented here combines and generalizes two different research
strands. On the one hand, it can be seen as a natural generalization from
the case of equations E to that of both equations E and rules R, of the
work in [54, 52] on (propositional) equational tree automata methods for
checking sufficient completeness of left-linear equations modulo axioms for
context-sensitive order-sorted specifications. On the other hand, it also gen-
eralizes the work by I. Gnaedig and H. Kirchner [44] on constructors for
non-terminating rewrite systems in the following precise sense: the notion
of sufficient completeness proposed in [44] exactly corresponds to that of R-
sufficient completeness in this work for the special case of a rewrite theory
R = (Σ,∅, R), where Σ has a single sort and there are no equations. The
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treatment of the more general case of rewrite theories R = (Σ, E ∪B,R, ν)
clarifies the important distinction between constructors for equations and
constructors for rules, extends the ideas to the more general order-sorted
case modulo axioms and with frozenness information, provides new tree
automata automated techniques that complement the deductive narrowing-
based techniques proposed in [44], and, to the best of the author’s knowledge,
investigates for the first time the use of R-constructors (and E-constructors)
for inductive proofs of ground reachability.
As usual, there is room for improvement. Since the goal in this work
has been to obtain automatic techniques for checking the sufficient com-
pleteness of a rewrite theory, some restrictions have been imposed, such as
treating only the order-sorted case (leaving out the case of membership equa-
tional theories), and also assuming that equations and rules are left-linear
and unconditional. The notion of a sufficiently complete rewrite theory is
equally meaningful and useful without these restrictions. Therefore, reason-
ing techniques that will allow such a property to be established for more
general rewrite theories should be investigated, even if such techniques are
no longer automatic. The related topic of constructor-based inductive tech-
niques for ground reachability and ground joinability has only been sketched
out; it deserves a much fuller development in future work, in which a de-
tailed comparison with alternative approaches to proving such properties
should also be given. Furthermore, these constructor-based induction tech-
niques should be supported by tools such as, for example, an extension of
the current Maude Inductive Theorem Prover (ITP).
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CHAPTER 4
DEDUCTIVE PROOFS FOR SAFETY PROPERTIES
Safety properties of concurrent systems are among the most important prop-
erties to verify. They have received extensive attention in many different for-
mal approaches, both algorithmic and deductive. Algorithmic approaches
such as model checking are quite attractive because they are automatic.
However, they cannot always be applied as a system can be infinite-state, so
that no model checking algorithm which assumes a finite-state system can
directly be used.
Even if an abstraction can be found to make the system finite-state, an
additional difficulty may arise: although for each initial state the set of states
reachable from it is finite, the set of initial states may still be infinite, so
that model checking verification may not be possible. For example, a mutual
exclusion protocol should be verified for an arbitrary number of clients in
its initial state, even if the states have been abstracted away so that the set
of states reachable from each initial state is always finite.
This chapter is part of a broader effort to develop generic methods to
reason about safety properties of concurrent systems and more generally
about any property specifiable in temporal logic. It advances such an ef-
fort by developing generic deductive methods and tools for proving two key
safety properties, namely, stability and invariance, plus their combination
by means strengthening techniques. The expression “generic” means that
the verification methods and their associated tools are not tied to a spe-
cific programming language. By contrast, the UNITY logic is an elegant
temporal logic inference system tailored for the verification of concurrent
programs in the UNITY language [20], so that nontrivial changes would be
required to apply such a logic to, say, threaded Java programs. Similarly,
the deductive methods for verifying safety properties developed by Manna
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and Pnueli in [68] are tailored to verify concurrent programs in the specific
imperative language described in [68].
The advantage of generic verification methods and tools is that the costly
tool development effort can be amortized across a much wider range of appli-
cations, whereas a language-specific verification tool can only be applied to
systems programmed in that specific language. Of course, any such generic
approach requires a logical framework general enough to encompass many
different models and languages. In this case, the use of the rewriting logic
framework [70] is justified by its ability to express very naturally many dif-
ferent models of concurrent computation and many concurrent languages.
The generic framework and its tools can then be easily specialized to spe-
cific languages. This is exactly the approach taken in the rewriting logic
semantics project [75], where the semantics of a wide variety of concurrent
programming languages is defined in rewriting logic, and then Maude [23]
and its LTL model checker can be used to verify programs in any of those
languages.
The goal of this chapter is to extend rewriting-logic-based generic verifi-
cation methods to support the deductive verification of concurrent systems,
beginning with safety properties. In the rewriting logic framework, a con-
current system, such as, for example, a network protocol or an entire con-
current programming language such as Java, is specified as a rewrite theory
R = (Σ, E,R), with (Σ, E) an equational theory specifying the system’s
states as elements of the initial algebra TΣ/E , and R a collection of (non-
equational) rewrite rules specifying the system’s concurrent transitions.
The generic approach presented here to safety property verification is
both transformational and reductionistic. Safety properties are a special
type of inductive properties. That is, they do not hold for just any model
of the given rewrite theory R, but for its initial reachability model TR (see
Chapter 2). Concretely, forR = (Σ, E,R), this means that the states of such
an initial model are precisely elements of the initial algebra TΣ/E , and that its
one-step transitions are provable rewrite steps between such states by means
of the rules R. Therefore, given any safety property ϕ, the interest here is
in the model-theoretic satisfaction relation TR |= ϕ, which is approximated
deductively by means of an inductive inference relation R  ϕ. This relation
is proved sound, that is, R  ϕ always implies TR |= ϕ.
This approach is transformational in the sense that the rules of inference
transform pairs of the form R  ϕ into other such pairs R′  ϕ′. It is
also reductionistic in the sense that: (i) all safety formulas in temporal logic
eventually disappear and are replaced by purely equational formulas, and (ii)
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the rewrite theory R = (Σ, E,R) is eventually replaced by its underlying
equational theory (Σ, E). That is, in the end all formal reasoning about
safety properties is reduced to inductive reasoning about equational properties
in the underlying equational theory (Σ, E). This allows these generic safety
verification methods to take advantage of the existing wealth of equational
reasoning techniques and tools already available.
The Maude Invariant Analyzer (InvA) tool supporting the transforma-
tional inference system presented in this chapter, makes systematic use of
narrowing modulo axioms with the equations defining state predicates, spe-
cialized in this chapter to ground stability and invariance analysis to greatly
simplify the equational proof obligations to which all proofs of safety formu-
las are ultimately reduced. It also takes full advantage of other heuristics
for discharging automatically many proof obligations, all explained in what
follows.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• Proof of the inductive soundness of a transformational inference system
to prove stability and invariance properties about the initial reachabil-
ity model TR of a topmost rewrite theoryR, as well as the soundness of
additional inference rules supporting the strengthening of invariants.
• Systematic use of narrowing modulo axioms with the equations defin-
ing state predicates, specialized to ground stability and invariance
analysis, to greatly simplify the equational proof obligations to which
all proofs of safety formulas are ultimately reduced.
• Implementation of the above inference system in the InvA tool, which
provides a substantial degree of automation and can automatically
discharge many proof obligations without user intervention.
This chapter is organized as follows. A temporal semantics in the form
of a Kripke structure is associated to a rewrite theory’s initial reachabil-
ity model in Section 4.1. An inference system for the deductive analysis of
ground stability and ground invariance, including narrowing-based inference
rules, is introduced and proved sound in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 discusses
new inference rules that can be used to strengthen ground invariants. The
Invariant Analyzer tool (InvA) is presented in Section 4.4, including a de-
scription of the main commands available to the user and the strategies it
uses for discharging proof obligations. Related work and some final remarks
can be found in Section 4.5. Case studies for these methods and the InvA
tool are presented in chapters 5 and 6.
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4.1 Temporal Semantics of TR
The models of temporal logic are Kripke structures. A Kripke structure can
be associated with the initial reachability model TR of a topmost rewrite
theory R = (Σ, E,R) by making explicit the intended set of states in TR
and the relevant state predicates to the verification task.
In general, the state predicates need not be part of the system specification
and therefore they need not be specified in R. They are typically part of the
property specification. This is mainly because state predicates need not be
related to the operational semantics of R, as they are just certain predicates
about the states of TR that are need to specify some of its properties.
Therefore, after choosing a top sort in Σ, say s, for the set of states,
the set of state predicates Π for R can be defined in an equational theory
EΠ = (ΣΠ, E ∪EΠ). Signature ΣΠ contains Σ and a sort Bool with constant
symbols > and ⊥ of sort Bool , predicate symbols
p : s s1 · · · sn −→ [Bool ]
for each each predicate p ∈ Π parametric on the tuple of sorts s1, . . . , sn in
Σ, abbreviated p ∈ Πs1...sn , and optionally some auxiliary function symbols.
Equations EΠ define the predicate symbols in ΣΠ and the auxiliary function
symbols, if any. The theory EΠ protects (Σ, E) and also the equational
theory specifying Bool (see Chapter 2 for details).
Given a state predicate ps1,...,sn ∈ Π and ground terms ti ∈ TΣ,si , with
1 ≤ i ≤ n, EΠ then defines the semantics of p at state t ∈ TΣ,s in TR as
follows:
TR, t |= p(t1, . . . , tn) ⇐⇒ EΠ ` p(t, t1, . . . , tn) = >. (4.1)
This defines the Kripke structure:
KΠR = (TΣ/E,s,→R, LΠ), (4.2)
with labeling function LΠ defined for each t ∈ TΣ,s and ti ∈ TΣ,si , with
1 ≤ i ≤ n, by:
p(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ LΠ(t) ⇐⇒ EΠ ` p(t, t1, . . . , tn) = >. (4.3)
In this way, all of LTL can be interpreted in KΠR in the standard way [22],
including also the first-order version of LTL.
Note that only the positive case is needed to define p’s semantics. The
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reason why p has codomain [Bool ] instead of Bool , is to allow partial def-
initions of p with equations that only define the positive case by equations
p(t, t1, . . . , tn) = > if γ, and either leave the negative case implicit or may
only define some negative cases with equations p(t′, t′1, . . . , t′n) = ⊥ if γ′
without necessarily covering all the cases, i.e., without p’s definition having
to be sufficiently complete. This possibly partial specification of predicates
(yet, with full specification in the positive case) can be very convenient,
since the full definition of the negative cases can sometimes be quite in-
volved. However, the sort Bool is protected: only when a term p(t) can be
proved equal to either > or ⊥ can the term p(t) have sort Bool . Neverthe-
less, for proving purposes it is often useful to define some negative cases for
which a state predicate p does not hold, since this helps in discarding proof
obligations in the form of an implication whose antecedent is false.
It is also important to note that a state predicate p ∈ Π can act as
a definitional extension of a Boolean combination of other state predicates
{p1, . . . , pn} in ΣΠ, so that the choice of focusing on atomic state predicates is
mainly to simplify the exposition but does not limit the general applicability
of the results that follow. In a rewriting logic language implementation
such as Maude [23], definitional extensions can be conveniently obtained
by having EΠ protecting Maude’s predefined functional module BOOL-OPS,
which declares constants > and ⊥ of sort Bool along with Boolean function
symbols such as conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc.
4.2 Ground Safety Properties
The development in section assumes a topmost rewrite theoryR = (Σ, E,R),
with order-sorted signature Σ = (S,≤, F ) and with top sort s ∈ S for the
set of states, and a set Π of state predicates for R equationally defined
in EΠ = (ΣΠ, E ∪ EΠ). Moreover, expressions of the form ~t are used to
abbreviate lists of terms t1, . . . , tn in TΣ(X), and thus simplify notation.
4.2.1 Ground Stability
The concept of ground stability for R is intimately related with the notion of
the set of states t ∈ TΣ/E,s of TR that satisfy a state predicate p being closed
under →R. More precisely, for p ∈ Πs1,...,sn and ~x = xs1 , . . . , xsn variables
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in X, the property p being ground stable for R is the safety property:
KΠR |= p(~x) ⇒ p(~x), (4.4)
meaning that for any ground substitution σ : X −→ TΣ if p(~xσ) holds in a
state t ∈ TΣ,s, then p(~xσ) holds in any state u ∈ TΣ,s that is reachable from
t.
Definition 13 (Ground Stability). Let p ∈ Πs1,...,sn and let ~x = xs1 , . . . , xsn
be variables in X. Then:
• R is ground p-stable under rules R0 ⊆ R if and only if for all t, u ∈
TΣ,s and ground substitution σ : X −→ TΣ the following implication
holds:
EΠ  p(t, ~xσ)=> ∧ (Σ, E,R0)  t→∗u =⇒ EΠ ` p(u, ~xσ) = >.
(4.5)
• R is ground p-stable, written R  p(~x) ⇒ p(~x), if and only if R is
ground p-stable under R.
Note that the deduction relation ‘’ in Definition 13 shares the same
meaning as the notation in Section 3.5 introduced for constructor-based
reachability analysis. This relation refers to deduction, both at the equa-
tional and rewrite theory levels, in the initial models, that is, to deduction
where variables range over ground terms only.
The reachability condition in the Definition 13 can be reduced to a simpler
1-step rewrite condition, resulting in an equivalent notion of ground stability
that avoids arbitrary depth proof search. In the notation of Linear Time
Temporal Logic (LTL), this is captured by the inference rule St in Figure 4.1.
This rule greatly simplifies the LTL reasoning about the p-stability of the
Kripke structure KΠR = (TΣ/E,s,→R, LΠ) associated to R and Π. Symbol
“©” corresponds to the next operator in LTL and symbol “⇒” to strong
implication in LTL (see [67] for details). So, for KΠR |= p(~x) ⇒ p(~x) to
hold, it is enough to show that KΠR |= p(~x)⇒©p(~x) holds.
Lemma 1 proves that the inference rule St is not only sound but also
complete.
Lemma 1. Inference rule G-st in Figure 4.1 is sound and complete.
Proof. Let t, u ∈ TΣ,s, R0 = (Σ, E,R0), σ : X −→ TΣ, and ~x = x1, . . . , xn ∈
X. ( =⇒ ) By assumption, EΠ ` p(t, ~xσ) = > and R0 ` t → u. The
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R  p(~x)⇒©p(~x)
R  p(~x)⇒ p(~x) St∧
(l→r if γ)∈R
(θ,w,γ′,~v)∈Θ(l,r,γ)
EΠ  p(rθ,~v) = > if γθ ∧ γ′θ ∧ wθ = >
R  p(~x)⇒©p(~x) Nr1
Figure 4.1: Ground p-stability for R = (Σ, E,R), with Θ defined as in Theorem 7.
latter fact implies that R0 ` t →∗ u. Then, from the hypothesis, it follows
that p(u, ~xσ) = >. (⇐=) By induction on the number m of rewrite steps
proving R0 ` t→m u. If m = 0, then R0 ` t = u and by definition t =E u.
Since EΠ ` p(t, ~xσ) = >, it must be the case that EΠ ` p(u, ~xσ) = >. If
R0 ` t →m+1 u, then there is u0 ∈ TΣ,s such that R0 ` t → u0 ∧ u0 →m u.
If EΠ ` p(t, ~xσ) = >, then EΠ ` p(u0, ~xσ) = >. Moreover, from assumption
and the induction hypothesis R0 ` u0 →m u, it follows that EΠ ` p(u, ~xσ) =
>.
The next question to ask is how to reduce the verification of the simpler
condition p⇒©p to inductive equational reasoning. For this purpose, the
idea of (one-step) narrowing with equations modulo axioms [58], a sound
and complete method for ground stability analysis, is used to reduce the
inductive reachability problem of p-stability for TR to equational inductive
properties of T(Σ,E).
Under admissibility assumptions, the equations in R are a disjoint union
E unionmultiB of ground sort-decreasing, ground operationally terminating, ground
confluent, and ground coherent (w.r.t. the rules R) equations E modulo
structural axioms B such as associativity, commutativity, and identity. For
a combination of free and associative and/or commutative and/or identity
axioms, except for symbols f that are associative but not commutative,
a finitary B-unification algorithm exists. Instead, in general there is no
finitary E ∪B-unification algorithm. However, for Ω ⊆ Σ a signature of free
equational constructors modulo B (see Chapter 3) and an Ω-equality t = u,
the ground instances of CSUB(t = u) exactly characterize as its ground
instances the set GUE∪B(t = u).
Lemma 2. Let E = (Σ, E ∪ B) be an admissible order-sorted equational
theory with finitary B-unification algorithm and with Ω ⊆ Σ a signature
of free equational constructors modulo B. Then, for any t, u ∈ TΩ, the
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following equivalence holds:
α ∈ GUE∪B(t = u)
⇐⇒ (∃θ ∈ CSUB(t = u))(∃σ : X −→ TΩ) θσ =E∪B α.
(4.6)
Proof. Let t, u ∈ TΩ(X)s for some sort s in Σ. ( =⇒ ) Assume α ∈
GUE∪B(t = u), i.e., α : X −→ TΣ is such that tα =E∪B uα. Since Ω
is a subsignature of E-free constructors, there is β : X −→ TΩ satisfying
α =E∪B β and such that α(x) ↓Σ,E/B=B β(x), for x ∈ X. Consequently
tβ =B uβ. Hence, there is θ ∈ CSUB(t = u) and σ : X −→ TΩ such that
θσ =B β =E∪B α. (⇐=) Suppose θ ∈ CSUB(t = u) and let σ : X −→ TΩ
be a ground substitution. Then, it follows that tθσ =B uθσ and, a fortiori,
tθσ =E∪B uθσ. Hence, θσ ∈ GUE∪B(t = u) as desired.
In order to show the ground p-stability of R the approach is to prove,
for each rule l → r if γ ∈ R, that if for a ground instance lσ of l the
predicate p and the condition γσ hold, then p(~xσ) must hold in state rσ.
Since by assumption l ∈ TΩ,s(X), the key observation here is that, if all left
hand-sides p(v,~v) of equations p(v,~v) = w if γ′ ∈ EΠ defining the state
predicate p ∈ Π are Ω-patterns in the state parameter v (i.e., v ∈ TΩ(X),s),
then CSUB(l = v) can be computed to obtain substitutions θ which, by
Lemma 2, exactly characterize any ground E ∪B-unifier in GUE∪B(l = v).
Each substitution θ ∈ CSUB(l = v) is such that p(lθ, ~v) = >, or at least
p(lθ, ~v) could be equal to >. Hence, all that is left is the task of inductively
proving p(rθ,~v) = > under the assumptions γθ, γ′θ, and wθ = >. In this
way, the inductive reachability problem of p-stability for TR is recast as the
problem of proving simpler equational inductive properties of TΣ/E∪B: TR
is ground p-stable if and only if TΣ/E∪B satisfies these inductive properties,
as stated by the narrowing inference rule Nr1 in Figure 4.1.
Theorem 7 proves soundness and completeness of the narrowing inference
rule Nr1 in Figure 4.1.
Theorem 7. Let R = (Σ, E ∪B,R) be admissible with signature Ω ⊆ Σ of
(equational) free constructors modulo B. Let p ∈ Πs1,...,sn and l → r if γ ∈
R. Without loss of generality, assume that the equations EpΠ ⊆ EΠ defining
p are all conditional, have no variables in common with the rewrite rule, and
have Ω-patterns as left-hand sides in the state parameter. If
Θ(l,r,γ) =
⋃
(p(v,~v)=w if γ′)∈EpΠ
{(θ, w, γ′, ~v) | θ ∈ CSUB(v = l)},
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then inference rule Nr-1 in Figure 4.1 is sound and complete.
Proof. In the following proof, some equations and rules explicitly mention
the variables occurring in them, and also the domain of some substitutions
is restricted to subsets of X. Let R0 = {(∀Y ) l → r if C} and R0 =
(Σ, E∪B,R0). In order to simplify the proof, and without loss of generality,
assume that p ∈ Π is such that it has no parameters.
R is ground p-stable under R0
⇐⇒ { by definition of ground p-stability and Lemma 1 }
(∀t, u ∈ TΣ,s)
EΠ ` p(t) = > ∧R0 ` t→ u =⇒ EΠ ` p(u) = >
⇐⇒ { by definition of rewriting and by ER0 = ER }
(∀α : Y −→ TΣ)
EΠ ` p(lα) = > ∧ ER ` γα =⇒ EΠ ` p(rα) = >
⇐⇒ { by EΠ protecting ER and γα a ground Σ-formula }
(∀α : Y −→ TΣ)
EΠ ` p(rα) = > if p(lα) = > ∧ γα
⇐⇒ { by EΠ ground confluent, with Zv = vars(v) }
(∀α : Y −→ TΣ)(∀(p(v) = w if γ) ∈ EpΠ)(∀β : Zv −→ TΣ)
EΠ ` p(rα) = > if lα = vβ ∧ γ′β ∧ wβ = > ∧ γα
⇐⇒ { by assumption Y ∩Zv=∅, with η=α∪β and Xv=Y ∪Zv }
(∀(p(v) = w if γ′) ∈ EpΠ)(∀η : Xv −→ TΣ)
EΠ ` p(rη) = > if lη = vη ∧ γ′η ∧ wη = > ∧ γη
⇐⇒ { by Lemma 2: l, v ∈ TΩ(X)s and EΠ protecting ER }
(∀(p(v) = w if γ′) ∈EpΠ)(∀θ∈CSUB(l = v)B)(∀σ : ran(θ) −→ TΣ)
EΠ ` p(rθσ) = > if γ′θσ ∧ wθσ = > ∧ γθσ
⇐⇒ { by definition of  }
(∀(p(v) = w if γ′) ∈EpΠ)(∀θ∈CSUB(l = v))
EΠ  p(rθ) = > if γθ ∧ γ′θ ∧ wθ = >
⇐⇒ { by definition of Θ(l,r,γ) }
(∀(θ, w, γ′) ∈ Θ(l,r,γ))
EΠ  p(rθ) = > if γθ ∧ γ′θ ∧ wθ = >
Observe that obtaining a complete set of unifiers in the definition of Θ(l,r,γ)
in Theorem 7 only involves Σ-terms and not ΣΠ-terms. This is useful in
practice because the generation of proof obligations from Θ(l,r,γ) does not
depend on the state predicates defined in EΠ and therefore is not affected by
their equational definitions, no matter how involved these definitions may be.
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Also observe that, since the complete set of B-unifiers is finite, the set Θ(l,r,γ)
is also finite for each l→ r if γ ∈ R. Therefore, the set of proof obligations
is finite because of the finiteness assumptions on E and R. As a final remark,
observe that when w is ⊥ in an equation p(v,~v) = w if γ′ ∈ EpΠ, each proof
obligation p(rθ,~v) = > if γθ∧γ′θ∧wθ = > can be soundly ignored, because
wθ = ⊥θ = ⊥ 6= > since EΠ protects the sort Bool .
4.2.2 Ground Invariance
Invariants are among the most important safety properties. Given a set of
initial states characterized by I ∈ Πs′1,...,s′m , a state predicate p ∈ Πs1,...,sn
being ground invariant for R from the set of initial states I is the safety
property
KΠR |= I(xs′1 , . . . , xs′m)⇒ p(xs1 , . . . , xsn), (4.7)
where the si and s
′
j (resp., the xsi and x
′
sj ) need not be different, meaning
that for any ground substitution σ : X −→ TΣ, if I(xs′1 , . . . , xs′m)σ holds in
a state t ∈ TΣ,s, then p(xs1 , . . . , xsn)σ holds in any state u ∈ TΣ,s reachable
from t. In other words, the invariant p holds for all states reachable from
I. Since the set of initial states is defined in EΠ as a state predicate I ∈ Π,
an equational definition of I can of course capture an infinite set of initial
states, even in the case when I has no parameters.
In what follows, it is assumed that the states predicates in Π are paramet-
ric on the same tuple of sorts, say s1, . . . , sn. This does help in keeping the
syntax cleaner and the definitions simpler, without affecting the generality
of the approach.
Definition 14 (Ground Invariance). Let p, I ∈ Πs1,...,sn be state predicates
and ~x = xs1 , . . . , xsn ∈ X. Then:
• R is ground p-invariant from I under rules R0 ⊆ R if and only if for
all t, u ∈ TΣ,s and ground substitution σ : X −→ TΣ the following
implication holds:
EΠ ` I(t, ~xσ) = > ∧ (Σ, E,R0) ` t→∗ u =⇒ EΠ ` p(u, ~xσ) = >.
(4.8)
• R is ground p-invariant from I, written R  I(~x) ⇒ p(~x), if and
only if R is ground p-invariant from I under R.
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Ground p-invariance for R is intimately related to its ground p-stability
in the sense that if every initial state defined by a predicate I satisfies p
and R is p-stable, then R is p-invariant from I. Of course, the converse
does not necessarily hold, because even if R is ground p-invariant from I,
the set of states of TR satisfying p need not be closed under →R. The key
observation is that in TR, when every initial state defined by I satisfies p,
the set of states satisfying p characterizes an over-approximation of the set
of reachable states from the set of initial states specified by I.
In LTL terms, Lemma 3 justifies the soundness of the inference rule Inv
in Figure 4.2 for proving that p is an invariant from I in the Kripke structure
KΠR.
Lemma 3. Inference rule Inv in Figure 4.2 is sound.
Proof. Let t, u ∈ TΣ,s, R0 = (Σ, E,R0), and σ : X −→ TΣ be a ground
substitution. Assume (i) EΠ ` I(t, ~xσ) = > and (ii) R0 ` t→∗ u. From (1)
and (i) it follows that EΠ ` p(t, ~xσ) = >, and then from (2) and (ii), and
the latter claim, follows that EΠ  p(u, ~xσ) = >, as desired.
For any state predicates p, q ∈ Πs1,...,sn and ~x = x1, . . . , xn ∈ X, let
q(~x)⇒ p(~x)
be a shorthand for p(xs, ~x) = > if q(xs, ~x), where the xi are assumed differ-
ent from xs. Condition 1 in Lemma 3 states that every initial state specified
by I must satisfy property p, abbreviated R  I(~x) ⇒ p(~x). Observe that
this condition does not depend on the dynamics of TR, but only on its set of
states TΣ/E,s. The premises in inference rule Inv are used in the literature
to cast the notion of inductive invariant, i.e., of a predicate holding in the
set of initial states and being maintained true by every transition.
The only remaining question is how to prove I(~x)⇒ p(~x). This question
is answered by Theorem 8, which gives a necessary and sufficient condition
for proving statements of this form. Theorem 8 justifies the soundness of
the the inference rule C⇒ in Figure 4.2.
Theorem 8. Inference rule C⇒ in Figure 4.2 is sound.
Proof. ( =⇒ ) Let q(v, v1, . . . , vn) = w if γ′ ∈ EqΠ and assume EΠ ` γ′σ ∧
wσ = > for some ground substitution σ : X −→ TΣ. The goal is to show
EΠ ` p(v, v1, . . . , vn)σ = >. Note that EΠ ` γσ ∧ wσ = > implies EΠ `
q(v, v1, . . . , vn)σ = > witnessed by equation q(v, v1, . . . , vn) = w if γ′, and
therefore EΠ ` p(v, v1, . . . , vn)σ = > by hypothesis. (⇐=) Let t ∈ TΣ,s
50
R  I(~x)⇒ p(~x) R  p(~x)⇒ p(~x)
R  I(~x)⇒ p(~x) Inv
EΠ 
∧
(q(v,~v)=w if γ′)∈EqΠ
p(v,~v) = > if γ′ ∧ w = >
R  q(~x)⇒ p(~x) C⇒
Figure 4.2: R ground p-invariance from I.
and σ : X −→ TΣ. Assume EΠ ` q(t, ~xσ) = >. The goal is to prove
EΠ ` q(t, ~xσ). Then, there is q(v, v1, . . . , vn) = w if γ′ ∈ EqΠ and ground
substitution ρ : X −→ TΣ such that EΠ ` γ′ρ ∧ wρ = >, t =E vρ, and
ρ(vi) =E σ(xi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, it follows from the assumption that
EΠ ` p(v, v1, . . . , vn)ρ = >, that is, EΠ ` p(t, ~x)σ = > since E ⊆ EΠ.
4.3 Strengthenings for Ground Invariance
Strengthening of invariants is a key technique for verifying safety properties.
This section presents two strengthening techniques for ground invariance
and proves their correctness. In what follows, R = (Σ, E,R), Σ = (S,≤, F ),
s ∈ S, and Π = (ΣΠ, E ∪ EΠ) are as assumed in Section 4.2. It is also
assumed that the states predicates in Π are parametric on the same tuple
of sorts, say s1, . . . , sn, xs ∈ Xs, and ~x = xs1 , . . . , xsn are variables in X
different from xs.
For state predicates p, I ∈ Πs1,...,sn , a strengthening for the ground p-
invariance from I of a topmost rewrite theory R is given by a state predicate
q ∈ Πs1,...,sn such that R is ground q-invariant from I and, moreover, q can
be used to prove R  I(~x)⇒ p(~x). Traditionally, state predicate q is the
result of a gradual refinement of a too-weakly defined p for which R being
ground p-invariant cannot be proved directly by means of inference rule Inv
in Figure 4.2.
Recall that inference rule Inv says that if I(~x) ⇒ p(~x) and R is ground
p-stable, then R is ground p-invariant from I. The first key observation for
an strengthening technique is the following: R may be ground p-invariant
from I and yet not be ground p-stable. For ground p-invariance from I
the only states from which p need not be falsified are precisely those states
reachable from a state in I. The idea is then to strengthen p as follows: if R
is ground q-invariant from I and every state satisfying q also satisfies p (i.e.,
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q(~x) ⇒ p(~x)), then clearly R is ground p-invariant from I. This is because
any state in TR reachable from I satisfies p.
Theorem 9 states that for proving R  I(~x) ⇒ p(~x) by assuming R 
J(~x) ⇒ q(~x), it is sufficient to equationally check the inductive validity
of q(~x) ⇒ p(~x) and I(~x) ⇒ J(~x). In LTL terms, Theorem 9 proves the
soundness of inference rule Str1 in Figure 4.3.
Theorem 9. Inference rule Str1 in Figure 4.3 is sound.
Proof. Let t, u ∈ TΣ,s and σ : X −→ TΣ, assume that (i) EΠ ` I(t, ~xσ) = >
and (ii) R ` t→∗ u. The goal is to prove that EΠ ` p(u, ~xσ) = >. From (1)
and (i) follows EΠ ` J(t, ~xσ) = >. This, (2), and (ii) imply EΠ ` q(u, ~xσ) =
>, which together with (3) imply EΠ ` p(u, ~xσ) = >, as desired.
The second strengthening technique is inspired by the following inductive
observation. If R is ground q-invariant from I, then any state reachable
from an initial state in I satisfies q. In particular, if t is a state from which a
transition falsifies p’s stability, then q may be used to to prune those spurious
states by strengthening the condition of the stability proof obligation with
the additional information of q and t.
Rule Str2 in Figure 4.3 formalizes this strengthening, which is proved
sound in Theorem 10.
Theorem 10. Inference rule Str2 in Figure 4.3 is sound.
Proof. Let t, u ∈ TΣ,s and let σ : X −→ TΣ be a ground substitution.
Assume that: (i) I(~xσ) holds in state t and (ii) t →∗ u. The goal is to
prove that p(~xσ) holds in u. By induction on the number m of rewrite steps
proving R ` t→m u. If m = 0, then R ` t = u and since t, u ∈ TΣ,s and EΠ
protects E , it follows that t =E u. Then, from (i) and the first premise in
the inference rule, EΠ ` p(u, ~xσ) = >. If R ` t→m+1 u, then there is a state
u0 ∈ TΣ,s satisfying R ` t →m u0 ∧ u0 → u. By the induction hypothesis
EΠ ` p(u0, ~xσ) = > holds. From the second premise, EΠ ` q(u0, ~xσ) = >
holds. These two facts and the third premise in the rule, imply the goal
EΠ ` p(u, ~xσ) = >.
Theorem 11 proves the soundness of the narrowing inference rule Nr2 in
Figure 4.3.
Theorem 11. Let R = (Σ, E ∪ B,R) be admissible with signature Ω ⊆ Σ
of free constructors modulo B. Let p, q ∈ Πs1,...,sn and l → r if γ ∈ R.
Without loss of generality, assume that the equations EpΠ ⊆ EΠ defining p
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R  I(~x)⇒ J(~x) R  J(~x)⇒ q(~x)
R  q(~x)⇒ p(~x)
R  I ⇒ p Str1
R  I(~x)⇒ p(~x) R  I(~x)⇒ q(~x)
R  q(~x) ∧ p(~x)⇒©p(~x)
R  I(~x)⇒ p(~x) Str2
EΠ 
∧
(l→r if γ)∈R
(θ,w,γ′,~v)∈Θ(l,r,γ)
p(r,~v)θ = > if γθ ∧ γ′θ ∧ wθ=> ∧ q(l, ~v)θ=>
R  q(~x) ∧ p(~x)⇒©p(~x) Nr2
Figure 4.3: Strengthenings for R = (Σ, E,R), with Θ as defined in Theorem 10.
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are all conditional, have no variables in common with the rewrite rule, and
have Ω-patterns as left-hand sides in the state parameter. If
Θ(l,r,γ) =
⋃
(p(v,v1,...,vn)=w if γ′)∈EpΠ
{(θ, w, γ′, v1, . . . , vn) | θ ∈ CSUB(v = l)}.
then, inference rule Nr2 in Figure 4.3 is sound.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.
4.4 InvA: The Maude Invariant Analyzer Tool
The approach for proving ground stability properties in the InvA tool is
depicted in Figure 4.4.
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For a topmost rewrite theory R and of a set of state predicates Π specified
in Maude, the InvA tool mechanizes inference rules St, Inv, Str1, Str2,
Nr1, and Nr2. Given a ground stability or ground invariance property
ϕ, it generates equational proof obligations such that, if they hold, then
TR |= ϕ. It also supports proving properties of the form q ⇒ p. Thanks
to the availability since Maude 2.6 of unification modulo commutativity
(C), associativity and commutativity (AC), and modulo these theories plus
identities (U), and to the narrowing modulo infrastructure, the InvA tool
can handle modules with operators declared C, CU, AC, and ACU.
4.4.1 Commands Available to the User
The commands available in the InvA tool are the following:
(help .) shows the list of commands available in the tool.
(analyze-stable <pred> in <module> <module> .) generates the proof
obligations for proving the premise of inference St with inference Nr1,
for the given predicate and the given modules. The first module equa-
tionally specifies the state predicate and the second one the topmost
rewrite theory. This command tries to eagerly discharge the proof
obligations; those that cannot be discharged are shown to the user.
(analyze-stable <pred> in <module> <module> assuming <pred> .)
generates the proof obligations for proving the third premise of infer-
ence Str2 with inference Nr2, for the given predicate and the given
modules. The first module equationally specifies the state predicates
and the second one the topmost rewrite theory. This command tries
to eagerly discharge the proof obligations; those that cannot be dis-
charged are shown to the user.
(analyze <pred> implies <pred> in <module> .) generates the proof
obligations for proving the given implication in the given module, ac-
cording to inference C⇒. This command tries to eagerly discharge the
proof obligations; those that cannot be discharged are shown to the
user.
(show pos .) shows the proof obligations computed in the last analyze
command that could not be discharged; those that were discharged
are not shown.
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(show-all pos .) shows all the proof obligations computed in the last
analyze command.
Observe that the analysis commands in InvA give direct tool support for
deductive reasoning with some of the inference rules presented in this chap-
ter, but not for all of them. For example, there is no command in InvA
directly supporting deduction with inference rule Inv. Nevertheless, de-
duction with all inference rules in this chapter is supported by InvA via
combination of commands. For example, deduction with inference rule Inv
can be achieved by combining the analyze and analyze-stable commands.
4.4.2 Automatic Discharge of Proof Obligations
After applying rules St, Inv, Str1, Str2, Nr1, and Nr2 according to the
user commands, the InvA tool uses rewriting-based reasoning and narrowing
procedures, and SMT decision procedures for automatically discharging as
many of the generated equational proof obligations as possible. For an
admissible equational specification E = (Σ, E ∪ B) and a conditional proof
obligation ϕ of the form
t = u if γ,
the InvA tool applies a proof-search strategy such that, if it succeeds, then
the Kripke structure associated to the initial reachability model satisfies ϕ.
Otherwise, if the proof-search fails, the proof obligation ϕ (or an equivalent
variant) is output to the user.
For the proof-search process, the InvA tool first tries to simplify Boolean
expressions in ϕ and assumes that any operator ‘∼’ is an equationally defined
equality predicate, i.e., an equality enrichment (see Section 2.3). Using this
information, a Boolean transformation can be applied recursively to ϕ with
the additional information of the equality enrichment, if any is defined.
The goal of the Boolean transformation process is to obtain, if possible, an
inductively equivalent proof obligation ϕ′ for which the of automatic search
techniques, explained below, have better chances of success.
The following is a description of the Boolean transformations applied re-
cursively by the tool:
• If t = u in ϕ is such that t is of the form t1 ∼ t2 and u of the form ⊥,
then ϕ is transformed into > = ⊥ if γ ∧ t1 = t2.
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• If v1 = v2, with v1, v2 ∈ TΣ(X)Bool , is any of the Σ-equalities in the
condition γ of ϕ, then:
– If v1 is of the form v
1
1 ∼ v21 and v2 of the form >, then v1 = v2 is
replaced by v11 = v
2
1.
– If v1 is of the form v
1
1 u · · · u vn1 and v2 of the form >, then
v1 = v2 is replaced by v
1
1 = > ∧ · · · ∧ vn1 = >. Note that the vi1
have sort Bool .
– If v1 is of the form v
1
1 unionsq · · · unionsq vn1 and v2 of the form ⊥, then
v1 = v2 is replaced by v
1
1 = ⊥ ∧ · · · ∧ vn1 = ⊥. Note that the vi1
have sort Bool .
Recall that u and unionsq are the conjunction and disjunction function symbols
used by the equality enrichment introduced in Section 2.3. Also note that Σ-
equalities are unoriented, and thus in the Boolean transformation the order
of terms in the equalities is immaterial.
After the Boolean transformation is completed, the following strategy
is applied to the resulting proof obligation. Assume ϕ has been already
simplified by the above transformation. Let t, u, γ be obtained by replacing
each variable x ∈ X by a new constant x ∈ X, with Σ ∩X = ∅.
Equational simplification. First, the strategy checks if ϕ holds trivially,
i.e., if t ↓Σ,E/B=B u ↓Σ,E/B or there is ti = ui in γ such that ti ↓Σ,E/B
, ui ↓Σ,E/B∈ TΣ but ti ↓Σ,E/B 6=B ui ↓Σ,E/B. Some simplifications in
the form of reduction to canonical forms can be made to ϕ, even if
they do not yield a trivial proof of ϕ. In some cases, such canonical
reductions are incorporated into ϕ and the Boolean transformation
used again.
Context joinability. Second, it checks whether ϕ is context-joinable [33].
The proof obligation ϕ is context-joinable if t and u are joinable in the
rewrite theory RϕE = (Σ(X), B,
−→
E ∪−→γ ), obtained by making variables
into constants and by orienting the equations E as rewrite rules
−→
E and
heuristically orienting each equality ti = ui in γ as a sequent ti → ui
in −→γ .
Unfeasability. Third, it checks if the proof obligation is unfeasible [33].
The proof obligation ϕ is unfeasible if there is a conjunct ti → ui in −→γ
and v, w ∈ TΣ(X) such that RϕE ` ti → v∧ti → w, CSUB(v = w) = ∅,
and v and w are strongly irreducible with
−→
E modulo B.
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SMT Solving. Last, it checks if the proof obligation can be proved by
an SMT decision procedure. The condition γ of the proof obligation
ϕ is analyzed and, if possible, a subformula consisting only of arith-
metic subexpressions is extracted. This subformula has the following
property: if it is a contradiction, then γ is unsatisfiable. Therefore,
if the SMT decision procedure answers that the input subformula is
unsatisfiable, then, as in the previous test, ϕ is unfeasible.
Because of the admissibility assumptions on (Σ, E ∪ B), the first test of
the strategy either succeeds or fails in finitely many equational rewrite steps.
For the second and third tests, the strategy is not guaranteed to succeed or
fail in finitely many rewrite steps because the oriented sequents −→γ can falsify
the termination assumption. So, for these last two checks, InvA uses a bound
on the depth of the proof-search.
4.5 Related Work and Concluding Remarks
Chandy and Misra [20] and Manna and Pnueli [68] pursued the idea of using
a deductive methodology to prove the invariance properties of concurrent
systems specified in imperative languages. The notion of stability was in-
spired by the definition of the stable predicate in [76]. A comprehensive
account of the vast literature on deductive approaches for verifying invari-
ants of concurrent systems is beyond the scope of the present work; the aim
here is more modest, namely, the focus is on related work using rewriting
techniques for the deductive verification of invariants.
Rusu [94] proposes an approach for verifying invariant properties of a
(possibly infinite-state) concurrent system specified by an unconditional top-
most rewrite theory, following the ideas of Bruni and Meseguer [18]. That
approach consists in casting an invariance problem of the form R  I ⇒ p
as an inductive problem of an equational theory M(R, I) in membership
equational logic, an equational sublogic of rewriting logic, as follows: R 
I ⇒ p if and only if M(R, I)  p(t) = > for every ground term t of sort
Reachable, and t has sort Reachable inM(R, I) if and only if t isR-reachable
from I. The approach in [94] is complemented by bounded symbolic execu-
tion, achieved by narrowing modulo, so that a property can be symbolically
tested before trying to prove it invariant. The key difference between this
approach and the one in this chapter is that the proof obligations generated
for proving M(R, I)  p(t) = > do not take advantage of p’s equational
definition, in contrast to the narrowing-based reasoning incorporated in the
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inference system here. The approach in this section can benefit from us-
ing narrowing for the symbolic testing of state predicates, although more
research is required for handling conditional rewrite theories.
Proof scores in the OTS/CafeOBJ method are used to prove invariant
properties of concurrent systems specified by observational transition sys-
tems (OTS) [80]. This approach has been applied for verifying safety prop-
erties of large specifications, including communication protocols. The ap-
proach is to divide a formula stating an invariant property into reasonably
smaller ones by exploiting properties of the Boolean operators, each of which
is proved by writing proof scores (or proof obligations) to be discharged indi-
vidually by equational rewriting. The main difference between the approach
presented here and the OTS one is that proof scores are constructed and
manipulated manually by the user, which adds considerable time to the veri-
fication process. The interesting idea of exploiting the properties of Boolean
operators needs to be further studied and considered within the inference
framework here.
Combinations of deductive and algorithmic techniques have also been pro-
posed for proving temporal logic properties ϕ of a (possibly infinite-state)
concurrent system specified by a rewrite theory R = (Σ, E,R). Equational
abstraction [74] reduces the problem of whetherR satisfies ϕ to model check-
ing ϕ on a finite state abstract version R/∆ = (Σ, E∪E∆, R∪R∆). Invisible
transitions [42] approach the problem of whether R satisfies ϕ by identifying
a subset S ⊆ R of rewrite rules that are ϕ-invisible (i.e., rewriting with S
does not change the truth value of the predicate ϕ) to model checking that
property on a finite state simplified version R/S = (Σ, E ∪ S,R \ S). Both
equational abstractions and invisible transition techniques tackle the veri-
fication problem of infinite-state systems by making finite the state space
explosion, so that model checking methods are decidable. These two ap-
proaches, as it is also the case in the approach discussed here, require user-
intervention for defining, respectively, the abstraction predicates and the
invisible rewrite rules, and for discharging the inductive proof obligations
resulting from the corresponding transformations (i.e., admissibility con-
ditions plus the proof obligations specific to each method). In particular,
the checking algorithms based on narrowing presented in this chapter can be
used to generate proof obligations for checking the rewrite rules S ⊆ R of R,
p-invisible for a state predicate p. These approaches can complement each
other and can be combined, resulting in a powerful and versatile framework
for proving temporal properties of rewrite theories. The mechanization of
these three approaches in order to reduce user intervention is an exciting
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topic for further research.
Narrowing-based symbolic model checking techniques for topmost rewrite
theories R have been previously studied in [38], where the idea is to “fold”
the narrowing tree forR that can in practice result in finite-state system that
symbolically simulates R. It is worth pursuing an extension of these nar-
rowing symbolic model checking techniques for conditional rewrite theories,
so that the two approaches can be combined for symbolic model checking
and for symbolic simulation (following the idea of Rusu in [94]).
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CHAPTER 5
INVA CASE STUDY I: RELIABLE COMMUNICATION
IN THE ALTERNATING BIT PROTOCOL
This chapter presents the first case study about the deductive analysis of
inductive safety properties using the methodology, the proof system, and the
Maude Invariant Analyzer tool (InvA) introduced in Chapter 4. The subject
of study is a highly concurrent protocol for reliable data communication
across a lossy channel. As a result, this chapter reports on the successful
and full mechanical verification in the InvA tool of a main invariant for the
communication protocol.
Implementations of the message-passing model, such as TCP/IP, provide
the programmer with an abstraction of a stream of data messages that
communicate two parties such that each message is delivered in the order
sent. However, the physical communication between these two parties is
not necessarily reliable. Due to congestion in the network (other traffic),
transient noise, buffer overflows, or other problems, some of the messages
sent out over the network may not actually arrive to the other end, or
they may arrive incomplete or corrupted (usually detected with some sort
of checksum). Furthermore, messages may arrive out of order. Therefore, it
is necessary to include in these message-passing implementations a protocol
that ensures that when a message is lost, it is retransmitted by the sender.
At the same time, the protocol must guarantee that duplicate messages are
not delivered to the receiver and that the delivery order is consistent with
the sending order.
The Alternating Bit Protocol (ABP) [8], is a simple, yet effective, pro-
tocol for managing the retransmission of lost or corrupted messages. The
protocol works by identifying two processes, the sender and receiver, each
with a control bit called the alternating bit, using a lossy channel. Both
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sender and receiver can send messages across the channel and every mes-
sage sent is signed with the current bit. By using the alternating bits, the
protocol can successfully identify message loss or corruption. In the proof
technologies that address distributed concurrent non-deterministic systems,
ABP is a well-established benchmark and it is perhaps the simplest non-
trivial example of such a system. This chapter uses ABP as the basis of the
analysis.
The invariant in this case study is about reliable communication in ABP,
which is the main safety property of the protocol. As a result of the case
study, a fully mechanized proof for the correctness of the protocol is ob-
tained with the InvA tool, and with help of Maude’s ITP that was useful
for discharging some equational proof obligations and auxiliary lemmata.
The proof relies heavily on the specification and verification methods of
Chapter 4, and their implementation in the InvA tool.
This chapter is organized as follows. A summary of ABP and the mod-
eling methodology in Maude are explained in Section 5.1. The discussion
on the verification task for the reliability property of ABP is documented in
Section 5.2. Related work and a comparison with other formal verification
case studies regarding the protocol are collected in Section 5.3. The formal
specification of ABP and a proof of its admissibility, including the specifi-
cation of state predicates, auxiliary functions, auxiliary lemmata, and ITP
proof scripts can be found in Appendix B.
5.1 ABP
The Alternating Bit Protocol (ABP) [8] is a data layer protocol. It was
designed to achieve reliable full-duplex data transfer between two processes
over an unreliable half-duplex transmission line in which messages can be
lost or corrupted in a detectable way. The data link layer, the second lowest
layer in the OSI seven layer model, splits data into frames for sending on
the physical layer and receives acknowledgment frames. It performs error
checking and re-transmits frames not received correctly. It provides an error-
free virtual channel to the network layer, the third lowest layer in the OSI
layer model.
The overall structure of ABP is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The protocol
comprises an input stream of data to be transmitted, a sender and a receiver
process, each having a data buffer and a one bit state, a data channel for
data-bit pairs called bit-packets, an acknowledgment channel for bit-packets
61
data bit data bit
output streamack channelinput stream
data channel
Figure 5.1: The Alternating Bit Protocol.
consisting of a single bit, and an output data stream. Here is how the
protocol works:
• The sender process starts by repeatedly sending bit-packets (b, d1) into
the data channel, where b is the sender’s bit and d1 is the first element
of the input stream.
• The receiver process starts by waiting until it receives the bit-packet
(b, d1), and then it repeatedly sends b over the acknowledgment chan-
nel.
• When the source process receives b, it begins repeatedly sending the
bit-packet (flip(b), d2), where d2 is the second element of the input
stream, which is what the receiver process is now waiting for.
• When the target receives (flip(b), d2), it begins sending packets con-
taining flip(b).
• At any moment either channel can duplicate or lose its oldest packet,
if any.
• And so on ...
The protocol is highly concurrent and non-deterministic because, for in-
stance, it is unknown how long will it take before a bit-packet gets through.
To guarantee progress, it must be assumed that the channels are fair, in the
sense that if the sender persists, eventually a bit-packet will get through.
The reason is that without this assumption the algorithm is not correct
because data transmission might fail forever. However, this is a fairness
assumption that is not needed for analyzing the reliable communication
enforced by the protocol. Remember that a safety property assures that
“nothing bad happens”, even when nothing ever happens.
5.1.1 Formal Modeling
The ABP specification in Maude has 9 modules. This section should be read
in connection with Appendix B, which contains the full formal specification.
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At the top level, the state space is represented by the top sort Sys defined
in module ABP-STATE, which is a 6-tuple:
sort Sys .
op _:_>_|_<_:_ : iNat Bit BitPacketQueue BitQueue Bit iNatList
-> Sys [ctor] .
The arguments of a state are the data from the input stream currently
being transmitted by the sender (as iNat), the bit of the sender (as Bit),
the data channel (as BitPacketQueue), the acknowledgment channel (as
BitQueue), the bit of the receiver (as Bit), and the output stream (as
iNatList).
The sort iNat is that of natural numbers in Peano notation, together with
an equality enrichment. Natural numbers are used to represent packets in
the potentially infinite input stream.
sort iNat .
op 0 : -> iNat [ctor] .
op s_ : iNat -> iNat [ctor] .
op _~_ : iNat iNat -> Bool [comm] .
Bits are defined in module BIT by sort Bit with two constructor constants,
a ‘flipping’ operator, and an equality enrichment:
sort Bit .
ops on off : -> Bit [ctor] .
op flip : Bit -> Bit .
op _~_ : Bit Bit -> Bool [comm] .
eq flip(on)
= off .
eq flip(off)
= on .
Sort BitPacketQueue represents lists of bit-packets, sort BitQueue rep-
resents lists of bits, and sort iNatList represents lists of natural numbers.
They are all lists defined in the usual way: an empty list is identified by the
constructor constant nil, “cons” is a constructor binary symbol denoted by
juxtaposition, and append is a defined binary symbol denoted by ‘;’. For
instance, sort BitQueue defined in module BIT-QUEUE is specified as follows:
sort BitQueue .
op nil : -> BitQueue [ctor] .
op __ : Bit BitQueue -> BitQueue [ctor prec 61] .
op _;_ : BitQueue BitQueue -> BitQueue [prec 65] .
eq nil ; BQ:BitQueue
= BQ:BitQueue .
eq B1:Bit BQ1:BitQueue ; BQ2:BitQueue
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= B:Bit (BQ1:BitQueue ; BQ2:BitQueue) .
Having covered the basic notation, consider the following ground term of
sort Sys representing a state in the system:
s(0) : on > (off,0) nil | nil < off : (0 nil)
In this state, the packet from the input stream currently being sent in s(0),
the sender’s bit is on, the data channel contains only the bit-packet (off,0),
the acknowledgment channel is empty, the receiver’s bit is off, and the
output stream consists only of the packet 0.
Finally, module ABP specifies the operation of the protocol with 15 rewrite
rules. These rewrite rules model the transmission of the bit-packets through
the data channel, the reception of acknowledgments from the receiver, data
duplication and loss, among other behaviors of the system. For instance,
consider the following five rewrite rules:
rl [send-1] :
N:iNat : B1:Bit > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList
=> N:iNat : B1:Bit > BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; ((B1:Bit, N:iNat) nil)
| BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList .
rl [recv-1b] :
N:iNat : on > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| off BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList
=> s(N:iNat) : off > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList .
rl [recv-1c] :
N:iNat : off > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| on BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList
=> s(N:iNat) : on > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList .
rl [recv-2a] :
N:iNat : B1:Bit > (on,N2:iNat) BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < on : NL:iNatList
=> N:iNat : B1:Bit > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < off : (N2:iNat NL:iNatList) .
rl [dup-1] :
N:iNat : B1:Bit > BP:BitPacket BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList
=> N:iNat : B1:Bit > BP:BitPacket (BP:BitPacket BPQ:BitPacketQueue)
| BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList .
The effects of these rules in a state can be summarized as follows:
[send-1] models the “fifo” placement of the current bit-packet in the data
channel (the acknowledgment channel behaves in the same way).
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[recv-1b] models the reception of the acknowledgment the sender was
waiting for and thus the sender process immediately updates the packet
to be transmitted with the next available packet from the input stream
and flips its communication bit.
[recv-1c] models the reception of an acknowledgment the sender was not
waiting for and thus the acknowledgment is ignored.
[recv-2a] models the reception of a bit-packet whose contents are put in
the output stream.
[dup-1] duplicates the first message in the data channel.
Note that because of rule [recv-1c], for instance, the formal model of the
ABP has potentially infinitely many reachable states: every time a packet is
successfully transmitted, the sender’s counter modeling the input stream is
increased by one and then the whole sending process starts over again but
the next packet.
5.2 Reliable Communication
The analysis that follows is based on the formal model explained in Sec-
tion 5.1.1.
One of the main properties the ABP should enjoy is the reliable commu-
nication property. This means that the protocol makes possible to reliably
communicate and deliver information from a source to a destination, even
in the presence of unreliable channels of communication. The goal in this
section is to report on the experience of using the InvA tool in the successful
and mechanical verification of this property.
5.2.1 Formal Specification of the Property
Reliable communication in ABP means that whenever n packets have been
delivered, these were the first n packets sent in that particular order. Note
that this is a property that must hold for each natural number n and that
cannot be effectively checked by means of direct algorithmic techniques, such
as model checking the ABP specification, even if the set of initial states is
finite.
The reliable communication property is expressed by the state predicate
inv-main and is defined as follows:
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op inv-main : Sys -> Bool .
eq [inv-main-1] :
inv-main(N:iNat : B:Bit > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < B:Bit : NL:iNatList)
= (N:iNat NL:iNatList) ~ gen-list(N:iNat) .
ceq [inv-main-2] :
inv-main(N:iNat : B1:Bit > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < B2:Bit : NL:iNatList)
= NL:iNatList ~ gen-list(N:iNat)
if B1:Bit ~ B2:Bit = false .
op gen-list : iNat -> iNatList .
eq gen-list(0)
= (0 nil) .
eq gen-list(s N)
= (s N) gen-list(N) .
State predicate inv-main is fully defined by two equations and uses the
auxiliary function gen-list. Equation [inv-main-1] considers the case in
which the parity of the sender and receiver bits coincides. In this case, the
reliable communication property holds if and only if the delivered packets
correspond to all but the last packet sent and they are all in order. Equation
[inv-main-2] considers the case in which the parity of the sender and
receiver bits does not coincide. In this case, the reliable communication
property holds if and only if the delivered packets correspond to all packets
sent and they are all in order. Given a natural number n, function gen-list
generates the list of the first n natural numbers in decreasing order.
Consider the rule [recv-2b] that models packet reception in ABP in order
to motivate the correctness of the reliable communication property:
rl [recv-2b] :
N:iNat : B:Bit > (off,N1:iNat) BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < off : NL:iNatList
=> N:iNat : B:Bit > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < on : (N1:iNat NL:iNatList) .
Note that when a packet N1:iNat is received, there is no assumption made
on the relationship between N1:iNat and the current packet from the input
stream N:iNat or the already delivered packets NL:iNatList. In this case,
there is no obvious reason for the reliable communication property to hold,
even if a state initially satisfies this property.
The goal is to prove the ABP inv-main-invariant from init. State predi-
cate init defines the set of initial states as follows:
op init : Sys -> [Bool] .
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eq [init-1] :
init( 0 : on > nil | nil < on : nil)
= true .
eq [init-2] :
init( 0 : off > nil | nil < off : nil)
= true .
The set of initial states for the verification task at hand, as defined by init,
consists of exactly two states. Namely, those states where the packet to be
transmitted is 0, the sender and receiver bits coincide, the communication
channels are empty, and no packet has been delivered.
The following verification commands can be given to the InvA tool in order
to check if state predicate inv-main is an inductive invariant from init:
(analyze init(S:Sys) implies inv-main(S:Sys) in ABP-PREDS .)
(analyze-stable inv-main(S:Sys) in ABP-PREDS ABP .)
It is assumed that module ABP-PREDS contains the state predicates and
their corresponding auxiliary function symbols, and module ABP contains
the specification of ABP, as explained in Section 5.1.1 and documented in
Appendix B.
When issuing the above-mentioned commands, the InvA tool generates
the following output:
Checking ABP-PREDS ||- init(S:Sys) => inv-main(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 2
Proof obligations discharged: 2
Success!
Checking ABP-PREDS ||- inv-main(S:Sys) => O inv-main(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 30
Proof obligations discharged: 22
The following proof obligations need to be discharged:
8. from inv-main-2 & recv-2b : pending
inv-main(#7:iNat : #8:Bit > #10:BitPacketQueue
| #11:BitQueue < on :(#9:iNat #12:iNatList)) = true
if off ~ #8:Bit = false
/\ #12:iNatList = gen-list(#7:iNat).
...
The tool generates 32 proof obligations and automatically discharges 24
of them. The remaining 8 proof obligations are returned to the user; in
the snapshot, only one proof obligation for ground stability that was not
automatically discharged is shown and it is identified by label 8.
Upon inspection of the InvA’s output, it is relatively easy to observe
that inv-main is not an inductive invariant for ABP. Indeed, consider the
proof obligation identified by label 8, as show in the snapshot above, and
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a ground interpretation where #8:Bit is on, #7:iNat and #9:iNat are 0,
and #12:iNatList is the singleton list 0 nil. For this particular ground
instantiation, the condition in the proof obligation is satisfied because on ~
off reduces to false and the value returned by gen-list on input 0 is the
ground list 0 nil. However, by equation [inv-main-2] in the definition of
predicate inv-main, this proof obligation is false because the lefthand side
of the conclusion reduces to the Boolean term 0 nil ~ 0 0 nil, which
ultimately reduces to false. This is evidence of the fact that a stronger
predicate is needed, that is, inv-main needs to be strengthened.
5.2.2 Strengthening the Invariant
The first observation to make is that the InvA tool would be able to automat-
ically discharge more proof obligations and also return simpler ones, if there
was some mechanism for achieving case analysis on the sort Bit. Since the
InvA internals do not offer this feature yet, a practical approach is to include
the case splitting as part of the predicate’s equational definition (similarly
to what was done in the definition of state predicate init). For instance,
state predicate inv is a finer-grained version of inv-main that exhibits the
idea of case splitting on the sort Bit for the case of the bits in the sender
and receiver.
op inv : Sys -> Bool .
eq [inv-1a] :
inv(N:iNat : on > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < on : NL:iNatList)
= (N:iNat NL:iNatList) ~ gen-list(N:iNat) .
eq [inv-1a] :
inv(N:iNat : off > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < off : NL:iNatList)
= (N:iNat NL:iNatList) ~ gen-list(N:iNat) .
eq [inv-2a] :
inv(N:iNat : on > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < off : NL:iNatList)
= NL:iNatList ~ gen-list(N:iNat) .
eq [inv-2a] :
inv(N:iNat : off > BPQ:BitPacketQueue
| BQ:BitQueue < on : NL:iNatList)
= NL:iNatList ~ gen-list(N:iNat) .
Since the case analysis on the sort Bit is already implemented in predi-
cate inv, and this is potentially useful for automation in the overall proof,
this predicate is preferred over predicate inv-main. The idea is then to
strengthen inv instead of inv-main. Within the overall context of the ver-
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ification task, the change of predicate inv-main for inv requires a formal
proof of the following implications:
ABP  init⇒ inv and ABP  inv⇒ inv-main.
These two proof obligations can be analyzed with the help of inference rule
C⇒ in Section 4.4. The InvA’s mechanization of this inference rule can
automatically discharge the implications:
Checking ABP-PREDS ||- init(S:Sys) => inv(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 2
Proof obligations discharged: 2
Success!
Checking ABP-PREDS ||- inv(S:Sys) => inv-main(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 4
Proof obligations discharged: 4
Success!
Finding a strengthening for inv is not an easy task at first sight. The non-
obvious relationships between the channels and the alternating bits, and the
many rules that can concurrently apply to a state make this harder. But it
is the deep understanding of these relationships that guides the proof effort
for obtaining a useful, yet succinct and elegant, strengthening for inv.
The key to it all is that the channels behave under some sort of uniformity
that is parametric on the sender and receiver bits. This notion of uniformity
can be precisely captured with the help of some auxiliary predicates for
the two communication channels. Indeed, consider the following auxiliary
predicates all-packets and good-packet-queue:
op all-packets : BitPacketQueue Bit iNat -> Bool .
eq [ap-1] :
all-packets(nil,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true .
eq [ap-2] :
all-packets(BP:BitPacket BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= BP:BitPacket ~ (B:Bit,N:iNat) and
all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .
op good-packet-queue : BitPacketQueue Bit iNat -> Bool .
eq [gpq-1] :
good-packet-queue(nil,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true .
ceq [gpq-2] :
good-packet-queue((B1:Bit,N1:iNat) BPQ:BitPacketQueue,
B:Bit,N:iNat)
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= N:iNat ~ s(N1:iNat) and
good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
if B1:Bit = flip(B:Bit) .
eq [gpq-3] :
good-packet-queue((B:Bit,N1:iNat) BPQ:BitPacketQueue,
B:Bit,N:iNat)
= N:iNat ~ N1:iNat and
all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:Nat) .
Predicate all-packets on input BPQ:BitPacketQueue and (B:Bit,N:iNat)
is true if and only if all bit-packets in BPQ have the form (B,N). Predicate
good-packet-queue on input BPQ:BitPacketQueue and (B:Bit,N:iNat)
is true if and only if BPQ can be split into two parts, one of them possibly
empty, where in the initial part of the channel all packets are of the form
(flip(B),N-1) and in the second part of the form (B,N). For example:
good-packet-queue((on,3) (off,4) (off,4) nil, off, 4) = true
good-packet-queue((on,3) (on,3) nil, off, 4) = true
good-packet-queue((off,4) nil, off, 4) = true
good-packet-queue((off,4) (on,4) nil, off, 4) = false
Auxiliary predicates all-bits and good-bit-queue are similar to the
auxiliary predicates just discussed for channels of bit-packets, but they are
about channels of bits.
op all-bits : BitQueue Bit -> Bool .
eq [ab-1] :
all-bits(nil,B:Bit)
= true .
eq [ab-2] :
all-bits(B1:Bit BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= B1:Bit ~ B:Bit and all-bits(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit) .
op good-bit-queue : BitQueue Bit -> Bool .
eq [gbq-1] :
good-bit-queue(nil,B:Bit)
= true .
ceq [gbq-2] :
good-bit-queue(B1:Bit BQ:BitQueue, B:Bit)
= good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit)
if B1:Bit = flip(B:Bit) .
eq [gbq-3] :
good-bit-queue(B:Bit BQ:BitQueue, B:Bit)
= all-bits(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit) .
The strengthening for inv is the state predicate good-queues that uses
the auxiliary predicates above-mentioned:
op good-queues : Sys -> Bool .
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2/2
init⇒ inv C⇒
2/2
init⇒ gq C⇒
28/48
(48/48)
gq⇒©gq Nr1
gq⇒ gq St
init⇒ gq Inv
46/48
(48/48)
gq ∧ inv⇒©inv Nr2
init⇒ inv Str2
4/4
inv⇒ inv-main C⇒
init⇒ inv-main Str1
Figure 5.2: Correctness proof of the Alternating Bit Protocol (gq stands for good-queues).
The expression d/g denotes the number g of proof obligations generated and the number
d of proof obligations automatically discharged by the InvA tool; the same expression in
parenthesis has the same meaning but includes the use of the ITP and/or some auxiliary
lemmata. Some trivial inferences have been omitted.
eq [good-queues-1a] :
good-queues(N:iNat : on > BPQ:BitPacketQueue |
BQ:BitQueue < on : NL:iNatList)
= all-bits(BQ:BitQueue,on) and
good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,on,N:iNat) .
eq [good-queues-1b] :
good-queues(N:iNat : off > BPQ:BitPacketQueue |
BQ:BitQueue < off : NL:iNatList)
= all-bits(BQ:BitQueue,off) and
good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,off,N:iNat) .
eq [good-queues-2a] :
good-queues(N:iNat : on > BPQ:BitPacketQueue |
BQ:BitQueue < off : NL:iNatList)
= good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,off) and
all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,on,N:iNat) .
eq [good-queues-2b] :
good-queues(N:iNat : off > BPQ:BitPacketQueue |
BQ:BitQueue < on : NL:iNatList)
= good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,on) and
all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,off,N:iNat) .
State predicate good-queues is fully defined by 4 equations. It characterizes
the patterns observed on the communication channels, and their relationship
with the alternating bits.
As it will be shown, the strengthening good-queues of inv is enough to
prove the correctness of ABP. Figure 5.2 depicts the full proof-tree for the
ground invariance of inv-main from init that uses state predicates inv and
good-queues.
The next step in the prove is to check
ABP  good-queues ∧ inv⇒©inv and
ABP  init⇒ good-queues,
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since the following two properties have been already proved:
ABP  init⇒ inv and ABP  inv⇒ inv-main.
When checking good-queues ∧ inv⇒©inv, the following is the output
given by the InvA tool:
rewrites: 97315 in 348ms cpu (346ms real) (279623 rewrites/second)
Checking ABP-PREDS ||- inv(S:Sys) => O inv(S:Sys)
assuming good-queues(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 48
Proof obligations discharged: 46
The following proof obligations could not be discharged:
8. from inv-1a & recv-2b : pending
gen-list(#5:iNat)~(#6:iNat #9:iNatList) = true
if #5:iNat = #6:iNat
/\ all-bits(#8:BitQueue,off) = true
/\ all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,off,#5:iNat) = true
/\ gen-list(#5:iNat) = #5:iNat #9:iNatList .
46. from inv-1a & recv-2a : pending
gen-list(#5:iNat)~(#6:iNat #9:iNatList) = true
if #5:iNat = #6:iNat
/\ all-bits(#8:BitQueue,on) = true
/\ all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,on,#5:iNat) = true
/\ gen-list(#5:iNat) = #5:iNat #9:iNatList .
The tool generates 48 proof obligations and automatically discharges 46 of
them. The remaining 2 proof obligations are about properties of lists of nat-
ural numbers. Note that the Boolean transformation internally implemented
by the InvA tool (explained in Section 4.4) splits the Boolean conjunctions in
the specification of good-queues into conditions and the equality predicate
‘∼’ into ‘=’, whenever it was possible. A proof script for proof obligations 8
and 46, that automatically discharges these proof obligations, can be given
to the ITP as follows:
(goal po8 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ #5:iNat ; #6:iNat ; #9:iNatList ;
#8:BitQueue ; #7:BitPacketQueue }
(
(#5:iNat) = (#6:iNat) &
(all-bits(#8:BitQueue,off)) = (true) &
(all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,off,#5:iNat)) = (true) &
(gen-list(#5:iNat)) = (#5:iNat #9:iNatList)
=>
(gen-list(#5:iNat) ~ (#6:iNat #9:iNatList)) = (true)
)
.)
(auto .)
(goal po46 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ #5:iNat ; #6:iNat ; #9:iNatList ;
#8:BitQueue ; #7:BitPacketQueue }
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((#5:iNat) = (#6:iNat) &
(all-bits(#8:BitQueue,on)) = (true) &
(all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,on,#5:iNat)) = (true) &
(gen-list(#5:iNat)) = (#5:iNat #9:iNatList)
=>
(gen-list(#5:iNat) ~ (#6:iNat #9:iNatList)) = (true)
)
.)
(auto .)
The following is the output of the ITP:
=================================
label-sel: po8#0@0
=================================
A{#5:iNat ; #6:iNat ; #7:BitPacketQueue ; #8:BitQueue ; #9:iNatList}
gen-list(#5:iNat) = #5:iNat #9:iNatList
& all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,off,#5:iNat) = true
& all-bits(#8:BitQueue,off) = true & #5:iNat = #6:iNat
==> gen-list(#5:iNat)~(#6:iNat #9:iNatList) = true
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
rewrites: 10751 in 173ms cpu (181ms real) (61990 rewrites/second)
Eliminated current goal.
q.e.d
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
rewrites: 9172 in 51ms cpu (51ms real) (177962 rewrites/second)
=================================
label-sel: po46#1@0
=================================
A{#5:iNat ; #6:iNat ; #7:BitPacketQueue ; #8:BitQueue ; #9:iNatList}
gen-list(#5:iNat) = #5:iNat #9:iNatList
& all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,on,#5:iNat) = true
& all-bits(#8:BitQueue,on) = true & #5:iNat = #6:iNat
==> gen-list(#5:iNat)~(#6:iNat #9:iNatList) = true
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
rewrites: 10751 in 179ms cpu (182ms real) (59745 rewrites/second)
Eliminated current goal.
q.e.d
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
This completes the proof of:
ABP  good-queues ∧ inv⇒©inv.
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For the proof of init⇒ good-queues the InvA tool gives the following
output:
rewrites: 10072 in 32ms cpu (35ms real) (314730 rewrites/second)
Checking ABP-PREDS ||- init(S:Sys) => good-queues(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 2
Proof obligations discharged: 2
Success!
rewrites: 57223 in 284ms cpu (283ms real) (201476 rewrites/second)
Checking
ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA ||- good-queues(S:Sys) => O good-queues(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 48
Proof obligations discharged: 48
Success!
Note that in the proof of ground stability, module ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA is
used instead of ABP-PREDS. The former module contains 10 lemmata about
the auxiliary predicates used by state predicate good-queues. Without
these lemmata, the InvA tool discharges automatically only 26 of the 48 proof
obligations. See Appendix B for a complete explanation of these lemmata
and their mechanical proof in the ITP. This concludes the proof of the
ground invariance of good-queues from init for ABP.
The main result about the correctness of the ABP is then established me-
chanically in the InvA with help of the ITP. Namely, the following inductive
property holds:
ABP  init⇒ inv-main.
See Appendix B for mechanical proofs of the admissibility of modules ABP,
ABP-PREDS, ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA, and also for the ITP proof scripts used as
part of the main result in this chapter.
5.3 Related Work and Concluding Remarks
The Alternating Bit Protocol (ABP) is a well-established benchmark in the
proof technologies that address concurrent, non-deterministic systems. As
such, it has been formally studied from different viewpoints using a wealth
of formal techniques. They include process algebra [10, 12], temporal Petri
nets [100], the Calculus of Constructions [43], and timed rewriting logic [98],
among many others.
In the framework of observational transition systems (OTS), ABP has
been formally studied independently by K. Ogata and K. Futatsugi [81],
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Measure [81] This chapter
Model LOC 286 208
Model + Predicates LOC 286 + 63 208 + 200
State predicates # 11 3
Lemmata # 7 10
Proof scripts LOC 5189 213
Proof scripts / # predicates LOC 471.8 71
Figure 5.3: Comparison of the ABP case study for the reliable communication property
with a similar case study using proof scores in [81].
and by K. Lin and J. Goguen [65]. In the former, the focus is on proving
the same invariant property about reliable communication based on simul-
taneous induction. In the latter, the focus is on verifying liveness properties
using conditional circular coinductive rewriting.
Figure 5.3 presents a comparison between the proof of the reliable com-
munication property for ABP presented in [81], that uses proof scores, and
the one presented here. This comparison is possible thanks to the authors
of [81] who kindly shared the source code of their case study.
Note that the human proof effort in [81] is significantly higher than the
one in proving the same property using the approach and tools of Chapter 4,
as presented in this chapter. However, this comparison needs to be taken
with a grain of salt, because many proof obligations in [81] are basic base
cases and there is no tool support for discharging them. In contrast, the
ITP was of great help, not only because it automatically took care of many
simple proof obligations, but also because of some of its equational inductive
techniques such as cover-set induction.
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CHAPTER 6
INVA CASE STUDY II: SOME SAFETY PROPERTIES
OF IBOS
From Chapter 4 it is known that a safety property of a software system
asserts that “something bad should never happen”. This chapter presents
a case study on the mechanical verification of invariants for a browsing sys-
tem designed to satisfy explicit security requirements. The main invariant
studied here is of prime interest in its own right, but it is also intended as
challenging benchmark for the inference system and its implementation in
the InvA tool from Chapter 4. As a result, this chapter reports on the suc-
cessful mechanical verification of some auxiliary invariants for the browsing
system, that help in the verification task for the main invariant. It also re-
ports on some limitations, in both the current methods and tool, that have
restricted the degree of success in obtaining a full mechanical verification
for the main invariant.
The notion of a browser that is to be secure by design is exemplified in the
work on the Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS) [101]. In contrast
to current web browsers that have enormous trusted computing bases that
commonly provide attackers with easy access to computer systems, IBOS
drastically reduces the trusted computing base for web browsers. This chap-
ter uses IBOS as the basis of the analysis and builds upon an updated version
of a Maude specification previously developed by R. Sasse [95, 96] that is
amenable for analysis in the InvA tool.
The main invariant is about the address bar being correct at all times,
which is an important safety property for a browser. In contrast to the
successful treatment of this similar property in [95, 96], in which reduction
techniques were used to obtain a finitary and tractable search space, the
specification in this chapter is used as it is for the purpose of the verifica-
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tion task. As a result of the case study, low-level specification invariants,
each literally generating thousands of proof obligations, are automatically
handled by the tool. However, the same methods and techniques are par-
tially limited when it comes to proving the address bar being correct. All in
all, the IBOS specification is to date, and by far, the most challenging case
study analyzed with the InvA tool.
A summary of IBOS and the modeling methodology in Maude are ex-
plained, respectively, in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2. The discussion on the
verification task for the correctness of the address bar is documented in Sec-
tion 6.3, as well as the mechanical verification of two auxiliary invariants.
A summary of the limitations identified during the development of the case
study are collected in Section 6.3.4.
6.1 IBOS
This section closely follows and adapts the introductory treatment of IBOS
by R. Sasse [95], Section 4.1.
The Illinois Browser Operating System (IBOS) [101] is a web browsing
system developed at the University of Illinois that reduces the trusted com-
puting base required by web browsers. The trusted computing base is the
subset of the software in which any exploitable error would lead to the system
being potentially compromised. The problem with modern web browsers is
that they have a huge trusted computing base and are integrated tightly into
the actual operating system, and thus provide a convenient environment for
malicious attackers to gain access to computer systems. By having a re-
duced trusted computing base, IBOS offers increased security with respect
to modern web browsers.
IBOS is a combination of web browser and operating system. The trusted
computing base is reduced by utilizing a microkernel and exposing browser-
level abstractions at the lowest software layer. This approach allows for re-
moval of almost all traditional OS components and services from the trusted
computing base by directly mapping those browser abstractions to hardware
abstractions. The resulting design turns out to be flexible enough to enable
browser security policies while supporting traditional applications. In IBOS,
for instance, device drivers, network protocol implementation, the storage
stack, and window management software, among other system services, are
outside of the trusted computing base. They all run on top of the trusted
kernel of IBOS, which can enforce security policies. Also, the overhead added
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to the browsing experience is small. See [101] for more details on IBOS.
Web-based applications (web apps) and the browser itself have become
quite popular targets for attacks on computer systems. The vulnerabilities
in web apps are ever increasing, so isolation of the web apps is highly desir-
able. Vulnerabilities in the actual web browsers are not as common as web
app vulnerabilities, but occur often enough to be troubling. Further vulner-
abilities are possible in the operating system, its services, and libraries.
Not all attacks are created equal. Attacks at the top of the software
stack will only give the attacker access to the browser’s current vulnerable
web app. Further down the stack, attacks on the browser would give the
attacker access to all web apps, their data, and system resources the browser
can access. At the bottom of that stack, attacks on the operating system
itself can be the most devastating, as the attacker can gain full control of
the system. Vulnerabilities higher in the stack turn out to be more common,
but are less damaging. Attacks lower in the stack have a much higher threat
potential, and that is what IBOS is trying to address.
IBOS is designed to compartmentalize all the different processes as much
as possible, and all communication is being forcibly routed through the
trusted kernel. The IBOS kernel decides, based on the policies, which com-
munication between processes is allowed, and thus possible. As will be seen
in Section 6.2, the communication between different web page instances, net-
work processes, the network card, the display memory, and the central kernel
is modeled. In Section 6.3, safety properties referring to the immutability
of the security policy are automatically obtained with help of the InvA tool.
The formal analysis in this chapter is done under the assumption of a correct
underlying microkernel. See [95] for a discussion about the features of the
L4Ka::Pistachio microkernel and the fully verified seL4 microkernel.
6.1.1 IBOS Architecture
Figure 6.1, borrowed from [95], depicts a simplified view of IBOS architec-
ture, in which the hardware is at the bottom of the stack, and the IBOS
kernel and part of the trusted computing base (TCB) are on top of that.
Everything on top of the kernel is not part of the TCB. Specifically, all web
apps, network processes and the network interface card (NIC) driver do not
need to be trusted. The following are observations about three important
components of the IBOS architecture:
The IBOS kernel. The IBOS kernel builds upon the L4Ka microkernel
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Figure 6.1: IBOS Architecture.
and is the central component of the IBOS web browser. It takes care
of traditional OS tasks, e.g., process creation and application memory
management. Message passing is based on the L4Ka::Pistachio message
passing implementation, forcing all messages through the kernel, and
specifically allows the checking of the security policies.
Network process. The network process is responsible for HTTP requests.
It transforms HTTP data into a TCP stream and in turn into a series
of Ethernet frames which are passed to the NIC driver.
Web apps. A new web app is created for each individual page visit of the
user; specifically, whenever a link is clicked or a new URL is entered
into the address bar. A web app sends out the HTTP request to the
network process, parses HTML and runs JavaScript and renders web
content to a tab. Each web app is labeled with the origin of the HTTP
request used at creation.
A key property of the IBOS browser is that all communication, i.e., all
messages sent or received, get transmitted through the IBOS kernel. This is
because the message passing is implemented as system calls, which of course
go to the microkernel operating system, which is tightly integrated with the
IBOS kernel. The following are two key goals of IBOS:
• Security decisions happen at the lowest possible level: small TCB.
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• Enough browser states and events are exposed, so as to allow for se-
curity policy checking; this makes IBOS flexible to allow new browser
security policies.
See [101] for all IBOS goals and more detail.
6.2 Formal Modeling Methodology
The verification of some IBOS properties in this chapter uses a new Maude
specification derived from the Maude specification of IBOS previously pre-
sented in [95, 96]. The new specification was obtained by source code inspec-
tion and from clarifications by R. Sasse when needed. It preserves reachabil-
ity and at the same time satisfies the conditions required by the techniques
in Chapter 4 for proving safety properties, and thus is amenable to me-
chanical analysis in the InvA tool. The documented source code of the new
specification is available from http://camilorocha.info/thesis.
The Maude specification models the architecture of IBOS and includes:
(i) the kernel, (ii) general message passing, (iii) web apps, (iv) network
processes, and (v) network interface card access. The main component, the
kernel, includes the policy checking mechanism for messages, an address bar,
the content currently displayed on the screen, etc. The user interface (UI)
is also part of the kernel.
All messages are forced to go through the kernel and they are thus subject
to the policies it wants to enforce. This is already a design decision in IBOS,
which the browser enforces, and it is reflected in the formal model in the
way messages are passed. Each process can only directly send messages to
the kernel, and the message will include the actual final destination in some
way; but only the kernel is able to send messages to any of the processes.
In the model, this is ensured by having two one-way pipes for messages
for each process and the kernel, i.e., one incoming and one outgoing pipe.
Thus, the kernel is the only connecting point and the policy checking is
easily centralized.
As mentioned earlier, the Maude specification of IBOS presented in this
section is amenable to mechanical verification in the InvA system, in contrast
to the original specification [95]. This new version of the specification is a
topmost rewrite theory which uses equality enrichments instead of built-in
equality predicates. Rewrite rules for checking the security policy enforced
by the system are preferred over auxiliary function symbols equationally de-
fined, and the list datatype modeling the communication pipes does not use
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any associativity axioms, since they are problematic for unification purposes.
It is important to note that the new specification preserves reachability with
respect to the original specification, but some clarifications are in order:
• The function symbol removed from the original specification in [95],
appeared in the right-hand side of the rewrite rule that enforced the
security policy of the browser. Such an auxiliary function symbol
was originally defined by a collection of 10 equations that have been
upgraded to equivalent topmost rewrite rules in the newer specifica-
tion. The observation here is that one of the equations used Maude’s
owise programming feature for specifying that a message to the ker-
nel should be dropped whenever none of the other 9 equations applied,
i.e., whenever the security policy does not allow the kernel to handle
the message. In the new specification a message to the kernel can be
handled by the kernel if the security policy allows it or be dropped,
even if the security policy allows the kernel to handle such a message.
• In the case of pipes, all but one rewrite rule in the original specifi-
cation used the common “first-rest” matching for syntactic lists, thus
making the use of any associativity axioms unnecessary in these cases.
The remaining rewrite rule relied on the associativity axiom for non-
deterministically choosing an element in a nonempty pipe. This rule is
replaced by two rewrite rules in the new specification: one for moving
the first element in a nonempty pipe to the end of the pipe, and an-
other for choosing the top element in a nonempty pipe. Some of these
changes are detailed in Section 6.2.1.
It can be argued that the success in proving safety properties for the
Alternate Bit Protocol in Chapter 4 is a good indication that a formal
modeling approach, as the one taken here, can provide assurance about a
design if safety properties can be proved for the formal model. However, the
formal modeling process is done completely by hand. This raises two issues:
one being that a counterexample found in the model might not actually be
a counterexample in the original specification. That is checkable and no
actual false positive counterexamples have been identified. The second issue
is that the formal model is an abstraction of the actual browser, as well as a
translation of its code. Therefore, all security guarantees based on the this
model are given with respect to the design and cannot guarantee the total
absence of bugs introduced in the browser implementation.
The verification task in this chapter is different from the one in Chapter 4,
in the sense that the IBOS specification is a novel and more challenging
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benchmark, even though the verification techniques in both cases are the
same. Also, this chapter is different from Chapter 4 in [95] in that the safety
properties here are mechanically obtained and do not rely on boundedness
arguments making the reachable state space finite, among other things.
6.2.1 IBOS Architecture Modeling
This section points out key properties and gives a general flavor of the model.
Figure 6.2, borrowed from [95], depicts the IBOS model state. At the top
level, the state space is represented by the top sort Sys, which is made up
of configurations of objects, all wrapped by curly brackets:
op {_} : Configuration -> Sys [ctor] .
Objects are formed by an object identifier, a type, and a set of attributes.
Each network process, web app, and the kernel is modeled as a single object.
In Figure 6.2, all objects outside the kernel are shown as rectangles. Pipes
are a special kind of object connecting the objects at their left and right
ends. Other than that, arrows show connectivity. The ellipses inside the
kernel contain relevant pieces of the kernel, that are not objects themselves.
There will be multiple copies of most objects, except for the NIC, display
and web app manager. The uniqueness of the kernel process is verified in
Section 6.3.2.
The Kernel and Message Passing.
All messages in the state are passed as system calls, where the browser-
specific part of the message is encapsulated in the system call. First, the
message part specific to the browser has the following format, called the
payload of the encapsulating system call:
op payload : Oid Oid MsgType MsgVal Label
typed untyped -> Payload [ctor] .
The arguments of payload are the sender (as Oid), the receiver (as Oid),
the message type (as MsgType), some auxiliary message info (as MsgVal),
an argument commonly containing the URL that is requested or sent (as
Label), and two more arguments (typed and untyped) that could transport
more data (and which are ignored here). The sort Oid is that of object or
process identifiers. Each web app, network process, etc., has an Oid. The
correct sender Oid is enforced by the kernel, as it knows which process sent
the system call encapsulating this payload.
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Figure 6.2: IBOS Model State.
The actual message is built using the payload and system call type:
op msg : SyscallType Payload -> Message [ctor] .
op OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE : -> SyscallType .
where OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE is the most commonly used type of
system call for sending browser messages.
To model the fact that the kernel knows which process actually sent a
message (as a system call) and to make sure that in the model no two
processes can send messages directly to each other, but are forced to send
messages via the kernel, the model defines one pipe object per process (using
the same Oid as the associated process), which contains two one-way pipes,
going to the kernel from the process and going to the process from the kernel:
op pipe : -> Cid [ctor] .
op fromKernel : MessageList -> Attribute [ctor] .
op toKernel : MessageList -> Attribute [ctor] .
For instance, a pipe object for the process with object identifier 1050,
which currently holds no message going either way, is represented as follows:
< 1050 : pipe | fromKernel(mt), toKernel(mt) >
Also consider the following message that is going to be sent by process 1050:
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msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(1050, 256, MSG-FETCH-URL, 0,
l(http,dom("test"),port(81)),
mtTyped, mtUntyped))
This message comes from web app 1050 and is addressed to network process
256. It requests an URL (MSG-FETCH-URL) from domain http://test:81.
In order to send the message, this is appended to the list of messages in
toKernel in the pipe object.
The kernel, with object identifier id(1), is only handling one thing at a
time, which is stored in handledCurrently. Once the current instruction
has been dealt with, any of the currently incoming messages can become the
next message to be executed. The following rule enforces the policy checking
when two process are allowed to exchange messages of a given type:
rl [kernelReceivesOPMessage-pa1] :
{ < id(1) : kernel |
handledCurrently(none),
msgPolicy(policy(ID:ProcId,ID2:ProcId,M:MsgType),
PS:PolicySet),
Att:AttributeSet >
< ID:ProcId : pipe |
toKernel(msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ID1:ProcId, ID2:ProcId, M:MsgType,
V:MsgVal, L:Label, T:typed, U:untyped)),
ML:MessageList),
Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration }
=> { < id(1) : kernel |
handledCurrently(
msg(ST:SyscallType,
payload(ID:ProcId, ID2:ProcId, M:MsgType,
V:MsgVal, L:Label, T:typed, U:untyped))),
msgPolicy(policy(ID:ProcId,ID2:ProcId,M:MsgType),
PS:PolicySet),
Att:AttributeSet >
< ID : pipe |
toKernel(ML:MessageList) ,
Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration } .
The policy checking is enforced by the matching condition on attributes
msgPolicy of the kernel and payload in attribute toKernel of the commu-
nicating process pipe. More precisely, the property being checked here is
that the message policy in msgPolicy allows the process ID:ProcId to send
messages of type M:MsgType to process ID2:ProcId. Then the message is
passed on to the kernel to become the next message to be executed. Note
that the sender identifier ID1:ProcId of the incoming message is changed
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to the actual sender identifier ID:ProcId, which is the process identifier of
the pipe (and thus the associated process).
For the network processes, identifiers 256 through 1023 are being used, as
does IBOS. The attribute names of a network process are:
op returnTo : ProcId -> Attribute [ctor] .
op in : LabelList -> Attribute [ctor] .
op out : LabelList -> Attribute [ctor] .
Attribute returnTo stores the process identifier of the web app that this
network process will return data to, while attributes in and out hold the
lists (or queues) of labels representing URLs that the network process will
ask data from and has received data from already. As a simplification, a
given URL label is used to represent the data from that URL instead of
using the actual HTML code from the URL.
Process identifiers 1024 through 1055 are used for web apps. Their at-
tributes names are:
op rendered : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
op URL : Label -> Attribute [ctor] .
op loading : Nat -> Attribute [ctor] .
The label inside rendered is the URL for which the web app has put the
data on the screen, provided it is the active web app. The label inside
URL is the location where this web app wants to load data from. Attribute
loading is just a binary flag indicating whether the web app has already
sent a request to load data. Initially, the rendered attribute for a new web
app will be empty, and loading is 0, meaning that it has not yet started to
load. The following topmost rule sends the message to start loading:
crl [fetch] :
{ < ID:ProcId : proc |
rendered(L1:Label), URL(L2:Label), loading(0),
Att:AttributeSet >
< ID:ProcId : pipe |
toKernel(ML:MessageList), Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration }
=> { < ID:ProcId : proc |
rendered(L1:Label), URL(L2:Label), loading(1),
Att:AttributeSet >
< ID:ProcId : pipe |
toKernel(ML:MessageList ;
(msg(OPOS-SYSCALL-FD-SEND-MESSAGE,
payload(ID:ProcId, id(4), MSG-FETCH-URL,
0, L2:Label, mtTyped, mtUntyped)),
mt)),
Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration }
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if isWebapp(ID:ProcId) .
The message is sent to the network process manager, which is identified
with id(4), for fetching the data from URL L2 and the loading attribute
changes to 1. On return of the requested data, L2 will be the new content
of attribute rendered.
The hardware pieces of Figure 6.2, video card, NIC, etc., are not modeled
in any detail. Only the NIC is modeled, and it receives target URLs from
the memory set aside for this purpose through the kernel, and then, after a
potential delay, returns the representation of the resulting data.
6.3 Address Bar Correctness and Some Auxiliary
Invariants
The analysis to follow is based on the formal model explained in Section 6.2.
An important property for a web browser is the trustworthiness of user
interface elements. This is crucial, for instance, to counter spoofing attacks.
Particularly, the address bar needs to be trustworthy, so that the user always
knows which site is currently being visited: it is important to know whether
the currently visited site is really the banking web site or is instead a phishing
site, where risk is imminent. It is simple for malicious attackers to create
phishing web sites that are indistinguishable on their looks from the real
web sites. A user should be able to trust the address bar and be guaranteed
that address bar spoofing attacks will not succeed. The goal of this section
is to stress test the capabilities and limits of the InvA tool when trying to
prove that address bar spoofing attacks are not possible in IBOS.
6.3.1 Formal Specification of the Property and Limitations
Address bar correctness in the browsing system model means that the con-
tent of the displayed page is always from the address displayed in the address
bar. In the IBOS model, the kernel keeps track of the address bar by means
of the data stored in the displayedTopBar attribute. The source of the
content being displayed is stored in the display process abstraction, which
has the displayedContent attribute to store this information. The content
of both fields needs to be the same at all times, except when there currently
is no content in one of the two fields. The empty content is modeled by the
about-blank label.
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The property being checked is modeled by the state predicate inv, where
the kernel process has identifier id(1) and the display process abstraction
has identifier id(15):
op inv : Sys -> [Bool] .
eq inv( { < id(1) : kernel |
displayedTopBar(about-blank), Att1:AttributeSet >
< id(15) : proc |
displayedContent(L1:Label), Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration } )
= true .
eq inv( { < id(1) : kernel |
displayedTopBar(L1:Label), Att1:AttributeSet >
< id(15) : proc |
displayedContent(about-blank), Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration } )
= true .
ceq inv( { < id(1) : kernel |
displayedTopBar(L1:Label), Att1:AttributeSet >
< id(15) : proc |
displayedContent(L2:Label), Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration
} )
= L1:Label ~ L2:Label
if L1:Label ~ about-blank = false
/\ L2:Label ~ about-blank = false .
The first equation in the definition of inv defines the case where the kernel’s
displayed top bar is empty. Similarly, the second equation defines the case
where the display’s displayed content is empty. The last case, as defined by
the third equation, is the most interesting one. In this third case, the invari-
ant is defined to hold if the two aforementioned contents coincide whenever
they both are nonempty. As a special remark, note that the operator ~ in
the third equation is an equality enrichment for sort Label (see Section 2.3).
To motivate the property of address bar correctness, note that the address
bar and the content as stored in the display process, are both stateless
objects as they have no memory, but only what is currently stored.
Both the address bar and the display content are only changed due to the
current web app interacting with the kernel when created or when the tab is
switched to it. These two separate behaviors are modeled in the system by
the rules [new-url], [tab-change], and [change-display]. The following
is the rewrite rule [change-display] as modeled in IBOS:
crl [change-display] :
{ < id(15) : proc |
activeWebapp(P:ProcId), displayedContent(L1:Label),
Att1:AttributeSet >
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< P:ProcId : proc |
rendered(L2:Label), Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration }
=> { < id(15) : proc |
activeWebapp(P:ProcId), displayedContent(L2:Label),
Att1:AttributeSet >
< P:ProcId : proc |
rendered(L2:Label), Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration }
if L1:Label ~ L2:Label = false
/\ isWebapp(P:ProcId) .
In summary, attribute displayedContent in the kernel process is changed
by this rule to the content of attribute rendered in the active web app,
whenever the two contents are different. This intuitively means that a con-
tent is displayed once the requested URL has been fetched by the system.
The goal is to obtain an automatic proof of the invariant:
IBOS  init⇒ inv.
The following verification commands can be given to the InvA tool to
check the above-mentioned invariant, as indicated by the inference rule Inv
in Section 4.4 and its implementation in the InvA tool:
(analyze init(S:Sys) implies inv(S:Sys) in IBOS-PREDS .)
(analyze-stable inv(S:Sys) in IBOS-PREDS KERNEL .)
Before showing the output given by the tool, it is assumed that module
IBOS-PREDS contains the state predicates and their corresponding auxil-
iary functions, and module KERNEL contains the specification of IBOS. State
predicate init defines the initial state of the system.
When issuing the above commands, the InvA tool generates and tries to
discharge more that 18000 proof obligations in less than 3 minutes:
Checking IBOS-PREDS ||- init(S:Sys) => inv(S:Sys) ...
rewrites: 28502 in 18ms cpu (18ms real) (1500342 rewrites/second)
Proof obligations generated: 1
Proof obligations discharged: 1
Success!
Checking IBOS-PREDS ||- inv(S:Sys) => O inv(S:Sys) ...
rewrites: 15810839 in 179525ms cpu (179557ms real)
(88070 rewrites/second)
Proof obligations generated: 18120
Proof obligations discharged: 18072
The following proof obligations need to be discharged:
1808. from inv-2 & webapp-change-display : pending
inv({ < #8:ProcId : proc | #10:AttributeSet,rendered(#9:Label)>
88
< id(1): kernel | displayedTopBar(#6:Label)>
< id(15): proc | activeWebapp(#8:ProcId),
displayedContent(#9:Label)>})
= true
if about-blank ~ #6:Label = false
/\ about-blank ~ #7:Label = false
/\ #6:Label = #7:Label
/\ #7:Label ~ #9:Label = false
/\ isWebapp(#8:ProcId) = true .
...
There are 48 proof obligations returned to the user. That is, less than 0.2% of
the verification task is left for the user. Upon inspection of the InvA’s output,
in this case all proof obligations shown to the user are generated from the
rewrite rule [change-display]. This situation softens the burden for the
user in the quest for a proof or a counterexample. A key observation about
this rule, is that it updates the value of attribute displayedContent in the
display process, regardless of the contents of attribute displayedTopBar in
the kernel process. Therefore, a pattern is observed in which there is no
inductive assumption on the relation of these two values that the inference
system can use to discharge the pending proof obligations.
To illustrate the process, consider the proof obligation identified by la-
bel 1808 and shown above. It is perfectly possible to have a situation
in where labels #6 and #7 represent the (fictitious but trusted) web site
mylifesavings.com, and where label #9 represents the (fictitious but dis-
trusted) web site danger.com. Assuming that #8 is a web app identifier, it
is straightforward to see that an actual attack could happen and that the
proof obligation in this case is false. In conclusion, state predicate inv is not
an inductive invariant of IBOS in the sense of the inference system in Chap-
ter 4. Therefore, a stronger property is required to imply the correctness of
the address bar.
In order to come up with a strengthening of the invariant, it is key to
understand the internal behavior of the system prior to changing the display.
To illustrate a specific situation, consider the following flow of events from
the moment when a new web app is created to display a given web page, say
L, to the moment when the actual web page L is displayed in the content
area of the browser:
1. Initially, the new web app is created with a new web app identifier
P, attribute URL with content L, and attribute rendered with content
about-blank. It becomes the active web app, which is represented in
the system by updating the value of attribute activeWebapp to P in
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the kernel. Also, attribute displayedTopBar in the kernel is updated
to L and the new web app is associated to L in the kernel storage for
web app connections weblabels. Attribute displayedContent in the
display process is updated to about-blank.
2. Eventually, web app P will start loading, which is modeled by rewrite
rule [fetch], previously introduced in this section. This is achieved by
sending a MSG-FETCH-URL message to the network processes requesting
to fetch L. This message is placed in the process’s pipe to later be
checked by the kernel, which enforces the security policy on every
message in the model. In the meantime, the new process waits for the
requested data.
3. The URL fetch request from P for the resource L will eventually be
checked by the kernel. The security policy enforced by the kernel will
trigger one of three possible actions in the system:
• If the security policy does not allow communication between web
apps and network processes, then the message is dropped and
ignored. In this case, the new web app will never get an answer
and the empty content will remain displayed, which is fine for the
purpose of proving the address bar correct.
• If the security policy allows communication between web apps
and network processes, then there are two cases: (i) if the resource
L was previously requested by another web app, then the cached
value in the network process connection storage networklabels
attribute is returned (this is done by placing a message in the
input pipe of the requesting web app with the cached value for
L); (ii) if the resource has not been previously requested, then a
memory process and an associated pipe are created. If the secu-
rity policy allows it, the new memory process will communicate
with the NIC driver process and ultimately will obtain the re-
quested resource. As a net effect of the overall transaction, the
network process connection storage networklabels attribute in
the kernel will be updated with the cached value, and the mes-
sage with this value will be forwarded to the web app initially
created as a response.
Presumably, the returned value, cached or not, will correspond to L.
4. In the event of receiving a MSG-RETURN-URL from a network process in
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its input pipe with URL L1, attribute rendered is updated to L1 and
this process stops waiting for the requested resource. Since presumably
the fetched value coincides with the requested one, then it must be the
case that L and L1 are the same. Therefore, at this point attributes
URL and rendered in the newly created web app are the same.
5. Finally, the content stored in the display process displayedContent is
updated to L and the safety property of interest is true at any point of
execution. This is because if attribute displayedContent in the dis-
play process has initially the empty content, then it will eventually be
updated to L, the value initially stored in attribute displayedTopBar
of the kernel when P was created.
Note that there is a lot going on behind the scenes and important assump-
tions are being made. Basically, each item in the list above is part of a
strengthening for inv, and thus needs to be formally verified. In the case
study experiments, the goal of proving the address bar correct was temporar-
ily abandoned because mechanically proving some of these strengthenings
turned out to be quite challenging. The difficulty was mainly due to the large
number of proof obligations that could not be automatically discharged by
the tool, even though the tool did discard many other ones. At first glance,
the tool was able to discharge more that 95% of tens of thousands of proof
obligations it generated.
However, there are specific results in the verification task of inv that are
promising in the light of the overall mechanical proof effort. In sections 6.3.2
and 6.3.3 the focus is on documenting automatic proofs obtained with InvA of
two auxiliary invariants that are stepping stones in a future mechanical proof
for the correctness of the address bar. Section 6.3.4 presents a discussion
about current limitations of the InvA tool that were identified during the
experiments with this case study.
6.3.2 Kernel Uniqueness
The kernel process plays a central role in the design of IBOS. This process
is responsible for enforcing the security policy in the entire browsing system
and does the bookkeeping for network process in the connection storage
networklabels, among other things. Uniqueness of the kernel is a trivial
property that the system should satisfy, but it needs to be formally proved.
One first reason is that almost all interesting properties in IBOS have to do
with message passing that is supervised by the kernel. Therefore a kernel
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must exist and be unique. A second reason is that having this property can
help in obtaining a simpler property specifications for IBOS because then
this requirement does not need to be explicitly stated.
Kernel uniqueness (and existence) in the IBOS system is modeled by state
predicate unique-kernel as follows:
op unique-kernel : Sys -> Bool .
ceq unique-kernel( { Cnf } )
= false
if no-kernel(Cnf) .
eq unique-kernel( { < P:ProcId : kernel | Att:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration } )
= no-kernel(Cnf:Configuration) .
eq unique-kernel( { < P1:ProcId : kernel | Att1:AttributeSet >
< P2:ProcId : kernel | Att2:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration } )
= false .
op no-kernel : Configuration -> Bool .
eq no-kernel(none)
= true .
eq no-kernel( < P:ProcId : C:Cid | Att:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration )
= not(C:Cid ~ kernel) and no-kernel(Cnf:Configuration) .
The equational definition of no-kernel fully defines the predicate and con-
siders three cases: the first when no kernel exists, the second when exactly
one kernel exists, and a third in which at least two kernels exist. Obvi-
ously, the second case is the only one in which the predicate should hold.
On input Cnf:Configuration, auxiliary function no-kernel holds if and
only if there is no kernel process in Cnf. Also note that no-kernel uses
the Boolean equality enrichment defined for the sort Cid of class identifiers.
As an additional remark, observe that both unique-kernel and no-kernel
preserve ground confluence, termination, and sort-decreasingness.
The goal with this predicate is to prove:
IBOS  init⇒ unique-kernel.
The outcome of the verification task in the InvA tool for this invariant is
shown below:
rewrites: 33699 in 84ms cpu (84ms real) (401154 rewrites/second)
Checking IBOS-PREDS ||- init(S:Sys) => unique-kernel(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 1
Proof obligations discharged: 1
rewrites: 944276 in 8724ms cpu (8762ms real) (108232 rewrites/second)
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Checking
IBOS-PREDS ||- unique-kernel(S:Sys) => O unique-kernel(S:Sys) ...
Proof obligations generated: 2592
Proof obligations discharged: 2592
Success!
A total of 2593 proof obligations are generated and discharged by the InvA
tool, thus providing an automatic mechanical proof of the invariance of
unique-kernel for IBOS. As a side margin note, from the experience with
this specification, in some cases it is convenient to prove uniqueness and
existence for other processes in the model besides the kernel. In such a case,
the approach presented here can be used as a template for obtaining easy
automatic proofs.
6.3.3 Immutability of the Security Policy
One important goal is to ensure that the IBOS kernel upholds the security
policy, even if one or more of the subsystems have been compromised. Note
that the security policy is trusted, for instance, at any point of execution in
the list of events in Section 6.3.1. This property turns out to be important,
not only as a stepping stone for proving other invariants, but also in its own
right.
For instance, consider a threat model, initially proposed in [101], in which
an attacker controls a web site and can feed arbitrary data to the browser.
Indeed, it can be assumed that this malicious data or application can com-
promise one or more of the components in the system, such as the drivers
and processes. Once the attacker gains control of these components, arbi-
trary instructions can be executed as a result of the attack. The aim, then,
is to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of the data in the browser.
More specifically, the goal is to guarantee that if a user opens a web page in
a trusted web server, then this user can interact with this page securely, even
if everything on the client system outside the TCB has been compromised.
The layers upon which IBOS is built are trusted. These layers include the
underlying hardware. IBOS enforces security decisions based on its security
policy, so it is important to establish safety properties about the integrity
of its security policy. More specifically, even if the system is subjected to
a threat model such as the one just described, one would like to have the
guarantee that the security policy can not be altered by the attacker. Of
course, compromising any of the underlying layers trusted by the kernel
could compromise the security of IBOS.
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The immutability of the security policy for IBOS is modeled by state
predicate immutable-policy as follows:
op immutable-policy : Sys PolicySet -> [Bool] .
eq immutable-policy(
{ < id(1) : kernel | msgPolicy(PS:PolicySet), Att:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration }, PS:PolicySet)
= true .
State predicate immutable-policy is parametric on security policy sets. It
holds if the policy set used by the kernel coincides with the given policy set.
Note that this predicate is only defined for the positive case, which is fine
for mechanical analysis in InvA, as explained in Chapter 4. Also, in order for
the analysis to be consistent, it is assumed that there is exactly one kernel
in the configuration, which has been established as an inductive invariant of
IBOS in Section 6.3.2.
The initial policy set is specified by means of constant init-policy:
op init-policy : -> PolicySet .
eq init-policy
= ( ... ) .
The goal with this predicate is to prove:
IBOS  init⇒ immutable-policy(init-policy).
By using the proof system for proving safety properties implemented in
the InvA tool (see Chapter 4 for details), the following results are obtained
when analyzing the invariance of immutable-policy with respect to the
security policy initially defined for IBOS:
rewrites: 28501 in 72ms cpu (72ms real) (395819 rewrites/second)
Checking
IBOS-PREDS ||- init(S:Sys)
=> immutable-policy(S:Sys,init-policy) ...
Proof obligations generated: 1
Proof obligations discharged: 1
Success!
rewrites: 444761 in 3260ms cpu (3258ms real)
(136421 rewrites/second)
Checking
IBOS-PREDS ||- immutable-policy(S:Sys,PS:PolicySet)
=> O immutable-policy(S:Sys,PS:PolicySet) ...
Proof obligations generated: 2088
Proof obligations discharged: 2088
Success!
The InvA tool generates more than 2000 proof obligations and mechani-
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cally proofs that the security policy is immutable in any reachable state by
automatically discharging all these proof obligations in less than 4 seconds.
In particular, this result asserts that the security policy, once defined will
never change even if everything outside the TCB has been compromised. It
is important to note that the inductive stability proof just shown has been
obtained for any policy set PS:PolicySet, and not only for the particular
case of init-policy. More precisely, the stability proof is actually a more
general proof of the form:
IBOS  immutable-policy(PS:PolicySet)⇒ immutable-policy(PS:PolicySet).
This ultimately means that any security policy defined as part of IBOS’s
initial state is immutable.
6.3.4 Discussion on Some Limits of InvA
The IBOS case study is the most challenging specification analyzed in the
InvA tool so far. The new IBOS specification used in this proof effort com-
prises more than 1150 lines of source code, 47 equations, and 26 rewrite rules,
which results in thousands of proof obligations for most verification tasks
performed with help of the InvA tool. As a point of comparison, the ABP
specification studied in Chapter 4 comprises 208 lines of code, 20 equations,
and has half the rewrite rules of IBOS. The largest number of proof obliga-
tions for a particular invariant in the ABP case study was about 100. As
previously seen, InvA was successful in discharging thousands of proof obli-
gations and automatically proving some invariants. However, the IBOS case
study has unveiled limitations of the InvA tool which, from the perspective
of stress testing the limits of the tool, is also a positive experience.
The following paragraphs identify and summarize some limitations of the
InvA tool. They also propose possible solutions that should make the me-
chanical verification of invariants in InvA effective for large specifications,
including the correctness of the address bar for IBOS:
User Support. There should be better management of proof obligations,
specially when analyzing large specifications: it is very complicated, time
consuming, and error-prone to analyze a list of almost 400 proof obligations!
For instance, consider the following header output by the tool:
Checking
IBOS-PREDS ||- good-webapps(S:Sys) => O good-webapps(S:Sys) ...
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Proof obligations generated: 2000
Proof obligations discharged: 1608
The following proof obligations need to be discharged:
...
In the worst case, the user needs to go through all of the 392 proof obligations
in order to understand what the situation is, and whether or not the state
predicate good-webapps is a promising inductive invariant. In this example,
it was easy to find a proof obligation indicating that good-webapps is not
an inductive invariant, but this may not be the case in general.
New Heuristics. There is a need for improving the proof heuristics used
by the tool. As explained in Chapter 4, a series of heuristics are employed by
the InvA for discharging proof obligations. However, it should be possible to
improve some of them and implement some new ones. For example, the InvA
tool implements some basic heuristic for checking unsatisfiability of numeric
conditions modulo SMT. This could perhaps be combined with equational
narrowing, which is already available in Maude. This should increase the
number of proof obligations automatically discharged by the tool, and thus
lessen the proof effort of the user.
Inductive Techniques. There is also the need for improving the tech-
niques available to the user in tools such as the ITP. These could help in
obtaining easy interactive proofs in many cases where the proof obligations
cannot be discharged automatically. As it was the case with the IBOS
specification, many data types in the state are actually sets or multisets.
Inductive techniques such as cover-set induction modulo AC should be in-
vestigated, implemented, and offered to the user. The current ITP version
supports cover-set induction [52] but for the moment not modulo AC.
6.4 Related Work and Concluding Remarks
Formal verification of the IBOS system in Maude has been done recently
by R. Sasse [95, 96]. The correctness of the address bar was obtained with
bounded model checking in Maude and reduction techniques that resulted
in a finitary and tractable state space that could then be inspected with
Maude’s search command. One difference between R. Sasse’s approach
and the one followed here is the ultimate goal of the verification task: in
the latter, the goal was to obtain mechanical proofs without user interaction
and, at the same time, stress test the InvA tool implementation.
96
Important earlier work on Internet Explorer was done in Maude [21],
where graphical user interface security has been addressed and previously
unknown attack types (for each of which an actual malicious web page could
succeed in an attack) were uncovered. Formal modeling has been done before
for the OP2 [47] browser. IBOS is based on some of the ideas of OP2 but
takes them further by, among other things, reducing the trusted computing
base.
The IBOS case study is the most challenging specification analyzed in the
InvA tool so far, which was successful in discharging thousands of proof obli-
gations and automatically proving some invariants. However, the IBOS case
study has unveiled limitations of the InvA tool which, from the perspective of
stress testing the limits of the tool, is also a positive experience. This chap-
ter identifies and summarizes these limitations, and also proposes possible
solutions that should make the mechanical verification of invariants in InvA
effective for large specifications, including the correctness of the address bar
for IBOS.
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CHAPTER 7
REACHABILITY ANALYSIS WITH CONSTRAINED
BUILT-INS
Rewriting logic theories have been successfully used for modeling and exe-
cuting concurrent systems with rich data structures and very general forms
of transitions. It would not be misleading to say that one of the most
attractive features for day-to-day verification purposes of a rewrite the-
ory R = (Σ, E,R) in Maude, is the implementation of general on-the-fly
algorithms for model checking properties of the initial reachability model
TR. These techniques include Maude’s search command and Maude’s LTL
model checker. However, the use of such tools often assumes that the set of
terms representing the state search space of R are indeed ground. Could it
be possible to have a more general rewrite relation that operates on terms
that are not necessarily ground and is at the same time amenable to verifi-
cation with the same Maude tools?
A direct but naive answer to the above question is yes: just do what is
often done in first order logic by means of the theorem of constants and treat
the variables in the state terms as constants by enlarging the signature of
R with new constants. However, this approach has a major drawback: the
“blind” codification of non-ground terms as ground terms with new con-
stants will in general not be complete with respect to the initial semantics
of TR. The reason for this is that the matching performed when computing
the rewrite relation for the extended rewrite theory uses constructor pat-
terns and therefore can miss substitutions on terms that contain the new
constants. An alternative solution would be to use the narrowing-based ap-
proach; but then the main objective of using Maude’s convenient on-the-fly
verification mechanisms could directly be impacted since new narrowing-
based model checking tools (such as, for example, the Maude-NPA tool for
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model checking cryptographic protocol [37]) are needed. In practice, the
main limitation of the narrowing-based methods is that their symbolic deci-
sion procedures are often difficult to find and, in some cases when available,
special purpose decision procedures such as those implemented by SMT
solvers can be more efficient.
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the notion of a constrained rewrite
theory, an extension of rewriting logic theories in which the rewrite rules can
be used to rewrite terms with constrained built-ins. That is, terms involving
user-definable data structures but whose only variables range over decidable
domains. The main advantage of these theories is that, under some mild
syntactic conditions and the availability of an oracle for the constraints (such
as an SMT solver), they can be directly encoded in Maude and thus induce
a symbolic rewrite relation that is amenable, for example, to model checking
verification using Maude’s search command and LTL model checker.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 presents the notion of
constrained built-in term. Section 7.2 introduces the notion of constrained
rewrite theory, symbolic atomic relation, and explains the relationship be-
tween the symbolic reachability semantics associated to the symbolic atomic
relation on constrained terms and its initial reachability semantics. The
soundness and completeness of the symbolic simulation with constrained
built-ins, under appropriate assumptions, is presented in Section 7.3. Sec-
tion 7.4 extends the symbolic atomic relation associated to a constrained
rewrite theory to more general cases of rewriting such as asynchronous and
parallel closures. Section 7.5 presents some related work. A case study on
a symbolic rewriting logic semantics for PLEXIL based on these methods is
presented in Chapter 9. The symbolic semantics complements the ground
rewriting logic semantics of PLEXIL, presented in Chapter 8, with sym-
bolic detection of reachability violations on input plans where the values of
external variables can be left unspecified.
7.1 Terms with Constrained Built-ins
The notion of built-ins for the order-sorted equational theory E = (Σ, E) is
modeled with a many-sorted equational theory EΛ = (Λ, EΛ) such that the
inclusion EΛ ⊆ E is protecting. The intuition is that TEΛ is the subalgebra
of built-in terms of TE . It is assumed that the built-in function symbols FΛ
of Λ are disjoint from any other symbols in Σ. Then Σ = (S,≤, F ) can
be decomposed into Λ = (SΛ, FΛ) and Σ
′ = (S,≤, F \ FΛ). The collection
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XΛ ⊆ X denotes the SΛ-indexed set of variables XΛ = {Xs}s∈SΛ .
A constraint is a Boolean combination of Λ-equalities. Constraints are
interpreted in a EΛ-algebra M = (M, M), with domain M = {Ms}s∈SΛ
and interpretation function M = { M,s}s∈SΛ , satisfying TEΛ ' M. The
collection of constraints is denoted by Λ(XΛ). The distinction between the
isomorphic algebras TEΛ and M is stressed to emphasize the fact that the
approach presented here can use an ‘oracle’ for solving constraints (using
term rewriting, SMT solving, theorem proving, etc.). Note that E is a
protecting extension of EΛ and therefore TE |Λ ' TEΛ 'M.
A constrained term is a pair 〈t ;ϕt〉 in TΣ(XΛ)×Λ(XΛ) and its denotation
〈t ;ϕt〉M is the set:
〈t ;ϕt〉M = {t′ | (∃σ : XΛ −→ TΛ) t′ = tσ ∧ M |= ϕtσ}. (7.1)
The domain of σ in the definition above ranges over all built-in variables XΛ
and consequently 〈t ;ϕt〉M ⊆ TΣ,s for any sort s ∈ S and term t ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s,
even if vars(t) 6⊆ vars(ϕt). Given s ∈ S, a constrained term 〈t ;ϕt〉 is
said to be an s-constrained term if and only if t ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s. Σ-terms not
containing any built-in variables will not be considered as first components
of constrained terms.
7.2 Atomic Relations for Constrained Terms
This section introduces a symbolic term rewrite relation on terms with
constrained built-in subterms and assumes the notation introduced in Sec-
tion 7.1.
The symbolic term rewrite relation on terms with constrained built-ins is
called the symbolic atomic relation and is defined by a constrained rewrite
theory. The symbolic atomic relation is intended to be a building block for
more general symbolic relations, such as the asynchronous and/or parallel
closures that are commonly used for specifying the semantics of program-
ming languages.
A constrained rewrite theory assumes the choice of a top sort s in one of
the connected components of Σ.
Definition 15 (Constrained Rewrite Theory). AM-constrained Σ-rule (or
constrained rule) is a triple l→ r JϕK where:
a. l and r are terms in TΣ(X)s with l /∈ X and vars(r) \ vars(l, ϕ) ⊆ XΛ,
b. ϕ ∈ Λ(XΛ) is satisfiable in M, and
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c. l is linear and if t ∈ TΛ(XΛ) is a proper subterm of l, then t ∈ XΛ.
Terms l and r are called, respectively, the lefthand and righthand side, and
ϕ the constraint of the constrained rule. An M-constrained rewrite theory
(or constrained rewrite theory) is a tuple (Σ, E,R), where R is a finite
collection of M-constrained Σ-rules.
A constrained rule can contain extra built-in variables in its righthand
side and excludes the case of an unsatisfiable constraint. The lefthand side
of a constrained rule is linear and does not refer to the operator structure
of the built-ins, not even to constants. These restrictions are key to the
completeness result proved in this section. On the other hand, they are not
overly restrictive for many practical applications. For example, consider a
rule
a(x1 + (x2 − x1))→ b(x2) JϕK ,
where a and b are non built-in unary function symbols in F \ FΛ, + and −
are built-in function symbols in FΛ, x1 and x2 are built-in variables in XΛ,
and ϕ is constraint in Λ(XΛ). This rule does not conform to Condition (c)
in Definition 15 because x1 occurs more than once in the lefthand side and
x1 + (x2 − x1) is a proper built-in subterm of the lefthand side that is not
a built-in variable. However, this rule can be transformed by applying the
technique of variable abstraction into the following constrained rule with an
extra built-in variable y1 in XΛ:
a(y1)→ b(x2) Jϕ ∧ y1 = x1 + (x2 − x1)K .
The relation induced by a constrained rewrite theory on s-constrained
terms is called the symbolic atomic relation and is introduced in Defini-
tion 16.
Definition 16 (Symbolic Atomic Relation). Let R = (Σ, E,R) be a con-
strained rewrite theory such that the variables in E and R are in the finite
set Y ⊆ X. The symbolic atomic relation  R induced by R on con-
strained terms denotes the set of pairs in (TΣ(XΛ \ Y )s × Λ(XΛ \ Y ))2
such that 〈t ;ϕt〉  R 〈u ;ϕu〉 if and only if there are l → r JϕK ∈ R and
θ : X −→ TΣ(X) satisfying
a. t =E lθ and u =E rθ,
b. M |= (ϕu ≡ ϕt ∧ ϕθ), and
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c. ϕu is satisfiable in M.
Intuitively, the symbolic atomic relation  R on constrained terms is de-
fined as the topmost rewrite relation induced by R modulo E on TΣ(XΛ)
with extra bookkeeping of constraints. Note that ϕu in 〈t ;ϕt〉 R 〈u ;ϕu〉,
when witnessed by l→ r JϕK and θ, is semantically equivalent to ϕt ∧ ϕθ in
M, in contrast to being syntactically equal. This freedom allows for sim-
plification of constraints if desired. Also, such a constraint ϕu is satisfiable
in M, implying that ϕt and ϕθ are both satisfiable in M, and therefore
〈t ;ϕt〉M 6= ∅ 6= 〈u ;ϕu〉M. The assumption that the variables occurring in
E and R are disjoint from the ones occurring in the constrained terms is
a well-known technical requirement, so that matching a term t ∈ TΣ(XΛ)
with the lefthand of a rule does not wrongly capture variables. Without this
requirement in Definition 16, it would be problematic to have a variable in
vars(t) \ vars(l) that occurs in ϕ.
The binary relation induced by a constrained rewrite theory on TΣ,s is
called the atomic relation.
Definition 17 (Atomic Relation). Let R = (Σ, E,R) be a constrained
rewrite theory. The atomic relation →R induced by R denotes the set of
pairs in T 2Σ,s such that t
′ →R u′ if and only if there are l → r JϕK ∈ R and
ground substitution σ : X −→ TΣ satisfying
a. t′ =E lσ and u′ =E rσ, and
b. M |= ϕσ.
The atomic relation →R is the topmost rewrite relation induced by R
modulo E on TΣ,s. This relation is defined even when a rule in R has
extra variables in its righthand side: such extra variables are assumed to
be arbitrarily instantiated. Also, note that non built-in variables can occur
in l, but the constraint ϕσ is a variable-free sentence in Λ(XΛ), so that the
expression M |= ϕσ is well defined.
7.3 Soundness and Completeness
This section assumes the notation introduced in Section 7.1.
The first question to ask is whether the symbolic atomic relation  R
soundly and completely simulates the atomic relation →R. It is important
to highlight that the notions of soundness and completeness discussed here
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are relative to the model M and should not be understood as the tradi-
tional notions in first-order logic. Soundness can be proved directly from
the definitions. For completeness the idea is that, assuming the admissi-
bility conditions for E , matching modulo axioms for TΣ(XΛ) is enough for
characterizing the complete set of ground unifiers (i.e., solutions) for a sub-
class of TΣ(XΛ).
The soundness of  R w.r.t. →R is stated and proved in Lemma 4. In-
tuitively, soundness means that a pair 〈t ;ϕt〉  R 〈u ;ϕu〉 is a symbolic
underapproximation of all pairs such that t′ →R u′ with t′ ∈ 〈t ;ϕt〉M and
u′ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉M.
Lemma 4 (Soundness). Let R = (Σ, E,R) be a constrained rewrite theory,
t, u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s, and ϕt, ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ). If 〈t ;ϕt〉 R 〈u ;ϕu〉, then tρ→R uρ
for all ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ satisfying M |= ϕuρ.
Proof. Let ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ be such that M |= ϕuρ. The goal is to show that
tρ →R uρ, i.e., that there exists a ground substitution σ : XΛ −→ TΛ such
that tρ =E lσ, uρ =E rσ, and M |= ϕσ. Let l → r JϕK and θ : XΛ −→
TΛ(XΛ) witness 〈t ;ϕt〉 R 〈u ;ϕu〉, with vars(t, ϕt)∩vars(l, r, ϕ) = ∅. Then
t =E lθ, u =E rθ,M |= (ϕu ≡ ϕt∧ϕθ), and ϕu is satisfiable inM. Without
loss of generality assume that θ|vars(t,ϕt) is the identity and let σ = θρ.
Then note that tρ =E (lθ)ρ = l(θρ) = lσ and uρ =E (rθ)ρ = r(θρ) = rσ.
Moreover, M |= (ϕu ≡ ϕt ∧ ϕθ) and M |= ϕuρ imply M |= ϕθρ, i.e.,
M |= ϕσ. Therefore, tρ→R uρ, as desired.
Under the admissibility assumptions, R has a disjoint union E unionmulti B of
equations, with B a collection of structural axioms for which there exists
a decidable and finitary matching algorithm modulo B, and E a set of
orientable sort-decreasing, operationally terminating, confluent rewrite rules
modulo B. Moreover, if the axioms B are such that they are regular and
collapse-free for built-in sorts, then matching modulo B can capture the
ground solutions of equalities modulo B for a subset of TΣ(XΛ). More
specifically, the ground instances of the set of B-matching substitutions of
a term t ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s to a term l ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s that satisfies Condition (c) in
Definition 15 exactly characterize the set GUB(t = l). This observation is
made precise and proved in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 (Lifting Lemma). Let t ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and l ∈ TΣ(X)s. If vars(t) ∩
vars(l) = ∅, B is regular and collapse-free for all sorts in SΛ, and l satisfies
Condition (c) in Definition 15, then
tB l ⇐⇒ GUB(t = l) 6= ∅.
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Proof. (=⇒) If t B l, then t =B lθ′ for some θ′ : X −→ TΣ(X). Let
θ : X −→ TΣ(X) be defined by θ = θ′|vars(l) ∪ id|X\vars(l). Since θ|vars(t) =
id|vars(t), it follows that tθ =B t =B lθ. Hence, tθσ =B lθσ for any σ : X −→
TΛ, and then GUB(t = l) 6= ∅. (⇐=) Without loss of generality assume l ∈
TΣ(XΛ), since otherwise, because vars(t) ⊆ XΛ, any variable x ∈ vars(l) ∩
(X\XΛ) can be substituted by a ground subterm of t obtaining a term l such
that GUB(t = l) = ∅ if and only if GUB(t = l) = ∅. Recall that Σ can be
decomposed into Λ and Σ′ = (S,≤, F \FΛ). If the axioms B are collapse-free
for any sort in SΛ, then B = BΛ ∪B′ for some sets of Σ-equations BΛ, with
B′ such that BΛ operates on TΛ(XΛ) and B′ on TΣ′(X). Then l ∈ TΣ′(XΛ),
since it satisfies Condition (c) in Definition 15 and by the assumption above.
Moreover, l can be viewed as the n-ary function L(x1, . . . , xn) with s-context
L = λx1, . . . , xn.l, where {x1, . . . , xn} = vars(l). Note that, by l linear, there
is a 1-to-1 correspondence between the xi’s and the built-in subterms of l.
Similarly, t can be viewed as them-ary function C(t1, . . . , tm), with s-context
C = λy1, . . . , ym.c and c ∈ TΣ′({y1, . . . , ym})s. Without loss of generality
assume {y1, . . . , ym} ∩ {x1, . . . , xn} = ∅. If σ ∈ GUB(t = l), then
C(t1σ, . . . , tmσ) = C(t1, . . . , tm)σ
= tσ
=B l(x1, . . . , xn)σ
= l(x1σ, . . . , xnσ).
Moreover, C(y1, . . . , ym) and l(x1, . . . , xn) must be B
′-equal up to renaming
of variables. Since B′ is regular, it follows that m = n. Then, there exists a
permutation ϕ : {1, ..., n} −→ {1, ..., n} satisfying
C(xϕ(1), . . . , xϕ(n)) =B′ l(x1, . . . , xn) and tϕ(i)σ =BΛ xiσ for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Let θ : X −→ TΛ(XΛ) be defined by θ(xi) = tϕ(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and be the
identity id elsewhere. Note that θ is well-defined because Λ is many-sorted.
Also note that vars(t) ∩ vars(l) = ∅ imply
t = C(tϕ(1), . . . , tϕ(n)) =B′ l(tϕ(1), . . . , tϕ(n)) =BΛ l(x1, . . . , xn)θ.
Therefore tB l, as desired.
The requirement of being collapse-free for built-in sorts is key in the proof
of Lemma 5: it allows viewing B-matching for TΣ(XΛ) as a modular combi-
nation of BΛ-matching for TΛ(XΛ) and B
′-matching for TΣ′(X). This idea
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was adopted and adapted from the development in [77]. Any combination
of associativity, commutativity, and identity axioms is regular and has a
decidable and finitary matching algorithm. However, only combinations of
associativity and commutativity are collapse free for any sort since these ax-
ioms are sort-preserving. For identity axioms there is a special treatment as
they are allowed in B as long as they are collapse-free for any built-in sort.
The restriction on identity axioms collapsing non built-in terms into built-in
terms can be handled by a theory transformation that eliminates the need
for identity axioms, such as the one described in [32]. As a final remark,
note that there is a finitary matching algorithm for associativity axioms in
contrast to a nonexistent general and finitary unification algorithm. This
means that the symbolic reachability method developed here based on the
symbolic atomic relation can be applied to specifications with lists, queues,
and stacks that often use associativity axioms, and that are outside the
scope of general-purpose unification-based methods such as narrowing.
As a side margin note, observe that Lemma 5 uses the same motivation
as Lemma 2 in Section 4.2.1. The main difference is that the former uses
matching instead of unification for computing a complete set of solutions for
ground equalities.
The completeness of  R w.r.t. →R is stated and proved in Lemma 6.
Intuitively, completeness states that  R is a symbolic overaproximation of
→R. In Lemma 6 it is assumed that the lefthand side of each constrained
rewrite rule in R is →E/B-irreducible. Such an assumption is easily met
in practice because if l is a lefthand side in R that is →E/B-reducible, by
confluence and operational termination it has an unique E/B-canonical form
to which variable abstraction can be applied, thus obtaining an equivalent
constrained rule.
Lemma 6 (Completeness). Let R = (Σ, E ∪B,R) be a constrained rewrite
theory, t ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s, u′ ∈ TΣ,s, and ϕt ∈ Λ(XΛ). Assume that (Σ, E ∪ B)
is admissible, the axioms in B are regular and are collapse-free for any
sort in SΛ, and the lefthand side of the rules in R are in E-canonical form
modulo B. For any ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ such that tρ ∈ 〈t ;ϕt〉M and tρ →R u′,
there exist u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ) such that 〈t ;ϕt〉 R 〈u ;ϕu〉 and
u′ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉M.
Proof. Let ρ be as given, and let l → r JϕK ∈ R and σ : XΛ −→ TΛ witness
tρ →R u′, i.e., tρ =E∪B lσ, u′ =E∪B rσ, and M |= ϕρ, with vars(t, ϕt) ∩
vars(l, r, ϕ) = ∅. The goal is to show the existence of u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and
ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ) s.t. (i) 〈t ;ϕt〉  R 〈u ;ϕu〉 and (ii) u′ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉M. Without
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loss of generality assume ρ = σ. Under the admissibility conditions for
(Σ, E∪B), the term t = t ↓E/B is well-defined and satisfies t ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and
vars(t) ⊆ vars(t). Then tσ =E∪B tσ =E∪B lσ. Since l is in E/B-canonical
form by assumption and t is in E/B-canonical form, it follows that tσ =B lσ.
Therefore GUB(t = l) 6= ∅ and, with the given assumptions, Lemma 5
yields the existence of θ : X −→ TΣ(X) such that t =B lθ; a fortiori,
t =E∪B lθ. Without loss of generality assume θ|X\vars(l) = σ|X\vars(l). Take
u = rθ and ϕu = ϕt ∧ ϕθ. First note that if x ∈ vars(r), then x ∈ vars(l)
or x ∈ X \ vars(l). If x ∈ vars(l), then θ(x) ∈ TΣ(XΛ) because θ(x) is
a subterm of t ∈ TΣ(XΛ); if x ∈ X \ vars(l), then θ(x) = σ(x) ∈ TΣ.
That is, u = rθ ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s. On the other hand, tσ = tρ ∈ 〈t ;ϕt〉M by
assumption and then M |= ϕtσ. Also tσ = tρ =E∪B= lσ and t =E∪B lθ,
imply θσ =E∪B σ. Then M |= ϕθσ, because M |= ϕρ by assumption and
ρ = σ. That is, M |= ϕtσ ∧ ϕθσ and therefore M |= ϕuσ by definition of
ϕu. Summarizing: t =E∪B lθ, u = rθ, ϕu = ϕt ∧ ϕθ, and ϕu is satisfiable
in M. Therefore (i) follows. For (ii) note that the already proven facts
u′ =E∪B rσ, σ =E∪B θσ, and M |= ϕuσ imply u′ =E∪B rσ ∈ 〈rθ ;ϕu〉M
with witness σ.
Under the admissibility assumptions for E = (Σ, E∪B), each t ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s
has an E/B-canonical form t with sort s and is unique modulo B. Also, the
canonical form t is such that vars(t) ⊆ vars(t).
Theorem 12 collects the soundness and completeness statements of  R
w.r.t. →R.
Theorem 12. Let R = (Σ, E ∪ B,R) be a constrained rewrite theory, t ∈
TΣ(XΛ)s, and ϕt ∈ Λ(XΛ).
(Soundness) If u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s, ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ), and 〈t ;ϕt〉 R 〈u ;ϕu〉, then
(∀ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ) M |= ϕuρ =⇒ tρ→R uρ.
(Completeness) If (Σ, E∪B) is admissible, B is regular and collapse-free
for SΛ, and the lefthand sides of the rules in R are in E/B-canonical
form, and if u′ ∈ TΣ,s and ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ are such that tρ→R u′ and
tρ ∈ 〈t ;ϕt〉M, then
(∃u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s, ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ)) 〈t ;ϕt〉 R 〈u ;ϕu〉 ∧ u′ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉.
Proof. By Lemma 4 and Lemma 6.
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It remains to be shown when Theorem 12 is effective, i.e., when  R and
→R can be computed.
Lemma 7. Let R = (Σ, E ∪B,R) be a constrained rewrite theory. Assume
(Σ, E ∪B) is admissible. Then:
a. if there is a decision procedure for satisfiability of equalities and inequal-
ities in M, →R and  R are computable;
b. if each constrained rule l → r JϕK ∈ R is such that vars(ϕ) ⊆ vars(l),
→R is decidable.
The existence of unique E/B-canonical forms for terms in TΣ(XΛ)s is not
enough for computing→R or R, even when solving Boolean combinations
of equalities with variables modulo B is decidable. The explanation for
this is that membership in →R or  R depends on inductive satisfiability
of constraints, i.e., on satisfiability in the initial algebra TΣ/E of constraints
that can have variables. For example, it is easy to devise an admissible
equational theory for specifying integer arithmetic, but it is well-known that
non-linear integer arithmetic is undecidable.
7.4 Symbolic Closures
This section provides an account of symbolic relations induced by a symbolic
atomic relation, such as the reflexive-transitive closure and the asynchronous
closure among others. Soundness and completeness for each symbolic rela-
tion w.r.t. to its ground counterpart are corollaries of Theorem 12. In the
development of this section, statements about soundness and completeness
are to be understood as in the statement of Theorem 12, including the as-
sumptions.
In the sequel it is assumed that the equational theories E = (Σ, E) and
EΛ = (Λ, EΛ), and the EΛ-algebraM are as defined in Section 7.2. It is also
assumed that the atomic relations induced by a constrained rewrite theory
R = (Σ, E,R) are sort-decreasing. The symbolic atomic relation  R is
sort-decreasing if and only if for any t, u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and ϕt, ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ)
if 〈t ;ϕt〉  R 〈u ;ϕu〉 then ls(t) ≥ ls(u). The atomic relation →R is sort-
decreasing if and only if for any t′, u′ ∈ TΣ,s if t′ →R u′ then ls(t′) ≥ ls(u′).
Let → be a binary relation on a given set. The identity relation, n-fold
composition, and reflexive-transitive closure of → are defined as usual and
denoted, respectively, by (→)0, (→)n, and (→)∗ (or simply →0, →n, and
→∗). Note that → and →1 denote the same binary relation.
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Corollaries 2 and 3 show, respectively, that the n-fold composition  nR
and reflexive-transitive closure  ∗R of the symbolic atomic relation  R are
sound and complete w.r.t. to →nR and →∗R, respectively.
Corollary 2 (Fold Composition). For each n ∈ N,  nR is sound and com-
plete w.r.t. →nR.
Proof. Let t ∈ TΣ(X)s and ϕt ∈ Λ(XΛ).
(Soundness). Let u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s, ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ), and ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ. The goal
is to prove for any n ∈ N that if 〈t ;ϕt〉  nR 〈u ;ϕu〉 and M |= ϕuρ,
then tρ→nR uρ.
n = 0 : then t = u, ϕt = ϕu, and then tρ→0R tρ.
n > 0 : then there are v ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and ϕv ∈ Λ(XΛ) such that
〈t ;ϕt〉 n−1R 〈v ;ϕv〉 R 〈u ;ϕu〉.
Since M |= ϕuρ, by the soundness of  R w.r.t. →R it follows
that vρ →R uρ. By definition of  R, ϕu implies ϕv in M and
thenM |= ϕvρ. By the induction hypothesis tρ→n−1R vρ. There-
fore,
tρ→n−1R vρ→1R uρ , i.e., tρ→nR uρ.
(Completeness). Let u′ ∈ TΣ,s and ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ satisfy tρ →nR u′ and
tρ ∈ 〈t ;ϕt〉. For each n ∈ N, the goal is to prove the existence of
u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ) such that 〈t ;ϕt〉  nR 〈u ;ϕu〉 and
u′ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉M.
n = 0 : then u = t and ϕu = ϕt witness 〈t ;ϕt〉  0R 〈u ;ϕu〉 = 〈t ;ϕt〉
and u′ = tρ ∈ 〈t ;ϕt〉M = 〈u ;ϕu〉M.
n > 0 : then there is v′ ∈ TΣ,s such that tρ→n−1R v′ →R u′. By the in-
duction hypothesis, there are v ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and ϕv ∈ Λ(XΛ) such
that 〈t ;ϕt〉 n−1R 〈v ;ϕv〉 and v′ ∈ 〈v ;ϕv〉M. Let σ : XΛ −→ TΛ
witness v′ ∈ 〈v ;ϕ〉M. Then v′ =E vσ →R t′. By the complete-
ness of  R w.r.t. →R there are u ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ)
such that 〈v ;ϕv〉  R 〈u ;ϕu〉 and u′ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉M. Therefore
〈t ;ϕt〉 nR 〈u ;ϕu〉 and u′ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉M, as desired.
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Corollary 3 (Reflexive-Transitive Closure).  ∗R is sound and complete
w.r.t. →∗R.
Proof. Follows by Corollary 2.
The symbolic asynchronous relation
M R is the binary relation on pairs
in TΣ(XΛ) × Λ(XΛ) defined by 〈t ;ϕt〉 M R 〈u ;ϕu〉 if and only if there is
an s-context C = λx.c and terms t1, u1 ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s such that t = C(t1),
u = C(u1), and 〈t1 ;ϕt〉 R 〈u1 ;ϕu〉. The asynchronous relation M→R is the
binary relation on TΣ defined by t
′ M→R u′ if and only if there is an s-context
C = λx.c and terms t′1, u′1 ∈ TΣ,s such that t′ = C(t′1), u′ = C(u′1), and
t′1 →R u′1. Note that the relations M R and M→R are well-defined because
 R and →R are sort-decreasing.
Corollary 4 (Asynchronous Closure). The following statements hold:
a.
M R is sound and complete w.r.t. M→R.
b. For each n ∈ N, ( M R)n is sound and complete w.r.t. ( M→R)n.
c. (
M R)∗ is sound and complete w.r.t. ( M→R)∗.
Proof. a. Let t ∈ TΣ(XΛ) and ϕt ∈ Λ(XΛ).
(Soundness). Let u ∈ TΣ(XΛ), ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ), and ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ. The
goal is to show that if 〈t ;ϕt〉 M R 〈u ;ϕu〉 and M |= ϕuρ, then
tρ
M→R uρ. By definition of M R, there is an s-context C = λx.c
and terms t1, u1 ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s such that t = C(t1), u = C(t2), and
〈t1 ;ϕt〉  R 〈u1 ;ϕu〉. Then, t1ρ →R u1ρ by M |= ϕuρ and the
soundness of R w.r.t. →R. Let θ : XΛ −→ TΛ(XΛ) be defined by
θ(x) = x and θ(x′) = σ(x′) otherwise, and define C ′ = λx.c′, where
c′ = cθ. Observe that C ′ is an s-context and that vars(c′) = {x}.
Moreover tρ = C ′(t1)ρ = C ′(t1ρ) and uρ = C ′(u1)ρ = C ′(u1ρ)
imply tρ
M→R uρ because t1ρ→R u1ρ.
(Completeness). Let u′ ∈ TΣ and ρ : XΛ −→ TΛ satisfy tρ M→R u′ and
tρ ∈ 〈t ;ϕt〉. The goal is to prove the existence of u ∈ TΣ(XΛ) and
ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ) such that 〈t ;ϕt〉 M R 〈u ;ϕu〉 and u′ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉M. By
definition of
M→R, there are s-context C = λx.c and terms tρ1, uρ1 ∈
TΣ,s such that tρ = C(t
ρ
1), u
′ = C(uρ1), and t
ρ
1 →R uρ1. Without
loss of generality assume vars(c) = {x}. Note then that there is
t1 ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s subterm of t such that tρ1 = t1ρ. Note also that
tρ ∈ 〈t ;ϕt〉M implies t1ρ ∈ 〈t1 ;ϕt〉M. Then, by completeness of
 R w.r.t. →R, there are u1 ∈ TΣ(XΛ)s and ϕu ∈ Λ(XΛ) satisfying
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〈t1 ;ϕt〉 R 〈u1 ;ϕu〉 and uρ1 ∈ 〈u1 ;ϕu〉M. In particular, uρ1 =E u1ρ
(see the proof of Theorem 12). Let u = C(u1), which is well-defined
because  R is sort-decreasing. Then it follows that t = C(t1) M R
C(u1) = u, and u
′ = C(uρ1) = C(u1ρ) = C(u1)ρ = uρ ∈ 〈u ;ϕu〉, as
desired.
b. Follows by part (a) and by mimicking the proof of Corollary 2.
c. Follows by part (b).
Note that Corollary 4 is of special interest for declarative specification and
programming languages such as Maude [23] that implement equational and
non-equational deduction via the asynchronous closure of the respective term
rewriting relations. Corollary 4 also makes explicit a significant difference
between
M R and the asynchronous closure of any reasonable unification-
based symbolic atomic relation. In the former, a deduction step within a
context would require the propagation of the witnessing unifier to the entire
context. However, this is not the case for  R, because there is no variable
renaming or specialization on the subject term when it is matched with the
lefthand side of a constrained rule.
The symbolic parallel relation
q R is the binary relation on TΣ(XΛ) ×
Λ(XΛ) defined by 〈t ;ϕt〉 q R 〈u ;ϕu〉 if and only if there is an s-context C =
λx1, . . . , xm.c, terms t1, . . . , tm and u1, . . . , um in TΣ(XΛ)s, and constraints
ϕ1, . . . , ϕm in Λ(XΛ) satisfying t = C(t1, . . . , tm), u = C(u1, . . . , um), 〈ti ;ϕt〉
 R 〈ui ;ϕi〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,M |= (ϕu ≡ ∧mi=1ϕi), and ϕu is satisfiable inM.
The parallel relation
q→R is the binary relation on TΣ defined by t′ q→R u′
if and only if there is an s-context C = λx1, . . . , xm.c and terms t
′
1, . . . , t
′
m
and u′1, . . . , u′m in TΣ,s satisfying t′ = C(t′1, . . . , t′m), u′ = C(u′1, . . . , u′m),
and t′i →R u′i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Note that the relations q R and q→R are
well-defined because  R and →R are sort-decreasing.
Corollary 5 (Parallel Closure). The following statements hold:
a.
q R is sound and complete w.r.t. q→R.
b. For each n ∈ N, ( q R)n is sound and complete w.r.t. ( q→R)n.
c. (
q R)∗ is sound and complete w.r.t. ( q→R)∗.
Proof.
a. Follows by an easy generalization of the proof for Corollary 5 part (a).
110
b. Follows by part (a) and by mimicking the proof of Corollary 2.
c. Follows by part (b).
The symbolic parallel closure generalizes the asynchronous closure of a
symbolic atomic relation to several redexes and, like the latter, does not need
to propagate the witnessing substitutions to the context. On the other hand,
the symbolic parallel relations in Corollary 5 are useful in obtaining formal
and executable semantics of synchronous languages by term rewriting. Such
an approach is taken, for instance in [91] and [92], where an equational
serialization procedure is used to simulate the parallel closure of an atomic
relation via an asynchronous term rewriting relation.
7.5 Related Work and Concluding Remarks
The idea of combining term-rewriting techniques and constraint data struc-
tures is a hot topic of research nowadays, specially since the raise of modern
theorem provers with highly efficient decision procedures in the form of SMT
solvers. The overall aim is to advance applicability of rewriting techniques
in verification by focusing on rewriting with constraints expressed in some
logic that has an efficient decision procedure (see [79] for an overview).
M. Ayala-Rinco´n [3] investigates, in the setting of many-sorted equational
logic, the expressiveness of conditional equational systems whose conditions
may use built-in predicates. This class of equational theories is important
because the combination of equational and built-in premises yield a type of
clauses which is more expressive than purely conditional equations. Rewrit-
ing notions like confluence, termination, and critical pairs are investigated.
In the context of rewriting logic, S. Falke and D. Kapur [40] have studied the
problem of termination with constrained built-ins. In particular, they have
extended the dependency pairs framework to handle termination of equa-
tional specifications with semantic data structures and evaluation strategies
(as explained in Chapter 3) in the Maude language. The same authors have
used the idea of combining rewriting induction and linear arithmetic over
constrained terms [41]. Their aim is to obtain equational decision proce-
dures that can handle semantic data types represented by the constrained
built-ins.
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CHAPTER 8
A REWRITING LOGIC SEMANTICS FOR PLEXIL
Synchronous languages were introduced in the 1980s to program reactive
systems, i.e., systems whose behavior is determined by their continuous re-
action to the environment where they are deployed. They are often used to
program embedded applications and automatic control software. The fam-
ily of synchronous languages is characterized by the synchronous hypothesis,
which states that a reactive system is arbitrarily fast and able to react imme-
diately in no time to stimuli from the external environment. One of the main
consequences of the synchronous hypothesis is that components running in
parallel are perfectly synchronized and cannot arbitrarily interleave. The
implementation of a synchronous language usually requires the simulation
of the synchronous semantics within an asynchronous computation model.
This simulation must ensure the validity of the synchronous hypothesis in
the target asynchronous model.
The Plan Execution Interchange Language (PLEXIL) [39] is a synchronous
language developed by NASA to support autonomous spacecraft operations.
Space mission operations require flexible, efficient and reliable plan execu-
tion. The computer system on board the spacecraft that executes plans is
called the executive and is a safety-critical component of the space mission.
The Universal Executive (UE) [103] is an open source PLEXIL executive
developed by NASA. PLEXIL and the UE have been used on mid-size ap-
plications such as robotic rovers and a prototype of a Mars drill. It has also
been used to demonstrate automation for the International Space Station.
Given the safety-critical nature of spacecraft operations, PLEXIL’s opera-
tional semantics has been formally defined [30] and several properties of the
language, such as determinism and compositionality, have been mechanically
verified [29] in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) [82]. The formal
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small-step semantics is defined using a compositional layer of five reduction
relations on sets of nodes. These nodes are the building blocks of a PLEXIL
plan and represent the hierarchical decomposition of tasks. From an oper-
ational point of view, PLEXIL is more complex, and more high-level, than
general-purpose synchronous languages such as Esterel [11] or Lustre [19].
PLEXIL is designed specifically for flexible and reliable command execution
in autonomous applications.
This chapter presents a rewriting logic semantics of PLEXIL specified
in Maude. This semantics complements the small-step structural opera-
tional semantics written in PVS but, in contrast to the PVS higher-order
logic specification, the rewriting logic semantics of PLEXIL is executable
and therefore provides an interpreter for the language. This interpreter is
used at NASA as an oracle and semantic standard for validating the imple-
mentation of PLEXIL executives, such as the UE, and as a language design
infrastructure for designers of the language to study new features or possible
variants of the language. Additionally, by using a graphical interface [84],
PLEXIL developers are able to more easily and conveniently exploit the for-
mal analysis tools provided by Maude to verify properties of actual plans.
A fruitful collaboration with the PLEXIL development team at NASA
Ames has been established by using the rewriting logic semantics of PLEXIL
to validate the intended semantics of the language against a wide variety of
plan examples. Two problematic issues about PLEXIL’s original semantics
were discovered with the help of the rewriting logic semantics of PLEXIL
presented in this chapter. The first was found at the level of the atomic re-
lation, for which undesired interleaving semantics were introduced in some
computations. The second was found at the level of the micro relation,
for which spurious infinite loops were present in some computations. Solu-
tions to both issues have been provided and validated using the rewriting
logic semantics, and have been adopted in the latest version of the PLEXIL
semantics.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 presents an overview
of the PLEXIL language. Section 8.2 introduces PLX, the rewriting logic
semantics of PLEXIL, and illustrates its main design features. Section 8.3
summarizes some of the main contributions made possible by the rewriting
logic semantics PLX, such as the finding of some defects in the PLEXIL’s
initial design and the development of new features for the language. Sec-
tion 8.4 presents a case study about a cruise control system that is specified
and formally verified in PLX. Some related work is discussed in Section 8.5.
The source code of the rewriting logic semantics in Maude is available at
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http://camilorocha.info/thesis.
8.1 PLEXIL Overview
This section presents an overview of PLEXIL, a synchronous language for
automation developed by NASA. The reader is referred to [39] for a detailed
description of the language.
A PLEXIL program, called a plan, is a tree of nodes representing a hi-
erarchical decomposition of tasks. Interior nodes, called list nodes, provide
control structure and naming scope for local variables. The primitive ac-
tions of a plan are specified in the leaf nodes. Leaf nodes can be assignment
nodes, which assign values to local variables, command nodes, which call
external commands, or empty nodes, which do nothing. PLEXIL plans in-
teract with a functional layer that provides the interface with the external
environment. This functional layer executes the external commands and
communicates the status and result of their execution to the plan through
external variables.
Nodes have an execution state, which can be inactive, waiting , executing ,
iterationend , failing , finishing , or finished , and an execution outcome, which
can be unknown, skipped , success, or failure. They can declare local vari-
ables that are accessible to the node in which they are declared and all its
descendants. In contrast to local variables, the execution state and outcome
of a node are visible to all nodes in the plan. Assignment nodes also have a
priority that is used to solve race conditions. The internal state of a node
consists of the current values of its execution state, execution outcome, and
local variables.
Each node is equipped with a set of gate conditions and check conditions
that govern the execution of a plan. Gate conditions provide control flow
mechanisms that react to external events. In particular, the start condition
specifies when a node starts its execution, the end condition specifies when a
node ends its execution, the repeat condition specifies when a node can repeat
its execution, and the skip condition specifies when the execution of a node
can be skipped. Check conditions are used to signal abnormal execution
states of a node and they can be either pre-condition, post-condition, or
invariant conditions. The language includes Boolean, integer and floating-
point arithmetic, and string expressions. It also includes lookup expressions
that read the value of external variables provided to the plan through the
executive. Expressions appear in conditions, assignments, and arguments of
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commands. Each of the basic types is extended by a special value unknown
that can result, for example, when a lookup fails.
The execution of a plan in PLEXIL is driven by external events that
trigger changes in the gate conditions. All nodes affected by a change in
a gate condition synchronously respond to the event by modifying their
internal state. These internal modifications may trigger more changes in
gate conditions that in turn are synchronously processed until quiescence is
reached for all nodes involved. External events are considered in the order
in which they are received. An external event and all its cascading effects
are processed before the next event is considered. This behavior is known
as run-to-completion semantics.
Henceforth, the notation (Γ, pi) is used to represent the execution state
of a plan, where Γ is a set of external variables and their current values,
and pi is a set of nodes and their internal states. Formally, the semantics of
PLEXIL is defined on states (Γ, pi) by a compositional layer of five reduction
relations [39]. The atomic relation describes the execution of an individual
node in terms of state transitions triggered by changes in the environment.
The micro relation describes the synchronous reduction of the atomic re-
lation with respect to the maximal redexes strategy, i.e., the synchronous
application of the atomic relation to the maximal set of nodes of a plan.
The remaining three relations are the quiescence relation, the macro rela-
tion, and the execution relation that describe, respectively, the reduction of
the micro relation until normalization, the interaction of a plan with the
external environment upon one external event, and the n-iteration of the
macro relation corresponding to n time steps.
Consider the PLEXIL plan in Figure 8.1. The plan consists of a root
node Exchange of type list, and leaf nodes SetX and SetY of type assign-
ment. The node Exchange declares two local variables x and y. The values
of these variables are exchanged by the synchronous execution of the node
assignments SetX and SetY. The node Exchange also declares a start con-
dition and an invariant condition. The start condition states that the node
can start executing whenever the value of an external variable T is greater
than 10. The invariant condition states that at any state of execution the
values of x and y add up to 3.
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Exchange: {
Integer x = 1;
Integer y = 2;
StartCondition: Lookup(T) > 10;
Invariant: x+y == 3;
NodeList:
SetX: { Assignment: x = y; }
SetY: { Assignment: y = x; }
}
Figure 8.1: A PLEXIL plan that reads the value of an external variable T and syn-
chronously exchanges the values of internal variables x and y.
8.2 Formal Semantics
The PLEXIL rewriting logic semantics PLX is defined in Maude and has
several modules comprising more than 2000 lines of code. A complete review
of its implementation is out of the scope of this section. Instead, this section
highlights some of the main features of the formal semantics and provides a
high-level overview of the PLX source code available with the thesis at http:
//camilorocha.info/thesis. Some syntax details have been omitted or
changed intentionally to favor a cleaner notation and a clearer explanation.
At the top level, the state space is represented by the top sort Sys, which is
made up of sequences of collections of external variables and configurations
of objects:
sort Sys .
op _|-_ : EnvList Configuration -> Sys [ctor] .
Sequences of collections of external variables correspond to sequences of
events in the external environment; more than one event can be recorded
in each collection which results in more than one external variable being
updated. Similar to the IBOS formal semantics in Chapter 6, objects are
made up out of an object identifier, a type an a set of attributes.
Object identifiers are nonempty lists of sort NeQualified made up of
simple identifiers of sort Identifier, and obtained by instantiating Maude’s
parametric list sort LIST:
protecting LIST{Identifier}
* ( op nil to nilq ,
sort List{Identifier} to Qualified,
sort NeList{Identifier} to NeQualified,
op __ to _._ ) .
For each plan, the names of the nodes are used to populate the sort
Identifier with constants. The elements in the list represent the hierarchy
of a node in a plan. For example, the actual name of node SetX in Figure 8.1
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is defined by two constants SetX and Exchange of sort Identifier, and is
represented by the ground term SetX.Exchange. The semantics assumes
that the qualified names in an input plan are unique.
The type of an object identifies the type of node or local memory:
op list : -> Cid .
op command : -> Cid .
op assignment : -> Cid .
op empty : -> Cid .
op memory : -> Cid .
op extvar : -> Cid .
The execution state of nodes and local memories is represented by the
attributes in its object representation. The following are some attribute
names:
--- internal state
op status:_ : Status -> Attribute [ctor] .
--- execution outcome
op outcome:_ : Outcome -> Attribute [ctor] .
--- assignment
op _:=_ : NeQualified Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
--- initial value of a local memory
op initVal:_ : Value -> Attribute [ctor] .
--- current value of a local memory
op actVal:_ : Value -> Attribute [ctor] .
--- priority for assignments
op priority:_ : Rat -> Attribute [ctor] .
--- Conditions
op repeatc:_ : Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
op startc:_ : Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
op endc:_ : Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
op post:_ : Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
op skip:_ : Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
op pre:_ : Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
op inv:_ : Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
op exit:_ : Expression -> Attribute [ctor] .
The most basic expressions in PLX are constant values with sort Value,
which are formed from Boolean, integer, float, and string Maude values.
Additional constants such as unknown and aborted are introduced, respec-
tively, to model the special information about unknown information and
aborted execution.
sort Value .
op v : Int -> Value .
op v : Bool -> Value .
op v : Float -> Value .
op v : String -> Value .
ops unknown aborted : -> Value .
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More general expressions are formed from constant values with construc-
tor const, from local memory names with constructor var, and from exter-
nal variable access with constructor lookups.
sort Expression .
op const : Value -> Expression [ctor] .
op var : NeQualified -> Expression [ctor] .
op lookup : NeQualified -> Expression [ctor] .
Expressions can also be formed from the Boolean, integer, and float op-
erators in the usual way.
As an illustration, the following is an initial state for the Exchange PLEXIL
plan in Figure 8.1:
nil |-
< Exchange : list |
status: inactive,
outcome: none,
startc: (lookupOnChange(T, v(0)) > const(v(10))),
inv: (var(x . Exchange) + var(y . Exchange) equ const(v(3))), ... >
< SetX . Exchange : assignment |
status: inactive,
outcome: none,
(x . Exchange) := var(y . Exchange), ... >
< SetY . Exchange : assignment |
status: inactive,
outcome: none,
(y . Exchange) := var(x . Exchange), ... >
< x . Exchange : memory | initVal: v(1),actVal: v(1) >
< y . Exchange : memory | initVal: v(2),actVal: v(2) >
< T : extvar | actVal: v(15) >
In this state, the value of the external variable T is the constant integer
value 15. Constant nil with sort environment list indicates that there are
not external events besides the one for initially updating T.
8.2.1 Synchronous Simulation
PLEXIL’s atomic relation is defined by 42 rules, indexed by the type and
the execution status of nodes into a dozen groups. Each group associates a
priority to its set of rules, which defines a linear order on the set of rules.
Atomic transitions are modeled by a collection of equations implementing
the serialization procedure [91, 31]. These serialization equations are all
triggered by the micro function:
op micro : Configuration -> Configuration .
The argument of micro is a configuration of objects representing the ex-
ecution state of a plan. The output is a configuration representing the
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synchronous application of all possible one-step atomic reductions on the
input configuration under the maximal redexes strategy. Note that since
PLEXIL is deterministic, it is assumed that the output of micro is at most
one state on any given input. If a synchronous reduction is not possible,
function micro returns the input configuration.
PLEXIL’s micro relation is specified by the rewrite rule [micro], which
uses the function micro:
crl [micro] :
EL:EnvList |- Cnf:Configuration
=> EL:EnvList |- Cnf’:Configuration
if Cnf’:Configuration := micro(Cnf:Configuration)
/\ Cnf:Configuration =/= Cnf’:Configuration .
A micro reduction is possible only when the outcome of micro is different
to its input. Function symbol ‘=/=’ is Maude’s built-in inequality operator.
See [31] for more details on the implementation of the serialization procedure
by function micro.
8.2.2 External Events
PLEXIL execution is driven by external events. The set of such events
includes events related to lookup in conditions, e.g., changes in the value
of an external state that affects a gate condition, acknowledgments that a
command has been initialized, reception of a value returned by a command,
etc.
PLEXIL’s interaction with the external environment is defined by the
macro relation. In the rewriting logic semantics PLX, rewrite rule [macro]
models the interaction of a plan with the external events:
crl [macro] :
Env:Environment . EL:EnvList |- Cnf:Configuration
=> EL:EnvList |- updateConf(Cnf’:Configuration,Env:Environment)
if Cnf’:Configuration := micro(Cnf:Configuration)
/\ Cnf:Configuration == Cnf’:Configuration .
A rewrite step with rule macro is possible whenever there is at least an
external event (modeled by Env:Environment) and no micro steps are possi-
ble, which corresponds to the formal definition of PLEXIL’s macro relation.
Auxiliary function updateEnv updates the value associated to the exter-
nal variables in the execution state with that from the next event of the
environment.
As an illustration on how rules [micro] and [macro] interact in the
rewriting logic semantics PLX, consider the following output given by Maude’s
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search command:
search in EXCHANGE : compile(ExchangeEnv, Exchange) =>! X:Sys .
Solution 1 (state 9)
states: 10 rewrites: 1217 in 4ms cpu (4ms real) (304250 rewrites/second)
X:Sys -->
nil |-
< Exchange : list |
status: finished,
outcome: success,
startc: (lookupOnChange(T, v(0)) > const(v(10))),
inv: (var(x . Exchange) + var(y . Exchange) equ const(v(3))), ... >
< SetX . Exchange : assignment |
status: finished,
outcome: success,
(x . Exchange) := var(y . Exchange), ... >
< SetY . Exchange : assignment |
status: finished,
outcome: success,
(y . Exchange) := var(x . Exchange), ... >
< x . Exchange : memory | initVal: v(1),actVal: v(2) >
< y . Exchange : memory | initVal: v(2),actVal: v(1) >
< T : extvar | actVal: v(15) >
In this case, plan Exchange is executed from an initial state, represented
by compile(ExchangeEnv, Exchange) and that corresponds to the initial
state presented before in this section (where the value of T is 15). The result
of the search is exactly one state in which the values of x . Exchange and
y . Exchange have been exchanged, the internal state of execution of the
nodes is finished, and the outcome of their execution is success.
8.3 Design Validation
The rewriting logic semantics PLX has been used to validate the design of
PLEXIL against a wide variety of plan examples. Thanks to the formal
semantics two problematic issues about the original PLEXIL semantics were
discovered:
Non-atomicity of the atomic relation. A prior version of the atomic
rules for executing assignment nodes introduced an undesired inter-
leaving semantics for variable assignments, which invalidated the syn-
chronous nature of the language.
Spurious non-termination of plans. Due to lack of detail in the original
specification of some predicates, there were cases in which some tran-
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sitions for list nodes ending iteration would lead to spurious infinite
loops.
Although the formal operational semantics of PLEXIL in [30] had been
previously used to prove several properties of PLEXIL, neither one of these
issues was uncovered. As as matter of fact, these issues do not compro-
mise any of the proven properties of the language. Solutions to both issues
were provided using the executable rewriting logic semantics and have been
adopted in the latest version of the formal PLEXIL semantics.
The rewriting logic semantics PLX has also been used to study variations
and extensions of the PLEXIL language design.
PLEXIL’s macro relation is especially important because it is the seman-
tic relation defining the interaction of a plan with the external environment.
On the one hand, it is reasonable to have access to the external state as
often as possible so that lookups in each atomic reduction can use the latest
information available. On the other hand, it can be computationally ex-
pensive to implement such a policy because sensors or similar artifacts can
significantly delay the execution of a plan. Another dimension of the prob-
lem arises when a guard of an internal loop depends on external variables:
should the loop run-to-completion regardless of the possible updates to the
value of the variable in its guard, or should it stop at each iteration so that
the value of the external variable can be updated?
The rewriting logic semantics PLX has been modified to accommodate
alternative specifications of PLEXIL’s semantics with different definitions of
the macro relation. These semantic variants of PLEXIL have been studied
and have been exercised with a significant number of examples.
Another concrete example that illustrates the use of PLEXIL’s rewriting
logic semantics by the designers of the language is the addition of a gate
condition called exit condition. The exit condition provides a mechanism
for a clean interruption of execution. In order to support this feature, the
PLX specification of the atomic relation was modified to include the intended
semantics. Given the modular definition of the formal semantics none of the
other rewriting relations need to be modified.
8.4 A Case Study
A cruise control system adapted from [13] is presented to showcase the
model checking capabilities made possible by the PLX executable semantics.
Originally, the cruise control model was designed for the Enhanced Oper-
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ator Function Model (EOFM) formalism, which is intended for the study
of human behavior in a human-computer interaction framework. However,
PLEXIL shares many characteristics with EOFM, including the hierarchical
structure of tasks decomposed into sub-tasks and the execution governed by
conditions (pre, post , repeat , invariant).
adjust speed
increase
set desired
cruise speed
maintain
cruise speed
no 
traffic
let ahead
(slowdown)
let behind
(speed up)
roll to stop break
seq xor xor
Drive to ramp Avoid traffic on ramp Stop at red light
speed = fast
acceleration > 0
cruise = on/moderate
roll cruise on break
seq
Figure 8.2: Cruise control model with task hierarchy.
8.4.1 Model Description
The cruise control model consists of three main components: car, driver,
and stoplight, which execute synchronously. The operator drives the car
on a street, approaching the stoplight. Other cars may merge into the lane
from a side ramp, roughly midway through. The car has three controls
represented in the model: the gas and break pedals to manage speed and
acceleration, and a cruise button to switch the cruise mode on/off and set
the cruise speed. The human operator’s plan is to safely operate the controls
of the car to achieve three sub-goals: (i) drive at a desired cruise speed, (ii)
avoid the possible merging traffic from the ramp, and (iii) obey the traffic
light at the intersection, i.e., stop the car in time if the light turns red. All
three properties can be represented in PLEXIL. Here the focus is on the
third, which is a safety property.
The model parameters are: the geometry of the intersection, i.e., the
length of each street segment; the location of the ramp along the street, in
distance units; the stoplight cycle length, in time units, for each color; and
the speed range, in distance per time units.
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Model variables. The model variables and their range are selected ac-
cording to an abstraction scheme that discretizes the values to allow finite
state model checking, yet leaves sufficient information to make the study
relevant.
• distance ∈ [0 . . . 55], the distance of the car to the intersection;
• time ∈ [0 . . . 28];
• speed ∈ {stopped = 0, slow = 1, moderate = 2, fast = 3};
• acceleration ∈ {−1, 0, 1};
• cruise enabled ∈ {true, false};
• cruise speed ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3};
Transitions. The car advances according to its speed until it reaches the
intersection. It updates
distance := distance− speed∗timestep
while the condition speed > 0∧ distance > 0 holds. The discretized speed
can change by at most one unit at a time, hence the possible values for
acceleration are only {−1, 0, 1}. The stoplight counts down the time units
until the end of the green-yellow-red cycle by assigning
stoplight := stoplight− timestep.
The light is red in the time interval [0 . . . 8], yellow in [9 . . . 12], and green
in [13 . . . 28].
The complexity resides in capturing the decision making of the driver.
In the first segment, the driver wants to set the cruise control to a desired
speed (e.g., moderate). The driver has the choice of accelerating from slow
or decelerating from fast, and then enable the cruise control which will
maintain the desired speed. On the second segment, the driver needs to
react to merging traffic from the ramp. If any car is on the ramp, the driver
may choose to let the other car go in front by slowing down, or to leave it
behind by speeding up. On the last segment, the driver has to react to the
stoplight turning red. The driver may choose to maintain the speed and
then break before reaching the stoplight, or may roll to a stop by releasing
the gas pedal.
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Comparison with the EOFM model.
• The original abstraction has been refined in PLEXIL to allow more
distance and time divisions, making it more realistic; in the EOFM
model the distance is heavily discretized (abstract locations 0 to 7)
and not coordinated with the time to travel each segment.
• Non-determinism is introduced by lookups of environment variables.
The script plays out a sequence of random choices for three Boolean
environment variables: MergingTraffic, LetBehind, RollStop.
• Some of the concepts are essentially cognitive in nature, as they depend
on the subjective (sometimes erroneous) perceptions and assessments
of the situation by the human operator, hence they cannot be as nat-
urally captured in the formal model. However, both normative and
erroneous behaviors are captured in the PLEXIL model, and it is the
job of the model checker to discover violations.
• The synchronous behavior is natural in PLEXIL, no further instru-
mentation is necessary, while in EOFM synchrony has to be expressly
specified, using appropriate decomposition operators.
8.4.2 Verification
The property of interest can be expressed either as a global invariant in the
PLEXIL model itself and checked with the generic “check invariants” button,
or entered in the LTL Model Checking dialog window. The safety property
is specified in the top level task node Main as the invariant condition:
¬(stoplight ≤ red ∧ distance = 0 ∧ speed > 0),
stating that it is not the case that the vehicle is moving at the intersection
when the light is red.
The PLEXIL semantics shows that the execution of the plan ends with
the outcome invariantFail for the root node (and parentFail for the suc-
cessor nodes) when the environment variables MergingTraffic, LetBehind,
and RollStop are all true. The result of model checking the safety property
is an execution trace where the formula is violated.
The counterexample can be described as follows:
1. the car enters at low speed at distance = 55 and time = 28;
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2. the driver accelerates to the desired moderate speed and sets the cruise
on at time = 20 and distance = 42;
3. at the ramp, with distance = 33, the driver decides to let the merging
car behind by accelerating to fast at time = 12 and distance = 25;
4. the stoplight light turns yellow, the driver chooses to roll to a stop
(assessing there is sufficient distance to the intersection to do so, by
releasing the gas pedal);
5. with the acceleration negative, the driver does not disengage the cruise
mode, the cruise control kicks in and maintains the cruise speed to
moderate for one execution cycle at time = 6 and distance = 10;
6. the effect of the automation is that the (now necessary) breaking is
too late to decrease the speed from moderate to low at time = 2 and
distance = 2, and then stopped in two execution cycles; and
7. when time expires, the car is moving in the intersection on the red
light.
To correct the problem, the node corresponding to the “roll to stop” ac-
tion has to be rectified, in order to include a check on the status of the cruise
control. The driver either has to make sure it is disabled before initiating
the “roll to stop” option or should manually disable it. In PLEXIL, this can
be instrumented via a start condition or, by duality, with the correspond-
ing negated skip condition. No other combination of environment lookup
variables leads to violations in this model.
The full model of the cruise control system consists of 929 lines of code.
8.5 Related Work and Concluding Remarks
Rewriting logic has been used previously as a testbed for specifying and
animating the semantics of synchronous languages. M. AlTurki and J.
Meseguer [1] have studied the rewriting logic semantics of the language Orc,
which includes a synchronous reduction relation. T. Serbanuta et al. [97]
define the execution of P -systems with structured data with continuations.
The focus of the former is to use rewriting logic to study the (mainly) non-
deterministic behavior of Orc programs, while the focus of the latter is
to study the relationship between P -systems and the existing continuation
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framework for enriching each with the strong features of the other. The ap-
proach here is instead based on exploiting the determinism of a synchronous
relation to tackle the problem associated with the interleaving semantics
of concurrency in rewriting logic. P. Lucanu [66] studies the problem of
the interleaving semantics of concurrency in rewriting logic for synchronous
systems from the perspective of P -systems. The determinism property of
the synchronous language Esterel [11] was formally proven by O. Tardieu
in [102]. C. Rocha and C. Mun˜oz [92] have implemented a framework for
the simulation of synchronous systems in Maude, following the main ideas
presented in this chapter for the rewriting logic semantics of PLEXIL.
An executable semantics of PLEXIL has been developed by P. J. Strauss in
the Haskell language [99] with the aim of analyzing features of the language
regarding the plan interaction with the environment. As a result, new data
types representing the external world have been proposed for more dynamic
runtime behavior of PLEXIL plans. More recently, D. Balasubramanian et
al. have proposed Polyglot, a framework for modeling and analyzing mul-
tiple Statechart formalisms, and have initiated research towards the formal
analysis of a Statechart-based semantics of PLEXIL [7].
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CHAPTER 9
SYMBOLIC REACHABILITY FOR PLEXIL MODULO
INTEGER CONSTRAINTS
In Chapter 8 it was explained that the execution of a plan in PLEXIL
is driven by external events that trigger changes in the gate conditions.
This chapter presents a case study on the symbolic analysis of reachability
properties for PLEXIL with the main goal of complementing the formal
verification capabilities already available to PLEXIL with the rewriting logic
semantics PLX presented in Chapter 8. As a result, this chapter reports on
the implementation of a symbolic rewriting logic semantics for a large subset
of the PLEXIL language that is able to automatically detect reachability
violations on input plans where the values of external variables can be left
unspecified.
The notion of an invariant violation or a race condition is important in
PLEXIL. In particular, as a safety property of the language, a plan is consid-
ered invalid if there is an execution that leads to a race condition. In other
words, a plan can be considered safe if none of its possible executions leads
to a race condition. Of course, detecting a race condition when knowing in
advance what the values of the external variables is not very difficult. But
what is required is to ensure that the non-determinism introduced by the
external environment can never lead to a race condition.
In order to motivate the discussion, consider the plan AssignWithConflig
in Figure 9.1. This plan has one list node and two assignment nodes, NonNeg
and NonPos. It declares a local integer memory x and interacts with the
external environment via the integer variable S. Note that depending on the
value of S, the assignment nodes NonNeg and NonPos may or may not start
execution, and a race condition can happen on x when the value of S is 0.
With the symbolic semantics presented in this chapter, the race condition on
127
AssignWithConflict: {
Integer x = 0;
Invariant: x >= 0;
NodeList:
NonNeg: {
Start: Lookup(S) >= 0;
Assignment: x := 1;
}
NonPos: {
Start: Lookup(S) <= 0;
Assignment: x := 2;
}
}
Figure 9.1: A parallel assignment with a potential race condition.
x can be automatically detected. In contrast, such an automatic checking is
not possible with the rewriting logic semantics PLX because of the inherently
symbolic interpretation of S.
This chapter uses the techniques developed in Chapter 7 to study the for-
mal verification of symbolic reachability properties for PLEXIL. The verifi-
cation task focuses on analyzing the non-determinism introduced in the lan-
guage by lookups of the external environment with help of Maude’s search
command and the LTL model checker. The symbolic semantics is given in
the form of a constrained rewrite theory that specifies the symbolic atomic
behavior of the language, which is encoded and executed in the Maude sys-
tem extended with CVC3 (available from the Matching Logic Project [93]).
The external variables of the environment are modeled as Boolean and inte-
ger constrained built-in terms and CVC3’s decision procedure for quantifier-
free linear integer arithmetic is used as an oracle for solving constraints on
them.
Given the asynchronous nature of the rewriting relations directly exe-
cutable in Maude, the synchronous execution of the symbolic atomic relation
is obtained by exploiting rewriting logic’s reflective capabilities available in
Maude. It is important to mention that the symbolic semantics of PLEXIL
uses data structures based on lists, sets, and multisets. Hence the insistence
in Chapter 7 on supporting any combination of associativity, commutativity,
and identity axioms in the specifications.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.1 explains how symbolic
states are modeled in the symbolic semantics. Section 9.2 presents an
summary on how the symbolic atomic relation of PLEXIL is encoded as
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a rewrite theory in Maude and Section 9.3 explains how its synchronous ex-
ecution is obtained. Section 9.4 shows how the symbolic semantics can
be used to detect the race condition in the running example, and also
find an automatic proof of its absence in other cases. The source code
of the symbolic rewriting logic semantics in Maude is available at http:
//camilorocha.info/thesis.
9.1 Symbolic States
At the top level, a state is represented by the top sort Sys, whose terms are
made up of a Boolean constraint and a configuration of objects:
sort Sys .
op {_,_} : iBool Configuration -> Sys [ctor frozen(2)] .
With respect to the development in Section 7.1, sort Sys instantiates the
abstract top sort s of constrained terms. Objects in the symbolic semantics
obey the syntax of objects already introduced in chapters 6 and 8.
Sort iBool represents built-in Boolean terms that are used as Boolean
constraints. Similarly, sort iInt represents built-in integer terms that can
be part of the configuration. Note that in contrast to the ground semantics
of PLEXIL presented in Section 8.2, the external environment is assumed
to be completely encoded in the configuration of objects in the symbolic
semantics. Also note that the second argument in a constrained state has
a frozenness constraint (see Chapter 3 for details). This is to prevent any
direct rewrite with the rewrite rules defining PLEXIL’s symbolic atomic
relation. As it will be explained, these rules are not executed directly but
by means of Maude’s reflective capabilities.
Terms of sort iBool and iInt represent symbolic built-in expressions.
They include the following definitions:
sort iBool iInt .
op c : Bool -> iBool [ctor] .
op c : Int -> iInt [ctor] .
op b : Nat -> iBool [ctor] .
op i : Nat -> iInt [ctor] .
Constructor function symbol c is a wrapper for Boolean and integer val-
ues. Constructor function symbols b and i play a key role in the symbolic
semantics: their goal is to encode, respectively, PLEXIL’s Boolean and in-
teger variables. In this way, a Boolean variable x1 in PLEXIL could be
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expressed as the ground term b(1) of sort iBool. The overall picture is
the following: the set XΛ in Chapter 7, for the case of PLEXIL’s Boolean
and integer variables, is actually being encoded in the symbolic semantics
by ground terms of sort iBool and iInt, respectively.
The Boolean and integer sorts iBool and iInt include more operators.
For instance, they include memory binding operators with the function sym-
bols bmem and imem, lookup expressions with the function symbols blookup
and ilookup, and the usual operators with self-explanatory syntax:
op bmem : NeQualName -> iBool .
op blookup : NeQualName -> iBool .
op imem : NeQualName -> iInt .
op ilookup : NeQualName -> iInt .
op -_ : iInt -> iInt .
ops _+_ _*_ : iInt iInt -> iInt [assoc comm] .
op _-_ : iInt iInt -> iInt .
ops _<=_ _<_ _>=_ _>_ : iInt iInt -> iBool .
ops _===_ _=//=_ : iInt iInt -> iBool [comm] .
It is important to note that the operators ‘===’ and ‘=//=’ shown above are
actually equality enrichments for the sort iInt. There are similar operators
for the sort iBool.
Boolean and integer expressions can be evaluated ‘symbolically’ by means
of function eval:
op eval : Configuration iBool -> iBool .
op eval : Configuration iInt -> iInt .
The evaluation of an expression by eval is given w.r.t. an object con-
figuration and it is equationally defined recursively on the complexity of
expressions.
For instance, the following is an equation evaluating a Boolean lookup of
an external variable:
eq eval( (< NeQN:NeQualified : extvar |
type: boolean,
values: (iB:iBool ; iEL:iBoolList),
AtS:AttributeSet > Cnf:Configuration),
blookup(NeQN:NeQualified))
= iB:iBool .
Attribute name type is used to identify the type (either boolean or int)
of an external variable. Attribute name values is used as a placeholder for
lists of expressions (either of sort iBoolList or iIntList) that represent
the future values of lookups.
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9.2 The Symbolic Atomic Relation
The symbolic atomic relation of PLEXIL is specified by a set of constrained
rewrite rules encoded as rewrite rules in an ordinary rewrite theory. The
notion of guarded actions is useful for this purpose, as explained below.
A symbolic atomic transition can update the status and the outcome of
a node, update the value of a memory, and reset the value of a memory to
its initial value. These actions are modeled by sort Action as follows:
sort Action .
op set-status : NeQualName Status -> Action [ctor] .
op set-outcome : NeQualName Outcome -> Action [ctor] .
op set-value : NeQualName iBool -> Action [ctor] .
op set-value : NeQualName iInt -> Action [ctor] .
op reset : NeQualName -> Action [ctor] .
Sets of actions are modeled by sort ActionSet that is defined by instan-
tiating Maude’s parametric module SET:
pr SET{Action} * (sort NeSet{Action} to NeActionSet,
sort Set{Action} to ActionSet,
op empty to mtas,
op _,_ to _;_) .
A guarded set of actions represents actions constrained by a Boolean con-
straint. They are a convenient representation for the purpose of encoding
the constrained rules:
pr 4TUPLE{String,Nat,iBool,ActionSet}
* (sort Tuple{String,Nat,iBool,ActionSet} to 4GuardedActionSet) .
In order to motivate the usefulness of guarded actions, consider the fol-
lowing rewrite rules encoding PLEXIL’s atomic transitions for lists in state
executing corresponding to the transition diagram depicted in Figure 9.2:
rl [exec-list-1] :
< O:NeQualified : list | status: executing,
AtS:AttributeSet >
=> ("exec-list",
1,
anc-inv(O:NeQualified) === c(false),
( set-outcome(O:NeQualified,fail(parent)) ;
set-status(O:NeQualified,failing))) .
rl [exec-list-2] :
< O:NeQualified : list | status: executing,
inv: iB:iBool,
AtS:AttributeSet >
=> ("exec-list",
2,
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Figure 9.2: Atomic transitions for list nodes in state executing.
iB === c(false),
( set-outcome(O:NeQualified,fail(inv)) ;
set-status(O:NeQualified,failing))) .
rl [exec-list-3] :
< O:NeQualified : list | status: executing,
end: iB:iBool,
AtS:AttributeSet >
=> ("exec-list",
3,
iB:iBool,
set-status(O:NeQualified,finishing)) .
First note that all terms representing guarded actions occur in the right-
hand side of the rewrite rules. Second, the string argument is the same in all
four tuples and the second argument records the order in which the condi-
tions appear is the diagram. This two values are used by the instrumentation
of the serialization procedure, presented in the next section, to compute the
set of maximal redexes. Actions with higher priority (indicated here by a
smaller value) have precedence over actions with lower priority (indicated
here by a larger value). The third argument is the actual guard of the set
of actions that appear in the fourth argument.
In order to understand how the symbolic atomic semantics works based
on this encoding, consider a ground state {B,Cnf} of sort Sys having the
following objects as part of its object configuration:
< bar : list |
inv: b(0), ... >
< foo . bar : list |
status: executing,
inv: b(0) == false,
end: b(0), ... >
Nodes bar and foo.bar are list nodes; the former is the parent of the
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latter. The invariant of node bar holds whenever the value (of the Boolean
variable represented) by b(0) is true. The invariant of foo.bar holds when-
ever b(0) is false. The end condition of foo.bar holds whenever b(0)
is true. Then, no matter what Boolean condition the constraint B repre-
sents, node foo.bar can never transition with rule [exec-list-3] because
[exec-list-1] has higher priority. However, there may be cases when
both rules [exec-list-1] and [exec-list-2] can be applied but not in
conjunction because they are mutually exclusive.
9.3 Synchronous Symbolic Execution
The problem of simulating PLEXIL’s symbolic synchronous relation can be
decomposed into a combination of smaller problems. The approach has three
phases: matching, parallel maximization, and action application.
In the matching phase, all possible guarded actions asynchronously in-
duced by the encoding of the symbolic atomic rules on a symbolic state are
collected. This phase is performed using a mapping:
op match : Sys -> PreSysSet .
The sort PreSysSet is introduced to represent multisets of constrained ac-
tions. On input {B,Cnf}, every constrained set of actions in match({B,Cnf})
is such that its constraint is satisfiable in conjunction with the constraint
B. The implementation of match uses Maude metalevel facilities to compute
the guarded actions by applying meta-rewrites on Cnf with each atomic rule.
The parallel maximization phase computes a collection of constrained ac-
tions from the collection of constrained actions returned by match. Each
of the constrained actions returned in this phase represents a maximal par-
allel reduction of atomic transitions whose constraints are all satisfiable in
conjunction with the input constraint. This phase is performed using a
mapping:
op maxp : iBool PreSysSet -> PreSysSet .
In the action application phase, constrained actions are applied to the
input constrained term, representing a symbolic maximal parallel atomic
reduction. This is done for each constrained action obtained from the par-
allel maximization phase on the initial input, thus capturing the (possible)
non-deterministic behavior of the symbolic parallel reduction. This phase is
performed using a mapping:
op apply : Sys PreSys -> Sys .
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The call to functions match, maxp, and apply, is triggered by function
bgc:
op bgc : Sys -> SysSet .
Given a ground term {B,Cnf} of sort Sys, function bgc computes a set of
ground terms of sort Sys, namely, those states reachable from {B,Cnf} in
one symbolic micro step.
The following are the rewrite rules that specify the symbolic micro and
macro relations in the symbolic semantics of PLEXIL:
crl [micro] :
St => { iB, Cnf }
if (iB,Cnf),GCS := bgc(St) .
crl [macro] :
St => { coll-constr(pop-env(conf(St))), pop-env(conf(St)) }
if mt := bgc(St)
/\ has-future?(conf(St)) = true .
Term mt is a constant with sort SysSet denoting the empty set of states.
Function has-future? checks if there is an event waiting to be processed.
Functions coll-constr and pop-env are auxiliary functions that update
the values of the external variables in the object configuration.
9.4 Symbolic LTL Model Checking
Detection of race conditions on local memories and violation of node invari-
ants are important in PLEXIL. As such, predicates for checking them are
already available from the symbolic semantics. In particular, states predi-
cates inv and race-free, which take an argument of sort NeQualified, are
offered to the user.
The intended semantics of the state predicates is with respect to the initial
semantics of PLEXIL. For example, consider the following definition of inv
in the syntax of Maude model checker:
eq ({ iB:Bool,
< O:NeQualified : C:Cid | inv: iB’:iBool, AtS:AttributeSet >
Cnf:Configuration }) |= inv(O:NeQualified)
= check-unsat(iB:iBool and
not(eval(< O:NeQualified : C:Cid |
inv: iB’:iBool, AtS:AttributeSet > Cnf,
iB’:iBool))) .
The invariant condition of node O represented by the Boolean expression iB’
yields an invariant violation for O whenever the conjunction of the state’s
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constraint iB and the negation of iB’ is unsatisfiable. This precisely means
that there is a ground counter-example state for the invariance of the node.
Function check-unsat implements the call to CVC3:
op check-unsat : iBool -> Bool .
Recall the plan AssignWithConflict in Figure 9.1, which has a potential
race condition for the local memory x. Assume that SPLX represents the sym-
bolic rewriting logic semantics of PLEXIL, and let init be a configuration
of objects representing an initial configuration for AssignWithConflict.
Consider the following safety verification requirements:
TSPLX, {c(true), init} |= race-free(x.AssignWithConflict),
(9.1)
TSPLX, {i(0) >= c(1), init} |= race-free(x.AssignWithConflict),
(9.2)
TSPLX, {i(0) >= c(1), init} |= inv(AssignWithConflict). (9.3)
The external variable S in AssignWithConflict is represented by the
Boolean term i(0). Property (9.1) states that there is no race condition on
memory x if i(0) has no initial constraints. Property (9.2) states that there
is no race condition on memory x if i(0) is assumed to be at least 1. Prop-
erty (9.3) states that the invariant condition of node AssignWithConflict
holds if i(0) is assumed to be at least 1. Note that these properties are
symbolic reachability requirements because of the nature of the external
variable S. Also, the constrained terms defining the initial states in these
properties represent, in each case, infinitely many initial states.
By directly using Maude’s LTL Model Checker, property (9.1) can be
disproved, and properties (9.2) and (9.3) can be proved automatically.
==========================================
reduce in ASSIGNWITHCONFLICT :
verify-lite({c(true), init}, [] race-free(x . AssignWithConflict)) .
rewrites: 2590 in 525ms cpu (1629ms real) (4929 rewrites/second)
result Bool: false
==========================================
reduce in ASSIGNWITHCONFLICT :
verify-lite( { i(0) >= c(1), init}, [] race-free(x . AssignWithConflict)) .
rewrites: 2846 in 575ms cpu (614ms real) (4947 rewrites/second)
result Bool: true
==========================================
reduce in ASSIGNWITHCONFLICT :
verify-lite( {i(0) >= c(1), init}, [] inv(AssignWithConflict) .
rewrites: 3191 in 576ms cpu (702ms real) (5534 rewrites/second)
result Bool: true
Function verify-lite is a wrapper to Maude’s LTL Model Checker func-
135
tion modelCheck. This mapping outputs either true or false depending
on the output of the model checker function, omitting a counterexample if
any.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter presents the conclusions of this dissertation, followed by a
discussion on research directions opened by it.
10.1 Conclusions
The focus of this dissertation has been on developing three deductive tech-
niques, with corresponding tool support, for symbolically reasoning about
the model theoretic satisfaction relation
TR |= ϕ,
where TR is the initial reachability model associated to an order-sorted
rewrite theory R, and ϕ is a reachability property. These deductive tech-
niques for reasoning symbolically about specifications with initial model
semantics include: (i) new constructor-based notions for inductive reason-
ing about reachability properties, (ii) a proof system for the task of proving
safety properties, and (iii) a novel method for symbolic reachability analysis
of rewrite theories with constrained built-ins.
The development on constructor-based notions for reachability analysis
combines and generalizes two different research strands. On the one hand,
it can be seen as a natural generalization from the case of equations E to that
of both equations E and rules R, of the work in [54, 52] on (propositional)
equational tree automata methods for checking sufficient completeness of
left-linear equations modulo axioms for context-sensitive order-sorted spec-
ifications. On the other hand, it also generalizes the work by I. Gnaedig
and H. Kirchner [44] on constructors for non-terminating rewrite systems in
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the following precise sense: the notion of sufficient completeness proposed
in [44] exactly corresponds to that of R-sufficient completeness in this work
for the special case of a rewrite theory R = (Σ,∅, R), where Σ has a single
sort and there are no equations. The treatment of the more general case of
rewrite theories R = (Σ, E ∪B,R, ν) clarifies the important distinction be-
tween constructors for equations and constructors for rules, extends the ideas
to the more general order-sorted case modulo axioms and with frozenness
information, provides new tree automata automated techniques that com-
plement the deductive narrowing-based techniques proposed in [44], and, to
the best of the author’s knowledge, investigates for the first time the use of
R-constructors (and E-constructors) for inductive proofs of ground reacha-
bility. All these new sufficient completeness methods have been automated
in a new version of the Maude Sufficient Completeness Checker (SCC).
The generic approach for the task of proving inductive safety properties,
namely ground stability and ground invariance, is both transformational and
reductionistic. The approach is transformational in the sense that the rules
of inference transform pairs of the form R  ϕ into other such pairs R′  ϕ′.
It is also reductionistic in the sense that: (i) all safety formulas in temporal
logic eventually disappear and are replaced by purely equational formulas,
and (ii) the rewrite theory R = (Σ, E,R) is eventually replaced by its under-
lying equational theory (Σ, E). That is, in the end all formal reasoning about
safety properties is reduced to inductive reasoning about equational properties
in the underlying equational theory (Σ, E). This allows these generic safety
verification methods to take advantage of the existing wealth of equational
reasoning techniques and tools already available. The Maude Invariant An-
alyzer (InvA) tool supporting the inference system, makes systematic use of
narrowing modulo axioms with the equations defining state predicates, to
greatly simplify the equational proof obligations to which all proofs of safety
formulas are ultimately reduced. It also takes full advantage of other heuris-
tics for discharging automatically many proof obligations. The advantage
of generic verification methods and tools is that the costly tool develop-
ment effort can be amortized across a much wider range of applications,
whereas a language-specific verification tool can only be applied to systems
programmed in that specific language; two case studies on the mechanical
verification of safety properties for a communication protocol and for a web
browsing system are visible evidence of this fact.
The method for symbolic reachability analysis of rewrite theories with
constrained built-ins is an extension of rewriting logic theories in which the
rewrite rules can be used to rewrite terms with constrained built-ins. That
138
is, terms involving user-definable data structures, but whose only variables
range over decidable domains, and constraints over these variables. The
main advantage of this approach is that, under some mild syntactic condi-
tions and the availability of an oracle for the constraints such as an SMT
solver, rewrite theories with constrained built-ins can symbolically be exe-
cuted by using matching instead of unification, and thus induce a rewrite
relation that is amenable, for example, to model checking verification using
Maude’s search command and LTL model checker. This method can be
used to address symbolic reachability problems for a broad class of speci-
fications: its applicability is only restricted in practice by the availability
of decision procedures available from the SMT solver of choice. Also, this
method can be applied to solve symbolic reachability problems where the
narrowing-based approach may not be applicable (e.g., associativity axioms
may prove problematic because of the possible non-finiteness of a complete
set of unifiers). As a case study, a rewrite theory with constrained built-
ins is used to address the formal verification of some symbolic reachability
properties for the Plan Execution Interchange Language (PLEXIL), a NASA
language for robotic machines. The verification task focuses on analyzing
the non-determinism introduced in the language by lookups of the external
environment with help of Maude’s search command and the LTL model
checker. The symbolic semantics is executed in the Maude system extended
with CVC3 (available from the Matching Logic Project [93]). The external
variables of the environment are modeled as Boolean and integer constrained
built-in terms and CVC3’s decision procedure for quantifier-free linear inte-
ger arithmetic is used as an oracle for solving constraints on them.
Together, the three above-mentioned techniques, their implementation in
the Maude system, and the case studies comprise a significant step forward
in automatic and semi-automatic reasoning for reachability properties of
rewriting logic specifications, a major research goal in the current frontier
of rewriting logic research (see, e.g., [72, p. 49]).
10.2 Future Work
Rewrite theories are formal specifications of concurrent systems [70]. This
dissertation suggests new open problems in the development of new deduc-
tive techniques, with tool support, for symbolically reasoning about reach-
ability properties of rewrite theories with initial semantics. Specifically, it
suggests the advancement of the following research directions.
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First, since the main goal of the constructor-based notions for reachability
analysis was to obtain automatic techniques for checking the sufficient com-
pleteness of a rewrite theory, some restrictions have been imposed, such as
treating only the order-sorted case (leaving out the case of membership equa-
tional theories), and also assuming that equations and rules are left-linear
and unconditional. The notion of a sufficiently complete rewrite theory is
equally meaningful and useful without these restrictions. Therefore, reason-
ing techniques that will allow establishing such a property for more general
rewrite theories should be investigated, even if such techniques are no longer
automatic. The related topic of constructor-based inductive techniques for
ground reachability and ground joinability has only been sketched out; it
deserves a much fuller development in future work, in which a detailed com-
parison with alternative approaches to proving such properties should also be
given. Furthermore, these constructor-based induction techniques should be
supported by tools such as, for example, an extension of the current Maude
Inductive Theorem Prover (ITP) and adopted to enhance the effectiveness
of Maude’s Church-Rosser Checker (CRC) tool.
Second, the generic approach for the task of proving inductive safety prop-
erties can be complemented by bounded symbolic execution, achieved by
narrowing modulo, so that a property can be symbolically tested before
trying to prove it invariant [94, 38]. In general, it is worth pursuing exten-
sions of narrowing-based symbolic model checking techniques for conditional
rewrite theories, so that these approaches can be combined for symbolic
model checking and for symbolic simulation for the task of proving/disprov-
ing inductive safety properties. The mechanical verification of invariants can
be more effective in InvA by adding automatic support for the discovery of
invariants, improving proof heuristics and adding subsumption checks, en-
hancing the management of proof obligations, and extending the techniques
available to the user in tools such as cover-set induction modulo axioms in
the ITP.
Third, the symbolic reachability analysis with constrained built-ins should
be complemented with narrowing-based techniques enhanced with SMT
solving capabilities such as those recently developed by S. Escobar, V.
Ganesh, and J. Meseguer. Foundations and efficient implementations are
needed to handle more general and larger case studies. The symbolic fold-
ing techniques in [38] should be investigated for the case of rewrite theories
with constrained built-ins. One major technical challenge is to develop a
rich interaction interface from Maude to different SMT solvers. This inter-
face should include support for obtaining models and proofs at the level of
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Maude, in addition to satisfiability/unsatisfiability queries. Another inter-
esting research question is that of how to deal generically and automatically
with order-sorted built-in specifications when using decision procedures that
are only many sorted. This will be useful for many Maude specifications
where, for example, the use of natural numbers may in some cases be pre-
ferred and may facilitate easier expression of some problems than the use
of the entire integer domain, or both naturals and integers may be used for
different subproblems.
The advancement of the above-mentioned research directions seems to be
an exciting topic for further research.
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APPENDIX A
MISSING PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
This appendix presents proofs that have been omitted in Chapter 3. It in-
cludes the existence and correctness proofs of the PTA in theorems 3 and 4,
and the mechanical proofs supporting the claims about the BAG-CHOICE+CARD
and CHANNEL specifications.
A.1 PTA Proofs
Theorem 3. Let R = (Σ, E ∪ A,R, ν) be an admissible, ground weakly-
terminating, and ground sort-decreasing simple generalized rewrite theory,
and let (Υ,Ω) be a constructor signature pair for R. If RE and RE∪R are
PTA-checkable, then there are PTAs BE and BE∪R such that R is canoni-
cally sufficiently complete relative to (Ω,Υ) if and only if L(BE)∪L(BE∪R) =
∅.
Proof. First, the construction of BE∪R is shown in detail. A s-context is a
term C in which a subterm t of sort s has been replaced by a s-hole, here
signified by s. The symbol  is the simplest context. If C is a s-context
and t is a term of sort s, then C[t] indicates C with s replaced by t. At
the same time, C[t] indicates that the term C contains an occurrence of the
subterm t. Let Σ = (S,≤, F ), and define ΣK = (K,FK) and IE∪R = {t |
C[t] ∈ lhs(−→E ∪R) ∧ t /∈ X ∧ C 6= }, where lhs(R′) denotes the left-hand
sides of the rules R′. Construct BE∪R = (ΣK , Q,ΓCSC,∆E∪R) as follows:
• Q = {Qk}k∈K with Qk = {rk} ∪ {cs | s ∈ S} ∪ {ps | s ∈ S} ∪ {pu |u ∈
IE∪R ∩ TΣ,k},
• ΓCSC = {γk}k∈K with γk = ¬rk ∧
∨
s∈[k]≤ ps ∧ ¬cs, and
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• ∆E∪R = {f(ps1 , . . . , psn)→ ps | f ∈ Fs1...sn,s}
∪ {c(rep1c(s1), . . . , repnc (sn))→ cs | c ∈ Υs1...sn,s}
∪ {ps → ps′ | s, s′ ∈ S ∧ s < s′}
∪ {cs → cs′ | s, s′ ∈ S ∧ s < s′}
∪ {f(pt1 , . . . , ptn)→pf(t1,...,tn) | f(t1, . . . , tn)∈IE∪R}
∪ {f(pt1 , . . . , ptn)→ rk | f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ TΣ,k ∩ lhs(
−→
E ∪R)}
∪ {f(pk1 , . . . , rki , . . . , pkn)→ rk | f ∈ FKk1...kn,k ∧ i ∈ ν(f)},
where repic(s) equals cs if i ∈ ν(c), and ps otherwise.
Let t ∈ TΣ. By structural induction on t, it follows that t →BE∪R ps if
and only if t ∈ TΣ,s. A similar inductive argument shows that t →BE∪R pu
if and only if there is a substitution θ such that t = uθ. This implies that
t→BE∪R rk if and only if there is an unfrozen context C, ground substitution
θ, and rule l→ r ∈ −→E ∪R such that t = C[lθ]. From an inductive argument,
it also follows that t→BE∪R cs if and only if t ∈ TΣ,s and posν(t) ⊆ posΥ(t).
Hence, t ∈ L(BE∪R)k if and only if [t]B ∈ NormRE∪R/B,k and [t]B /∈ C ΥR/B,k.
The construction and proof for BE are entirely similar to those for BE∪R,
with BE = (ΣK , Q,ΓCSC ,∆E), where ∆E is defined as ∆E∪R but omitting
the rules R (with the appropriate E-constructors Ω and IE). By mimicking
the argument above, it is straightforward to show that t ∈ L(BE)k if and
only if [t]B ∈ NormRE/B,k and [t]B /∈ TΩ/B,k.
Theorem 4. Let R = (Σ, E∪B,R,ϕ) be a simple generalized rewrite the-
ory that canonically sufficiently complete relative to the constructor signa-
ture pair (Ω,Υ). If RE and RE∪R are PTA-checkable, then there are PTAs
FE and DE∪R such that Ω is a signature of E-free constructors modulo V
if and only if L(FE) = ∅, and Υ is signature of R-deadlock constructors if
and only if L(DE∪R) = ∅.
Proof. Let Σ = (S,≤, F ), and let ΣK = (K,FK). Define IE = {t | C[t] ∈
lhs(
−→
E )∧ t /∈ X ∧C 6= }, and IE∪R = {t | C[t] ∈ lhs(−→E ∪R)∧ t /∈ X ∧C 6=
}. The construction of FE = (ΣK , QE ,ΓE ,∆E) is as follows:
• QE = {QE,k}k∈K with QE,k = {rEk } ∪ {cs | s ∈ S} ∪ {ps | s ∈ S} ∪
{pu |u ∈ IE ∩ TΣ,k},
• ΓE = {γE,k}k∈K with γE,k = rEk ∧
∨
s∈[k]≤ ps ∧ cs, and
• ∆E = {f(ps1 , . . . , psn)→ ps | f ∈ Fs1...sn,s}
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∪ {c(cs1 , . . . , csn)→ cs | c ∈ Ωs1...sn,s}
∪ {ps → ps′ | s, s′ ∈ S ∧ s < s′}
∪ {cs → cs′ | s, s′ ∈ S ∧ s < s′}
∪ {f(pt1 , . . . , ptn)→pf(t1,...,tn) | f(t1, . . . , tn)∈IE}
∪ {f(pt1 , . . . , ptn)→ rEk | f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ TΣ,k ∩ lhs(
−→
E )}
∪ {f(pk1 , . . . , rEki , . . . , pkn)→ rEk | f ∈ FKk1...kn,k}.
The construction of DE∪R = (ΣK , QE∪R,ΓE∪R,∆E∪R) is as follows:
• QE∪R = {QE∪R,k}k∈K with QE∪R,k = {rEk , rRk }∪{cs | s ∈ S}∪{ps | s ∈
S} ∪ {pu |u ∈ IE∪R ∩ TΣ,k},
• ΓE∪R = {γE∪R,k}k∈K with γE∪R,k = rRk ∧ ¬rEk ∧
∨
s∈[k]≤ ps ∧ cs, and
• ∆E∪R = {f(OBps1 , . . . , psn)→ ps | f ∈ Fs1...sn,s}
∪ {c(rep1c(s1), . . . , repnc (sn))→ cs | c ∈ Υs1...sn,s}
∪ {ps → ps′ | s, s′ ∈ S ∧ s < s′}
∪ {cs → cs′ | s, s′ ∈ S ∧ s < s′}
∪ {f(pt1 , . . . , ptn)→pf(t1,...,tn) | f(t1, . . . , tn)∈IE∪R}
∪ {f(pt1 , . . . , ptn)→ rEk | f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ TΣ,k ∩ lhs(
−→
E )}
∪ {f(pt1 , . . . , ptn)→ rRk | f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ TΣ,k ∩ lhs(R)}
∪ {f(pk1 , . . . , rEki , . . . , pkn)→ rEk | f ∈ FKk1...kn,k}
∪ {f(pk1 , . . . , rRki , . . . , pkn)→ rRk | f ∈ FKk1...kn,k ∧ i ∈ ϕ(f)},
where repic(s) equals cs if i ∈ ϕ(c), and ps otherwise.
Let t ∈ TΣ. By structural induction on t, it follows that t →FE ps (resp.
t→DE∪R ps) if and only if t ∈ TΣ,s. A similar inductive argument shows that
t →FE pu (resp. t →DE∪R pu) if and only if there is a substitution θ such
that t = uθ. This implies that: (i) t→FE rEk (resp. t→DE∪R rEk ) if and only
if there is a context C, ground substitution θ, and rule l→ r ∈ −→E such that
t = C[lθ], and (ii) t →DE∪R rRk if and only if there is an unfrozen context
C, ground substitution θ, and rule l → r ∈ R such that t = C[lθ]. From an
inductive argument, it also follows that t→FE cs (resp. t→DE∪R cs) if and
only if t ∈ TΩ,s (resp. t ∈ TΣ,s and posϕ(t) ⊆ posΥ(t)). Hence, t ∈ L(FE)k if
and only if [t]B ∈ TΩ,E/B,k and [t]B /∈ NormRE/B,k, and t ∈ L(DE∪R)k if and
only if [t]B ∈ C ΥR/B,k and [t]B /∈ NormRE∪R/B,k. Observe that because R is
a simple generalized rewrite theory, it is correct to ignore frozen contexts in
the automata FE and DE∪R when only considering equations.
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A.2 Mechanical Proofs
In this section, the mechanical proofs of ground sort-decreasingness, conflu-
ence, and coherence are obtained with the Maude Church-Rosser Checker
and the Maude Coherence Checker tools [34]. The proofs of ground op-
erational termination are obtained with the Maude Termination Tool [32].
Inductive claims about initial algebras are proved using the current version
of Maude’s Inductive Theorem Prover [52].
A.2.1 Proofs for BAG-CHOICE+CARD
The input specification is
(ΣBCC, EBCC ∪BBCC, µBCC, RBCC, νBCC)
as in Section 3.3. In order to simplify notation, the expression BCC denotes
BAG-CHOICE+CARD, BCCE denotes BCCEBCC , and BCCE∪R denotes BCCEBCC∪RBCC .
Lemma 8. BCC is admissible.
Proof.
• The rewrite rules in BCCE are ground sort-decreasing and confluent
modulo BBCC:
Maude> (check Church-Rosser .)
rewrites: 26197 in 76ms cpu (83ms real) (341226 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser checking of BAG-CHOICE+CARD
Checking solution:
The following critical pairs cannot be joined:
cp s | #4:Bag |
= s | mt #4:Bag | .
The specification is sort-decreasing.
Despite the fact that this critical pair is not joinable automatically by
the CRC tool, it is easy to see that it is indeed joinable because mt
is the identity operator for and the structural axioms BBCC are not
affected by the strategy map µBCC.
• The rewrite rules in BCCE are ground operationally terminating mod-
ulo BBCC: this proof is obtained with the MTT using AProVE as the
backend. The proof is rather long, so a reduced snapshot of it is pre-
sented.
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START Maude C;Uk;B false false
SUCCESSFULLY 4 Maude seconds 3
(VAR B N V1 V2 V X X@@@)
(THEORY
(AC ---osb-Bag-csb-osb-Bag-csb)
)
...
Using the Dependency Graph resulted in no new DP problems.
Termination of R successfully shown.
Duration:
0:00 minutes
• RBCC and EBCC are ground-coherent modulo BBCC:
Maude> (check coherence .)
rewrites: 24006 in 71ms cpu (75ms real) (336378 rewrites/second)
Coherence checking of BAG-CHOICE+CARD
Coherence checking solution:
All critical pairs have been rewritten and all equations are non-constructor.
The specification is ground coherent.
Lemma 9. CanΣBCC,EBCC/BBCC ∼= Canµ
BCC
ΣBCC,EBCC/BBCC.
Proof. The isomorphism is checked with the SCC’s command “ccc” (see [54]
for details):
Maude> (ccc BAG-CHOICE+CARD .)
Checking canonical completeness of BAG-CHOICE+CARD ...
Success: BAG-CHOICE+CARD is canonically complete.
Lemma 10. The rewrite rules in BCCE∪R are ground sort-decreasing and
ground weakly-normalizing modulo BBCC.
Proof.
• The rewrite rules in BCCE∪R are ground sort-decreasing modulo BBCC:
Maude> (check Church-Rosser .)
rewrites: 26197 in 76ms cpu (83ms real) (341226 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser checking of hatBAG-CHOICE+CARD
Checking solution:
...
The specification is sort-decreasing.
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• The rewrite rules in BCC are ground weakly-normalizing modulo BBCC:
this proof is obtained with the MTT using AProVE as the backend.
The proof is rather long, so a reduced snapshot of it is presented.
START Maude C;Uk;B false false
SUCCESSFULLY 5 Maude seconds 3
(VAR B N NeB V1 V2 V X X@@@)
(THEORY
(AC ---osb-Bag-csb-osb-Bag-csb)
)
...
Using the Dependency Graph resulted in no new DP problems.
Termination of R successfully shown.
Duration:
0:00 minutes
A.2.2 Proofs for CHANNEL
The input specification is
(ΣCHANNEL, ECHANNEL ∪BCHANNEL, RCHANNEL)
as in Section 3.6. In order to simplify notation, the expression CHANNELE
denotes CHANNELECHANNEL and CHANNELE∪R denotes CHANNELECHANNEL∪RCHANNEL .
Lemma 11. CHANNEL is admissible.
Proof.
• The rewrite rules in CHANNELE are ground local confluent and sort-
decreasing modulo BCHANNEL.
Maude> (check Church-Rosser .)
rewrites: 9474 in 34ms cpu (37ms real) (278606 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser checking of CHANNEL
Checking solution:
All critical pairs have been joined.
The specification is locally-confluent.
The specification is sort-decreasing.
• The rewrite rules in CHANNELE are ground operationally-terminating:
this proof is obtained with the MTT using µ-Term as the backend:
YES
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Problem 1:
(VAR M N L L’)
(RULES
_@_(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _;_(N,_@_(L,L’))
_@_(nil,L) -> L
)
Problem 1:
Order-Sorted Dependency Pairs Processor:
-> Pairs:
_@_#(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _@_#(L,L’)
-> Rules:
_@_(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _;_(N,_@_(L,L’))
_@_(nil,L) -> L
Problem 1:
SCC Processor:
-> Pairs:
_@_#(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _@_#(L,L’)
-> Rules:
_@_(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _;_(N,_@_(L,L’))
_@_(nil,L) -> L
->Strongly Connected Components:
->->Cycle:
->->-> Pairs:
_@_#(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _@_#(L,L’)
->->-> Rules:
_@_(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _;_(N,_@_(L,L’))
_@_(nil,L) -> L
Problem 1:
SubNColl Processor:
-> Pairs:
_@_#(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _@_#(L,L’)
-> Rules:
_@_(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _;_(N,_@_(L,L’))
_@_(nil,L) -> L
->Projection:
pi(_@_#) = 1
Problem 1:
SCC Processor:
-> Pairs:
Empty
-> Rules:
_@_(_;_(N,L),L’) -> _;_(N,_@_(L,L’))
_@_(nil,L) -> L
->Strongly Connected Components:
There is no strongly connected component
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The problem is finite.
• RCHANNEL and ECHANNEL are ground-coherent modulo BCHANNEL:
Maude> (check coherence .)
rewrites: 11760 in 37ms cpu (43ms real) (315408 rewrites/second)
Coherence checking of CHANNEL
Coherence checking solution:
All critical pairs have been rewritten and all equations are non-constructor.
The specification is coherent.
Lemma 12. The rewrite rules in CHANNELE∪R are ground sort-decreasing,
confluent, and operationally terminating modulo BCHANNEL.
Proof.
• The rewrite rules in CHANNELE∪R are ground sort-decreasing and local
confluent modulo BCHANNEL:
Maude> (check Church-Rosser hatCHANNEL .)
rewrites: 51279 in 141ms cpu (157ms real) (361845 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser checking of hatCHANNEL
Checking solution:
All critical pairs have been joined.
The specification is locally-confluent.
The specification is sort-decreasing.
• The rewrite rules in CHANNELE∪R are ground strongly-normalizing: this
proof is obtained with the MTT using AProVE as the backend. The
proof is rather long, so a reduced snapshot of it is presented. Observe
that this proof implies the ground strong-normalization of CHANNELE .
START AProVE
SUCCESSFULLY AProVE seconds: 3
...
R ->Dependency Pair Analysis
...
->DP Problem 1
->SCP
->DP Problem 2
->SCP
->DP Problem 3
->SCP
->DP Problem 4
->Polo
->DP Problem 5
->DGraph
...
->DP Problem 6
->Polynomial Ordering
...
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Using the Dependency Graph resulted in no new DP problems.
Termination of R successfully shown.
Duration:
0:01 minutes
Lemma 13. The following are inductive consequences of ECHANNEL:
1. nil is the right identity of @ , and
2. @ is associative.
Proof. In order to avoid name clashes between the names in Maude’s pre-
lude, such as Nat and List, the sorts Nat and List in CHANNEL are renamed
to Nat2 and List2, respectively. Both goals are discharged automatically
by structural induction on the equational constructors ΩCHANNEL,List2 via the
ITP’s command ind* which creates constructor-based structural induction
goals and tries to discharge them automatically. For a detailed explanation
of the ITP’s commands see [52].
1. ECHANNEL |= (∀l : List) l @ nil = l
=================================
label-sel: id@0
=================================
A{l:List2} l:List2 @ nil = l:List2
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(ind* on l:List2 .)
rewrites: 625 in 4ms cpu (4ms real) (141019 rewrites/second)
Eliminated current goal.
q.e.d
2. ECHANNEL |= (∀l, l′, l′′ : List) l @ (l′ @ l′′) = (l @ l′) @ l′′
=================================
label-sel: assoc@0
=================================
A{l’’:List2 ; l’:List2 ; l:List2}
l:List2 @(l’:List2 @ l’’:List2) = (l:List2 @ l’:List2)@ l’’:List2
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(ind* on l:List2 .)
rewrites: 1126 in 5ms cpu (5ms real) (211098 rewrites/second)
Eliminated current goal.
q.e.d
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APPENDIX B
MISSING PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 5
This appendix includes the ABP specification and predicates in Maude,
proofs of admissibility, and the missing proofs in the formal verification of
the protocol in Section 5.2.
The ABP specification can be found in abp.maude and the predicate spec-
ification in abp.preds.maude, both available for download with this disser-
tation. The mechanical proofs were obtained with the tools integrated in
the current version of the Maude Formal Environment (MFE) [36, 35].
B.1 abp.maude
This file contains the Maude specification of the ABP.
--- Booleans
fmod IBOOL is
--- use Maude built-in Booleans
pr BOOL-OPS .
endfm
---- Natural numbers
fmod INAT is
pr IBOOL .
sort iNat .
op 0 : -> iNat [ctor] .
op s_ : iNat -> iNat [ctor] .
vars N N’ : iNat .
--- equality enrichment
op _~_ : iNat iNat -> Bool [comm] .
eq N ~ N
= true .
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eq s N ~ s N’
= N ~ N’ .
eq 0 ~ s N
= false .
eq N ~ s N
= false .
endfm
--- bits
fmod BIT is
pr IBOOL .
sort Bit .
ops on off : -> Bit [ctor] .
op flip : Bit -> Bit .
eq flip(on) = off .
eq flip(off) = on .
--- equality enrichment
op _~_ : Bit Bit -> Bool [comm] .
eq B:Bit ~ B:Bit
= true .
eq on ~ off
= false .
eq B:Bit ~ flip(B:Bit)
= false .
endfm
--- list of naturals
fmod INAT-LIST is
pr INAT .
sort iNatList .
op nil : -> iNatList [ctor] .
op __ : iNat iNatList -> iNatList [ctor prec 61] .
vars N N’ : iNat .
vars NL NL’ : iNatList .
op _;_ : iNatList iNatList -> iNatList [prec 65] .
eq nil ; NL = NL .
eq N NL ; NL’ = N (NL ; NL’) .
--- equality enrichment
op _~_ : iNatList iNatList -> Bool [comm] .
eq nil ~ (N NL)
= false .
eq NL ~ NL
= true .
eq (N NL) ~ (N’ NL’)
= (N ~ N’) and (NL ~ NL’) .
endfm
--- queue of bits
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fmod BIT-QUEUE is
pr BIT .
sort BitQueue .
op nil : -> BitQueue [ctor] .
op __ : Bit BitQueue -> BitQueue [ctor prec 61] .
vars B B’ : Bit .
vars BQ BQ’ : BitQueue .
op _;_ : BitQueue BitQueue -> BitQueue [prec 65] .
eq nil ; BQ = BQ .
eq B BQ ; BQ’ = B (BQ ; BQ’) .
endfm
--- packets: pair of bit and nat
fmod BIT-PACKET is
pr BIT .
pr INAT .
sort BitPacket .
op ‘(_,_‘) : Bit iNat -> BitPacket [ctor] .
vars B B’ : Bit .
var BP : BitPacket .
vars N N’ : iNat .
--- equality enrichment
op _~_ : BitPacket BitPacket -> Bool [comm] .
eq BP ~ BP
= true .
eq (B,N) ~ (B’,N’)
= B ~ B’ and N ~ N’ .
endfm
--- queue of pairs of bits and nats
fmod BIT-PACKET-QUEUE is
pr BIT-PACKET .
sort BitPacketQueue .
op nil : -> BitPacketQueue [ctor] .
op __ : BitPacket BitPacketQueue -> BitPacketQueue [ctor prec 61] .
vars B B’ : Bit .
vars BP BP’ : BitPacket .
vars BPQ BPQ’ : BitPacketQueue .
var N : iNat .
op _;_ : BitPacketQueue BitPacketQueue -> BitPacketQueue [prec 65] .
eq nil ; BPQ = BPQ .
eq BP BPQ ; BPQ’ = BP (BPQ ; BPQ’) .
endfm
--- state syntax
fmod ABP-STATE is
pr BIT-PACKET-QUEUE .
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pr BIT-QUEUE .
pr INAT-LIST .
sort Sys .
op _:_>_|_<_:_ : iNat Bit BitPacketQueue
BitQueue Bit iNatList -> Sys [ctor] .
endfm
--- transitions
mod ABP is
pr ABP-STATE .
vars B B’ B’’ : Bit .
var BP : BitPacket .
vars BQ BQ’ : BitQueue .
vars BPQ BPQ’ : BitPacketQueue .
vars N N’ : iNat .
vars NL NL’ : iNatList .
rl [send-1] :
N : B > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BPQ ; ((B, N) nil) | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [recv-1a] :
N : B > BPQ | B BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [recv-1b] :
N : on > BPQ | off BQ < B’ : NL
=> s(N) : off > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [recv-1c] :
N : off > BPQ | on BQ < B’ : NL
=> s(N) : on > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [send-2] :
N : B > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ ; (B’ nil) < B’ : NL .
rl [recv-2a] :
N : B > (on,N’) BPQ | BQ < on : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < off : (N’ NL) .
rl [recv-2b] :
N : B > (off,N’) BPQ | BQ < off : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < on : (N’ NL) .
rl [recv-2c] :
N : B > (off,N’) BPQ | BQ < on : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < on : NL .
rl [recv-2d] :
N : B > (on,N’) BPQ | BQ < off : NL
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=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < off : NL .
rl [drop-1a] :
N : B > (off,N’) BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [drop-1b] :
N : B > (on,N’) BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [dup-1] :
N : B > BP BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BP (BP BPQ) | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [drop-2a] :
N : B > BPQ | off BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [drop-2b] :
N : B > BPQ | on BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | BQ < B’ : NL .
rl [dup-2] :
N : B > BPQ | B’’ BQ < B’ : NL
=> N : B > BPQ | B’’ (B’’ BQ) < B’ : NL .
endm
B.2 ABP Admissibility and Free Constructors Modulo
This section presents the mechanical proofs for the admissibility of module
ABP and for the equational freeness of its subsignature of constructors.
For ground sort-decreasingness, operational termination, confluence, and
coherence, the following is the output of the mechanical proof:
Maude> (ccr ABP .)
rewrites: 8114680 in 5145ms cpu (5146ms real) (1577130 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser check for ABP
All critical pairs have been joined.
The specification is locally-confluent.
The module is sort-decreasing.
Maude> (ctf ABP .)
rewrites: 95604 in 141ms cpu (2796ms real) (673371 rewrites/second)
Success: The functional part of module ABP is terminating.
Maude> (cch ABP .)
rewrites: 2188028 in 1470ms cpu (1470ms real) (1487669 rewrites/second)
Coherence checking of ABP
All critical pairs have been rewritten and no rewrite with rules can
happen at non-overlapping positions of equations left-hand sides.
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For sufficient completeness and equational freeness of constructors mod-
ulo, the following is the output of the mechanical proof:
Maude> (scc ABP-STATE .)
rewrites: 3285 in 7ms cpu (8ms real) (410676 rewrites/second)
Sufficient completeness check for ABP-STATE
Completeness counter-examples: none were found
Freeness counter-examples: none were found
B.3 abp.preds.maude
This section contains the Maude specification of the state predicates, with
the additional lemmata.
----- predicate defining initial states
fmod ABP-PRED-INIT is
pr ABP-STATE .
--- initial states
op init : Sys -> [Bool] .
eq [init-1] :
init( 0 : on > nil | nil < on : nil)
= true .
eq [init-2] :
init( 0 : off > nil | nil < off : nil)
= true .
endfm
---- strengthening
fmod ABP-PRED-GOOD-QUEUES is
pr ABP-STATE .
vars B1 B2 B : Bit .
var BP : BitPacket .
var BPQ : BitPacketQueue .
var BQ : BitQueue .
vars N N’ : iNat .
var NL : iNatList .
op good-queues : Sys -> Bool .
eq [good-queues-1a] :
good-queues(N : on > BPQ | BQ < on : NL)
= all-bits(BQ,on) and good-packet-queue(BPQ,on,N) .
eq [good-queues-1b] :
good-queues(N : off > BPQ | BQ < off : NL)
= all-bits(BQ,off) and good-packet-queue(BPQ,off,N) .
eq [good-queues-2a] :
good-queues(N : on > BPQ | BQ < off : NL)
= good-bit-queue(BQ,off) and all-packets(BPQ,on,N) .
eq [good-queues-2b] :
good-queues(N : off > BPQ | BQ < on : NL)
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= good-bit-queue(BQ,on) and all-packets(BPQ,off,N) .
-------------------------------------------------
--- auxiliary functions for the queue of bits ---
-------------------------------------------------
op good-bit-queue : BitQueue Bit -> Bool .
eq [gbq-1] :
good-bit-queue(nil,B)
= true .
ceq [gbq-2] :
good-bit-queue(B1 BQ, B)
= good-bit-queue(BQ,B)
if B1 = flip(B) .
eq [gbq-3] :
good-bit-queue(B BQ, B)
= all-bits(BQ,B) .
op all-bits : BitQueue Bit -> Bool .
eq [ab-1] :
all-bits((nil).BitQueue,B)
= true .
eq [ab-2] :
all-bits(B1 BQ,B)
= B1 ~ B and all-bits(BQ,B) .
----------------------------------------------------
--- auxiliary functions for the queue of packets ---
----------------------------------------------------
op good-packet-queue : BitPacketQueue Bit iNat -> Bool .
eq [gpq-1] :
good-packet-queue(nil,B,N)
= true .
ceq [gpq-2] :
good-packet-queue((B1,N’) BPQ,B,N)
= N ~ s(N’) and good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,N)
if B1 = flip(B) .
eq [gpq-3] :
good-packet-queue((B,N’) BPQ,B,N)
= N ~ N’ and all-packets(BPQ,B,N) .
op all-packets : BitPacketQueue Bit iNat -> Bool .
eq [ap-1] :
all-packets((nil).BitPacketQueue,B,N)
= true .
eq [ap-2] :
all-packets(BP BPQ,B,N)
= BP ~ (B,N) and all-packets(BPQ,B,N) .
endfm
---- lemmata for strengthening
fmod ABP-PRED-GOOD-QUEUES-LEMMATA is
pr ABP-PRED-GOOD-QUEUES .
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vars B1 B2 B : Bit .
var BP : BitPacket .
var BPQ : BitPacketQueue .
var BQ : BitQueue .
vars N N’ : iNat .
var NL : iNatList .
------------------------
--- auxiliary lemmas ---
------------------------
--- queues of bits
eq [lem-bq1] :
good-bit-queue(B B BQ,B1)
= good-bit-queue(B BQ,B1) .
eq [lem-bq2] :
all-bits(BQ ; (B nil),B)
= all-bits(BQ,B) .
eq [lem-bq3] :
good-bit-queue(BQ ; (B nil),B)
= good-bit-queue(BQ,B) .
ceq [lem-bq4] :
good-bit-queue(BQ,B)
= true
if all-bits(BQ,B) = true .
ceq [lem-bq5] :
good-bit-queue(BQ,B)
= true
if all-bits(BQ,flip(B)) = true .
--- queues of packets
eq [lem-pq1] :
good-packet-queue(BP BP BPQ,B,N)
= good-packet-queue(BP BPQ,B,N) .
eq [lem-pq2] :
all-packets(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)
= all-packets(BPQ,B,N) .
eq [lem-pq3] :
good-packet-queue(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)
= good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,N) .
ceq [lem-pq4] :
good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,N)
= true
if all-packets(BPQ,B,N) .
ceq [lem-pq5] :
good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,s(N))
= true
if all-packets(BPQ,flip(B),N) = true .
endfm
---- main invariant
fmod ABP-PRED-INV is
pr ABP-STATE .
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vars B1 B2 B : Bit .
var BPQ : BitPacketQueue .
var BQ : BitQueue .
vars N N’ : iNat .
var NL : iNatList .
--- main invariant
op inv : Sys -> Bool .
eq [inv-1a] :
inv(N : on > BPQ | BQ < on : NL)
= (N NL) ~ gen-list(N) .
eq [inv-1a] :
inv(N : off > BPQ | BQ < off : NL)
= (N NL) ~ gen-list(N) .
eq [inv-2a] :
inv(N : on > BPQ | BQ < off : NL)
= NL ~ gen-list(N) .
eq [inv-2a] :
inv(N : off > BPQ | BQ < on : NL)
= NL ~ gen-list(N) .
--- less fine-grained invariant
op inv-main : Sys -> Bool .
eq [inv-main-1] :
inv-main(N : B > BPQ | BQ < B : NL)
= (N NL) ~ gen-list(N) .
ceq [inv-main-2] :
inv-main(N : B1 > BPQ | BQ < B2 : NL)
= NL ~ gen-list(N)
if B1 ~ B2 = false .
-------------------------------------
--- auxiliary generation of lists ---
-------------------------------------
op gen-list : iNat -> iNatList .
eq gen-list(0)
= (0 nil) .
eq gen-list(s N)
= (s N) gen-list(N) .
endfm
---- all predicates
fmod ABP-PREDS is
pr ABP-PRED-INIT .
pr ABP-PRED-GOOD-QUEUES .
pr ABP-PRED-INV .
endfm
---- all predicates and lemmata
fmod ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA is
pr ABP-PREDS .
pr ABP-PRED-GOOD-QUEUES-LEMMATA .
endfm
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B.4 ABP-PREDS is Admissible
This section presents the mechanical proofs for the admissibility of module
ABP-PREDS.
For ground sort-decreasingness, operational termination, confluence, and
coherence, the following is the output of the mechanical proofs:
Maude> (ccr ABP-PREDS .)
rewrites: 13992680 in 9647ms cpu (9649ms real) (1450389 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser check for ABP-PREDS
The following critical pairs must be proved joinable:
ccp ABP-PREDS1614 for gbq-3 and gbq-2
all-bits(BQ:BitQueue,B1:Bit)
= good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B1:Bit)
if B1:Bit = flip(B1:Bit).
ccp ABP-PREDS1617 for gpq-3 and gpq-2
N:iNat ~ N’:iNat and all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B1:Bit,N:iNat)
= N:iNat ~ s N’:iNat and
good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B1:Bit,N:iNat)
if B1:Bit = flip(B1:Bit).
The module is sort-decreasing.
Maude> (ctf ABP-PREDS .)
rewrites: 209594 in 378ms cpu (3363ms real) (553101 rewrites/second)
Success: The functional part of module ABP-PREDS is terminating.
Maude> (cch ABP-PREDS .)
rewrites: 157674 in 227ms cpu (227ms real) (691658 rewrites/second)
Coherence checking of ABP-PREDS
All critical pairs have been rewritten and no rewrite with rules can happen
at non-overlapping positions of equations left-hand sides.
The ground confluence check for ABP-PREDS returns two critical pairs.
These critical pairs are joinable because their conditions are trivially unfea-
sible. Therefore ABP-PREDS is admissible.
B.5 ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA is Admissible
This section presents the mechanical proofs for the admissibility of module
ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA.
For ground sort-decreasingness, operational termination, confluence, and
coherence, the following is the output of the mechanical proofs:
Maude> (ccr ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA .)
rewrites: 19037580 in 40313ms cpu (42315ms real) (472234 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser check for ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA
The following critical pairs must be proved joinable:
cp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA12
good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket(#2:BitPacketQueue ;
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(B:Bit,N:iNat)nil),B:Bit,N:iNat)
= good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat).
cp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA9
good-bit-queue(#1:Bit(#2:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil),B:Bit)
= good-bit-queue(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit).
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1632 for lem-bq3 and lem-bq4
good-bit-queue(#1:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
if all-bits(#1:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil,B:Bit)= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1633 for lem-bq3 and lem-bq5
good-bit-queue(#1:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
if all-bits(#1:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil,flip(B:Bit))= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1636 for gbq-3 and lem-bq4
all-bits(#2:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
if all-bits(B:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1638 for gbq-3 and gbq-2
all-bits(BQ:BitQueue,B1:Bit)
= good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B1:Bit)
if B1:Bit = flip(B1:Bit).
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1641 for lem-bq1 and lem-bq4
good-bit-queue(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
if all-bits(#1:Bit #1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1648 for lem-pq3 and lem-pq4
good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets(#1:BitPacketQueue ;(B:Bit,N:iNat)nil,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1649 for lem-pq3 and lem-pq5
good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets(#1:BitPacketQueue ;
(B:Bit,s N:iNat)nil,flip(B:Bit),N:iNat)
= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1652 for lem-pq1 and lem-pq4
good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets(#1:BitPacket #1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1657 for gpq-3 and lem-pq4
N:iNat ~ #2:iNat and all-packets(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets((B:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1659 for gpq-3 and gpq-2
N:iNat ~ N’:iNat and all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B1:Bit,N:iNat)
= N:iNat ~ s N’:iNat and good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B1:Bit,N:iNat)
if B1:Bit = flip(B1:Bit).
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1679 for lem-bq4 and gbq-2
true
= good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit)
if B1:Bit = flip(B:Bit)/\ all-bits(B1:Bit BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit)= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1689 for gbq-2 and lem-bq4
good-bit-queue(#2:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
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if all-bits(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)= true /\ #1:Bit = flip(B:Bit).
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1698 for lem-pq4 and gpq-2
true
= N:iNat ~ s N’:iNat and good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
if B1:Bit = flip(B:Bit)
/\ all-packets((B1:Bit,N’:iNat)BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1705 for lem-pq5 and gpq-2
true
= N’:iNat ~ #3:iNat and good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s #3:iNat)
if B1:Bit = flip(B:Bit)
/\ all-packets((B1:Bit,N’:iNat)BPQ:BitPacketQueue,flip(B:Bit),#3:iNat)= true .
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1708 for gpq-2 and lem-pq4
N:iNat ~ s #2:iNat and good-packet-queue(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets((#1:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true
/\ #1:Bit = flip(B:Bit).
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1709 for gpq-2 and lem-pq5
N:iNat ~ #2:iNat and good-packet-queue(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets((#1:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,flip(B:Bit),N:iNat)= true
/\ #1:Bit = flip(B:Bit).
The module is sort-decreasing.
Maude> (ctf ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA .)
rewrites: 258798 in 493ms cpu (3631ms real) (523962 rewrites/second)
Success: The functional part of module ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA is terminating.
Maude> (cch ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA .)
rewrites: 205927 in 291ms cpu (291ms real) (705335 rewrites/second)
Coherence checking of ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA
All critical pairs have been rewritten and no rewrite with rules can happen
at non-overlapping positions of equations left-hand sides.
The ground confluence check returns 18 critical pairs. These critical pairs
can be shown joinable by the admissible ABP-PREDS module, that is, these
proof obligations are inductive equational properties of ABP-PREDS. The cor-
responding ITP proof script is shown below:
---(
cp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA12
good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket(#2:BitPacketQueue ;(B:Bit,N:iNat)nil),B:Bit,N:iNat)
= good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat).
)
---- assume lemmas lem-pq2 and lem-pq3 previously proved in abp.lemmata.itp
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA12 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #1:BitPacket ; #2:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
((all-packets(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)) = (all-packets(BPQ,B,N)))) &
(A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(((good-packet-queue(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)) = (good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,N)))))
=>
(good-packet-queue(
#1:BitPacket(#2:BitPacketQueue ;(B:Bit,N:iNat)nil),B:Bit,N:iNat))
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= (good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat))
)
.)
(cov on good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .)
(ind on V0#1:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#3:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#3:Bit .)
---(
cp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA9
good-bit-queue(#1:Bit(#2:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil),B:Bit)
= good-bit-queue(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit).
)
---- assume lemmas lem-bq2 and lem-bq3 previously proved in abp.lemmata.itp
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA9 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #1:Bit ; #2:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(
(A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit } ((all-bits(BQ ; (B nil),B)) = (all-bits(BQ,B)))) &
(A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(((good-bit-queue(BQ ; (B nil),B)) = (good-bit-queue(BQ,B)))))
=>
(good-bit-queue(#1:Bit(#2:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil),B:Bit))
= (good-bit-queue(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit))
)
.)
(ind on B:Bit .)
(ind* on #1:Bit .)
(ind* on #1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1632 for lem-bq3 and lem-bq4
good-bit-queue(#1:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
if all-bits(#1:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil,B:Bit)= true .
)
---- assume lemmas lem-bq2 previously proved in abp.lemmata.itp
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1632 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #1:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(
(A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit } ((all-bits(BQ ; (B nil),B)) = (all-bits(BQ,B)))) &
(all-bits(#1:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil,B:Bit)) = (true)
=>
(good-bit-queue(#1:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
)
.)
(cov on good-bit-queue(#1:BitQueue,B:Bit) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1633 for lem-bq3 and lem-bq5
good-bit-queue(#1:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
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if all-bits(#1:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil,flip(B:Bit))= true .
)
---- assume lemmas lem-bq2 previously proved in abp.lemmata.itp
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1633 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #1:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(
(A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit } ((all-bits(BQ ; (B nil),B)) = (all-bits(BQ,B)))) &
(all-bits(#1:BitQueue ; B:Bit nil,flip(B:Bit))) = (true)
=>
(good-bit-queue(#1:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
)
.)
(lem aux : (A{ BQ:BitQueue } ((all-bits(BQ ; (on nil),off)) = (false)) ) .)
(ind on BQ:BitQueue .)
(auto .)
(ind* on V0#0:Bit .)
(lem aux : (A{ BQ:BitQueue } ((all-bits(BQ ; (off nil),on)) = (false)) ) .)
(ind on BQ:BitQueue .)
(auto .)
(ind* on V0#0:Bit .)
(cov on good-bit-queue(#1:BitQueue,B:Bit) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1636 for gbq-3 and lem-bq4
all-bits(#2:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
if all-bits(B:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)= true .
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1636 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #2:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(
(all-bits(B:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
=>
(all-bits(#2:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
)
.)
(auto .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1638 for gbq-3 and gbq-2
all-bits(BQ:BitQueue,B1:Bit)
= good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B1:Bit)
if B1:Bit = flip(B1:Bit).
)
--- the equality enrichment predicate is used instead of equality;
--- the use of equality induces a loop in the rewriting process
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1638 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B1:Bit }
(
(B1:Bit ~ flip(B1:Bit)) = (true)
=>
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(good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B1:Bit)) = (all-bits(BQ:BitQueue,B1:Bit))
)
.)
(ind* on B1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1641 for lem-bq1 and lem-bq4
good-bit-queue(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
if all-bits(#1:Bit #1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)= true .
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1641 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #2:BitQueue ; #1:Bit ; B:Bit }
(
(all-bits(#1:Bit #1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
=>
(good-bit-queue(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
)
.)
(ind on B:Bit .)
(ind* on #1:Bit .)
(ind* on #1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1648 for lem-pq3 and lem-pq4
good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets(#1:BitPacketQueue ;(B:Bit,N:iNat)nil,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true .
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1648 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #1:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
((all-packets(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)) = (all-packets(BPQ,B,N)))) &
(all-packets(#1:BitPacketQueue ;(B:Bit,N:iNat)nil,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
=>
(good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
)
.)
---- assume lemma lem-pq2 previously proved in abp.lemmata.itp
(cov on good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1649 for lem-pq3 and lem-pq5
good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets(#1:BitPacketQueue ;(B:Bit,s N:iNat)nil,flip(B:Bit),N:iNat)= true .
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1649 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #1:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
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(A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
((all-packets(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)) = (all-packets(BPQ,B,N)))) &
(all-packets(#1:BitPacketQueue ;(B:Bit,s N:iNat)nil,flip(B:Bit),N:iNat)) = (true)
=>
(good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s N:iNat)) = (true)
)
.)
(lem aux : (A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; N:iNat ; N’:iNat }
((all-packets(BPQ ; ((on,N’) nil),off,N)) = (false)) ) .)
(ind on BPQ:BitPacketQueue .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:BitPacket .)
(ind* on V1#0:Bit .)
(lem aux : (A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; N:iNat ; N’:iNat }
((all-packets(BPQ ; ((off,N’) nil),on,N)) = (false)) ) .)
(ind on BPQ:BitPacketQueue .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:BitPacket .)
(ind* on V1#0:Bit .)
(cov on good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s N:iNat) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1652 for lem-pq1 and lem-pq4
good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets(#1:BitPacket #1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true .
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1652 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #1:BitPacket ; #2:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(all-packets(#1:BitPacket #1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
=>
(good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
)
.)
(cov on good-packet-queue(#1:BitPacket #2:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .)
(ind on V0#1:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#3:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#3:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1657 for gpq-3 and lem-pq4
N:iNat ~ #2:iNat and all-packets(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets((B:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true .
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1657 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #2:iNat ; #3:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(all-packets((B:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
=>
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(N:iNat ~ #2:iNat and all-packets(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
)
.)
(auto .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1659 for gpq-3 and gpq-2
N:iNat ~ N’:iNat and all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B1:Bit,N:iNat)
= N:iNat ~ s N’:iNat and good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B1:Bit,N:iNat)
if B1:Bit = flip(B1:Bit).
)
--- the equality enrichment predicate is used instead of equality;
--- the use of equality induces a loop in the rewriting process
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1659 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ N’:iNat ; BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B1:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(B1:Bit ~ flip(B1:Bit)) = (true)
=>
(N:iNat ~ N’:iNat and all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B1:Bit,N:iNat))
= (N:iNat ~ s N’:iNat and good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B1:Bit,N:iNat))
)
.)
(ind* on B1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1679 for lem-bq4 and gbq-2
true
= good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit)
if B1:Bit = flip(B:Bit)/\ all-bits(B1:Bit BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit)= true .
)
--- the equality enrichment predicate is used instead of equality;
--- the use of equality induces a loop in the rewriting process
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1679 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit ; B1:Bit }
(
(B1:Bit ~ flip(B:Bit)) = (true) &
(all-bits(B1:Bit BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
=>
(good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
)
.)
(ind on B:Bit .)
(ind* on B1:Bit .)
(ind* on B1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1689 for gbq-2 and lem-bq4
good-bit-queue(#2:BitQueue,B:Bit)
= true
if all-bits(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)= true /\ #1:Bit = flip(B:Bit).
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1689 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #2:BitQueue ; B:Bit ; #1:Bit }
(
(#1:Bit ~ flip(B:Bit)) = (true) &
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(all-bits(#1:Bit #2:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
=>
(good-bit-queue(#2:BitQueue,B:Bit)) = (true)
)
.)
(ind on B:Bit .)
(ind* on #1:Bit .)
(ind* on #1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1698 for lem-pq4 and gpq-2
true
= N:iNat ~ s N’:iNat and
good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
if B1:Bit = flip(B:Bit)
/\ all-packets((B1:Bit,N’:iNat)BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true .
)
--- the equality enrichment predicate is used instead of equality;
--- the use of equality induces a loop in the rewriting process
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1698 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; B1:Bit ; N:iNat ; N’:iNat }
(
(B1:Bit ~ flip(B:Bit)) = (true) &
(all-packets((B1:Bit,N’:iNat)BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
=>
(N:iNat ~ s N’:iNat and
good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
)
.)
(ind on B:Bit .)
(ind* on B1:Bit .)
(ind* on B1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1705 for lem-pq5 and gpq-2
true
= N’:iNat ~ #3:iNat and good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s #3:iNat)
if B1:Bit = flip(B:Bit)
/\ all-packets((B1:Bit,N’:iNat)BPQ:BitPacketQueue,flip(B:Bit),#3:iNat)= true .
)
--- the equality enrichment predicate is used instead of equality;
--- the use of equality induces a loop in the rewriting process
---- assume lemma lem-pq5 previously proved in abp.lemmata.itp
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1705 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; B1:Bit ; #3:iNat ; N’:iNat }
(
(B1:Bit ~ flip(B:Bit)) = (true) &
(all-packets((B1:Bit,N’:iNat)BPQ:BitPacketQueue,flip(B:Bit),#3:iNat)) = (true) &
(A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
( (all-packets(BPQ,flip(B),N)) = (true) => (good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,s(N)))
= (true) ))
=>
(N’:iNat ~ #3:iNat and good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s #3:iNat))
= (true)
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).)
(auto .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1708 for gpq-2 and lem-pq4
N:iNat ~ s #2:iNat and good-packet-queue(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets((#1:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)= true
/\ #1:Bit = flip(B:Bit).
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1708 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #3:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; #1:Bit ; #2:iNat ; N:iNat }
(
(#1:Bit ~ flip(B:Bit)) = (true) &
(all-packets((#1:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
=>
(N:iNat ~ s #2:iNat and
good-packet-queue(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat)) = (true)
)
.)
(ind on B:Bit .)
(ind* on #1:Bit .)
(ind* on #1:Bit .)
---(
ccp ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1709 for gpq-2 and lem-pq5
N:iNat ~ #2:iNat and good-packet-queue(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s N:iNat)
= true
if all-packets((#1:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,flip(B:Bit),N:iNat)= true
/\ #1:Bit = flip(B:Bit).
)
(goal ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA1709 : ABP-PREDS |-
A{ #3:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; #1:Bit ; #2:iNat ; N:iNat }
(
(#1:Bit ~ flip(B:Bit)) = (true) &
(all-packets((#1:Bit,#2:iNat)#3:BitPacketQueue,flip(B:Bit),N:iNat)) = (true) &
(A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat } ( (all-packets(BPQ,flip(B),N)) = (true)
=> (good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,s(N))) = (true) ))
=>
(N:iNat ~ #2:iNat and
good-packet-queue(#3:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s N:iNat)) = (true)
)
.)
(auto .)
Therefore ABP-PREDS+LEMMATA is admissible.
B.6 ITP Proof Scripts for Proof Obligations
This section contains the ITP proof scripts for completing the proof of
good-queues ∧ inv ⇒ ©inv. This script and the output are available
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in the abp.itp file.
---(
8. from inv-1a & recv-2b : pending
gen-list(#5:iNat)~(#6:iNat #9:iNatList) = true
if #5:iNat = #6:iNat
/\ all-bits(#8:BitQueue,off) = true
/\ all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,off,#5:iNat) = true
/\ gen-list(#5:iNat) = #5:iNat #9:iNatList .
)
(goal po8 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ #5:iNat ; #6:iNat ; #9:iNatList ;
#8:BitQueue ; #7:BitPacketQueue }
(
(#5:iNat) = (#6:iNat) &
(all-bits(#8:BitQueue,off)) = (true) &
(all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,off,#5:iNat)) = (true) &
(gen-list(#5:iNat)) = (#5:iNat #9:iNatList)
=>
(gen-list(#5:iNat) ~ (#6:iNat #9:iNatList)) = (true)
)
.)
(auto .)
---(
46. from inv-1a & recv-2a : pending
gen-list(#5:iNat)~(#6:iNat #9:iNatList) = true
if #5:iNat = #6:iNat
/\ all-bits(#8:BitQueue,on) = true
/\ all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,on,#5:iNat) = true
/\ gen-list(#5:iNat) = #5:iNat #9:iNatList .
)
(goal po46 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ #5:iNat ; #6:iNat ; #9:iNatList ;
#8:BitQueue ; #7:BitPacketQueue }
(
(#5:iNat) = (#6:iNat) &
(all-bits(#8:BitQueue,on)) = (true) &
(all-packets(#7:BitPacketQueue,on,#5:iNat)) = (true) &
(gen-list(#5:iNat)) = (#5:iNat #9:iNatList)
=>
(gen-list(#5:iNat) ~ (#6:iNat #9:iNatList)) = (true)
)
.)
(auto .)
B.7 ITP Proof Scripts for Lemmata
This section contains the ITP proof scripts for inductively proving in ABP-PREDS
that the lemmata used in the ground stability proof of good-queues is in-
deed true. This script and the output are available in the abp.lemmata.itp
file.
---(
eq [lem-bq1] :
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good-bit-queue(B B BQ,B1)
= good-bit-queue(B BQ,B1) .
)
(goal lem-bq1 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ B:Bit ; BQ:BitQueue ; B1:Bit }
(
(good-bit-queue(B B BQ,B1)) = (good-bit-queue(B BQ,B1))
)
.)
(ind on B1:Bit .)
(ind* on B:Bit .)
(ind* on B:Bit .)
---(
eq [lem-bq2] :
all-bits(BQ ; (B nil),B)
= all-bits(BQ,B) .
)
(goal lem-bq2 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(
(all-bits(BQ ; (B nil),B)) = (all-bits(BQ,B))
)
.)
(ind* on BQ:BitQueue .)
---(
eq [lem-bq3] :
good-bit-queue(BQ ; (B nil),B)
= good-bit-queue(BQ,B) .
)
(goal lem-bq3 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(
(good-bit-queue(BQ ; (B nil),B)) = (good-bit-queue(BQ,B))
)
.)
(lem aux : (A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
((all-bits(BQ ; (B nil),B)) = (all-bits(BQ,B))) ) .)
(ind* on BQ:BitQueue .)
(cov on good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
---(
ceq [lem-bq4] :
good-bit-queue(BQ,B)
= true
if all-bits(BQ,B) = true .
)
(goal lem-bq4 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(
(all-bits(BQ,B)) = (true)
=>
(good-bit-queue(BQ,B)) = (true)
)
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.)
(eq-split on good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
---(
ceq [lem-bq5] :
good-bit-queue(BQ,B)
= true
if all-bits(BQ,flip(B)) = true .
)
(goal lem-bq5 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BQ:BitQueue ; B:Bit }
(
(all-bits(BQ,flip(B))) = (true)
=>
(good-bit-queue(BQ,B)) = (true)
)
.)
(cov on good-bit-queue(BQ:BitQueue,B:Bit) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#1:Bit .)
---(
eq [lem-pq1] :
good-packet-queue(BP BP BPQ,B,N)
= good-packet-queue(BP BPQ,B,N) .
)
(goal lem-pq1 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ;
BP:BitPacket ; N:iNat }
(
(good-packet-queue(BP BP BPQ,B,N)) = (good-packet-queue(BP BPQ,B,N))
)
.)
(eq-split on good-packet-queue(BP:BitPacket BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#3:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#3:Bit .)
---(
eq [lem-pq2] :
all-packets(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)
= all-packets(BPQ,B,N) .
)
(goal lem-pq2 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(all-packets(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)) = (all-packets(BPQ,B,N))
)
.)
(cov* on all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .)
---(
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eq [lem-pq3] :
good-packet-queue(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)
= good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,N) .
)
(goal lem-pq3 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(good-packet-queue(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)) = (good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,N))
)
.)
(lem aux : (A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
((all-packets(BPQ ; (B,N) nil,B,N)) = (all-packets(BPQ,B,N))) ) .)
(cov* on all-packets(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .)
(cov on good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
---(
ceq [lem-pq4] :
good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,N)
= true
if all-packets(BPQ,B,N) .
)
(goal lem-pq4 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(all-packets(BPQ,B,N)) = (true)
=>
(good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,N)) = (true)
)
.)
(cov on good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,N:iNat) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
---(
ceq [lem-pq5] :
good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,s(N))
= true
if all-packets(BPQ,flip(B),N) = true .
)
(goal lem-pq5 : ABP-PREDS |- A{ BPQ:BitPacketQueue ; B:Bit ; N:iNat }
(
(all-packets(BPQ,flip(B),N)) = (true)
=>
(good-packet-queue(BPQ,B,s(N))) = (true)
)
.)
(cov on good-packet-queue(BPQ:BitPacketQueue,B:Bit,s N:iNat) .)
(auto .)
(ind on V0#0:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
(ind* on V0#2:Bit .)
173
APPENDIX C
MISSING PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 6
This appendix documents the module structure of the IBOS specification
and that of its predicates in Section 6; it also includes a proof of their
admissibility.
The IBOS specification can be found in ibos.maude and the predicate
specification in ibos.preds.maude, both available for download with this
dissertation. The mechanical proofs were obtained with the tools integrated
in the current version of the Maude Formal Environment (MFE) [36, 35].
C.1 Module Structure of ibos.maude
File ibos.maude comprises the Maude specification of the IBOS containing
more than 1000 lines of code. This section describes the module structure
of the specification, which is depicted in Figure C.1.
Modules BOOL-OPS and CONFIGURATION come from Maude’s prelude. Nat-
ural numbers with their equality enrichment are defined in module INAT.
Module SYSCALL-TYPE defines the constants modeling the different types
of system calls available in the model. Labels, defined in module LABEL
comprise constants such as about-blank and url(iN:iNat) for identify-
ing web site labels. Module MSG-TYPE defines different types of messages
such as MSG-NEW-URL or MSG-RETURN-URL, but not all of them are necessary
for the formal verification. Module PROC-ID defines the infrastructure used
for identifying processes either with a natural number N:iNat or a tuple
id(N:iNat). The top sort Sys of the specification is defined in module
SYS. The payload associated to messages resulting from process interac-
tion is modeled in module PAYLOAD. Module MSG-PIPE-BASICS defines the
attributes for pipe objects, while modules WEBAPPMGR and NETWORK define
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KERNEL-POLICY
OO
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77
NETWORK
ff
MSG-PIPE-BASICS
gg 88
PAYLOAD
OO
LABEL
77
MSG-TYPE
OO
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ff
SYS
XX
SYSCALL-TYPE
<<
INAT
gg OO 88
CONFIGURATION
ee OO
BOOL-OPS
kk OO 44
Figure C.1: Module inclusion in ibos.maude.
predicates for checking if a process is a web application or a network pro-
cess, respectively. The object attributes for the kernel object are specified
in module KERNEL-POLICY, together with auxiliary data types such as the
policy multiset. All rewrite rules of the IBOS specification are contained in
module KERNEL, which is the main module of the specification.
C.2 IBOS Admissibility and Free Constructors Modulo
This section presents the mechanical proofs for the admissibility of module
IBOS and for the equational freeness of its subsignature of constructors.
A mechanical proof for ground operational termination could not be ob-
tained automatically because of current limitations of the MTT tool. How-
ever, it is easy to see by inspection on the equations that the specification
is ground operationally terminating. For ground sort-decreasingness, con-
fluence, and coherence, the following is the output of the mechanical proof:
Maude> (ccr KERNEL .)
rewrites: 15472344 in 45954ms cpu (45950ms real) (336685 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser check for KERNEL
All critical pairs have been joined.
The specification is locally-confluent.
The module is sort-decreasing.
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Maude> (cch KERNEL .)
rewrites: 2188028 in 1470ms cpu (1470ms real) (1487669 rewrites/second)
Coherence checking of KERNEL
All critical pairs have been rewritten and no rewrite with rules can
happen at non-overlapping positions of equations left-hand sides.
For sufficient completeness and equational freeness of constructors mod-
ulo, the following is the output of the mechanical proof:
Maude> (scc KERNEL .)
rewrites: 1027061 in 1048ms cpu (1046ms real) (979958 rewrites/second)
Sufficient completeness check for KERNEL
Completeness counter-examples: none were found
Freeness counter-examples: none were found
C.3 ibos.preds.maude
This section contains the Maude specification of the state predicates.
---- predicate defining initial states
mod IBOS-PRED-INIT is
pr KERNEL .
op init : Sys -> [Bool] .
--- initial state
eq [init]:
init(
{ < 0 : nic | in(mtLL),out(mtLL) >
< id(1) : kernel |
msgPolicy(
policy(id(3), id(4), MSG-FETCH-URL),
policy(id(3), id(4), MSG-FETCH-URL-ABORT),
policy(id(3), id(6), MSG-DOM-COOKIE-SET),
policy(id(3), id(6), MSG-DOM-COOKIE-GET),
policy(id(3), id(11), MSG-UI-MSG),
policy(id(3), id(14), MSG-WRITE-FILE),
policy(id(3), id(14), MSG-READ-FILE),
policy(id(4), id(3), MSG-RETURN-URL),
policy(id(4), id(3), MSG-RETURN-URL-METADATA),
policy(id(4), id(6), MSG-COOKIE-SET),
policy(id(4), id(6), MSG-COOKIE-GET),
policy(id(6), id(3), MSG-DOM-COOKIE-GET-RETURN),
policy(id(6), id(4), MSG-COOKIE-GET-RETURN),
policy(id(11), id(3), MSG-NEW-URL),
policy(id(11), id(3), MSG-SWITCH-TAB),
policy(id(11), id(3), MSG-WEBAPP-MSG),
policy(id(14), id(3), MSG-READ-FILE-RETURN),
policy(id(14), id(11), MSG-DOWNLOAD-INFO)),
nextNetworkProc(256),
handledCurrently(none),
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weblabels(mtWPIS),
networklabels(mtNPIS),
displayedTopBar(about-blank) >
< id(2) : proc | nextWAN(1024) >
< id(2) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(5) : proc | none >
< id(5) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(6) : proc | none >
< id(6) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(7) : proc | none >
< id(7) : pipe | fromKernel(mt), toKernel(mt) >
< id(8) : proc | none >
< id(8) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(9) : proc | none >
< id(9) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(10) : proc | none >
< id(10) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(11) : proc | none >
< id(11) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(12) : proc | none >
< id(12) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(13) : proc | none >
< id(13) : pipe | fromKernel(mt),toKernel(mt) >
< id(15) : proc | activeWebapp(id(0)),
displayedContent(about-blank) > })
= true .
endm
---- unique kernel
mod IBOS-PRED-UNIQUE-KERNEL is
pr KERNEL .
var Att : AttributeSet .
vars Att1 Att2 : AttributeSet .
var C : Cid .
var Cnf : Configuration .
vars P P1 P2 : ProcId .
op unique-kernel : Sys -> [Bool] .
ceq [unique-kernel-0] :
unique-kernel( { Cnf } )
= false
if no-kernel(Cnf) .
eq [unique-kernel-1] :
unique-kernel( { < P : kernel | Att > Cnf } )
= no-kernel(Cnf) .
eq [unique-kernel-2] :
unique-kernel( { < P1 : kernel | Att1 >
< P2 : kernel | Att2 > Cnf } )
= false .
--- auxiliary function symbol
op no-kernel : Configuration -> Bool .
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eq no-kernel(none)
= true .
eq no-kernel(<> Cnf)
= no-kernel(Cnf) .
eq no-kernel( < P : C | Att > Cnf )
= not(C ~ kernel) and no-kernel(Cnf) .
endm
---- policy immutability
mod IBOS-PRED-IMMUTABLE-POLICY is
pr KERNEL .
op immutable-policy : Sys PolicySet -> [Bool] .
op init-policy : -> PolicySet .
eq init-policy
= ( policy(id(3), id(4), MSG-FETCH-URL),
policy(id(3), id(4), MSG-FETCH-URL-ABORT),
policy(id(3), id(6), MSG-DOM-COOKIE-SET),
policy(id(3), id(6), MSG-DOM-COOKIE-GET),
policy(id(3), id(11), MSG-UI-MSG),
policy(id(3), id(14), MSG-WRITE-FILE),
policy(id(3), id(14), MSG-READ-FILE),
policy(id(4), id(3), MSG-RETURN-URL),
policy(id(4), id(3), MSG-RETURN-URL-METADATA),
policy(id(4), id(6), MSG-COOKIE-SET),
policy(id(4), id(6), MSG-COOKIE-GET),
policy(id(6), id(3), MSG-DOM-COOKIE-GET-RETURN),
policy(id(6), id(4), MSG-COOKIE-GET-RETURN),
policy(id(11), id(3), MSG-NEW-URL),
policy(id(11), id(3), MSG-SWITCH-TAB),
policy(id(11), id(3), MSG-WEBAPP-MSG),
policy(id(14), id(3), MSG-READ-FILE-RETURN),
policy(id(14), id(11), MSG-DOWNLOAD-INFO)) .
var Att : AttributeSet .
var Cnf : Configuration .
var PS : PolicySet .
eq [immutable-policy]:
immutable-policy({ < id(1) : kernel | msgPolicy(PS), Att >
Cnf }, PS)
= unique-kernel({ < id(1) : kernel | msgPolicy(PS), Att >
Cnf } ) .
endm
---- all predicates
mod IBOS-PREDS is
pr IBOS-PRED-INIT .
pr IBOS-PRED-UNIQUE-KERNEL .
pr IBOS-PRED-IMMUTABLE-POLICY .
endm
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C.4 IBOS-PREDS is Admissible
This section presents the mechanical proofs for the admissibility of module
IBOS-PREDS.
A mechanical proof for ground operational termination could not be ob-
tained automatically because of current limitations of the MTT tool. How-
ever, it is easy to see by inspection on the equations that the specification
is ground operationally terminating. For ground sort-decreasingness, con-
fluence, and coherence, the following is the output of the mechanical proof:
Maude> (ccr IBOS-PREDS .)
rewrites: 17325456 in 198165253ms cpu (198213314ms real) (87 rewrites/second)
Church-Rosser check for IBOS-PREDS
All critical pairs have been joined.
The specification is locally-confluent.
The module is sort-decreasing.
Maude> (cch IBOS-PREDS .)
rewrites: 18767431 in 220183279ms cpu (230455430ms real) (85 rewrites/second)
Coherence checking of IBOS-PREDS
All critical pairs have been rewritten and no rewrite with rules can happen
at non-overlapping positions of equations left-hand sides.
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